AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT AND SETTLER COLONIALISM: FOOD SOVEREIGNTY AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO NEOLIBERALISM IN PALESTINE

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Abstract (English)
Although historically a predominantly agricultural society, the agricultural sector in Palestine has fallen into steep decline. The control by Israel of Palestine’s agricultural sector is of vital importance to Israel’s settler colonial project. In this regard, the neoliberal development of the Palestinian agricultural sector does not represent a break with the past, but should rather be seen as an intertwined structure of settler colonialism. The first part of this article will discuss the role of agriculture to Israel’s settler colonial project. Several policies of Israel that aim to eliminate the Palestinian farmer will be discussed. The second part of this article will turn to the neoliberalisation of the Palestinian agricultural sector. This article will show that the outcomes of the neoliberal development agenda has outcomes for the Palestinian agricultural sector that are in line with settler colonialism. The final part of this article will turn to the question how an alternative model of agricultural development in Palestine could look like. This article will look at the strengths of the Indigenous Food Sovereignty Framework to challenge the issues related to settler colonialism and neoliberalism discussed throughout the paper. The aim of this article is to bring a theoretical contribution to the literature on decolonization and development in Palestine. To achieve this goal, this article mainly draws on the literature on settler colonialism, agricultural development, and food sovereignty.

Abstract (Nederlands)
Alhoewel Palestina historisch gezien voornamelijk een agrarische maatschappij was, is de Palestijnse agrarische sector stevig aan het vervallen. Israelische controle over de Palestijnse agrarische sector is essentieel voor het slagen van Israels ‘settler-colonial’ project. In dit opzicht moet de recentelijke neoliberalisatie van de Palestijnse agrarische sector niet gezien worden als het breken van het verleden, maar als een structuur verweven in settler-colonialism. Het eerste gedeelte van dit artikel bespreekt de rol van landbouw in Israels settler-colonial project. Verschillende beleidsinterventies van Israël zullen besproken worden die tot doel hebben de Palestijnse boer te elimineren. Het tweede gedeelte bespreekt de neoliberalisatie van de Palestijnse agrarische sector. Zoals dit artikel zal bespreken komen de doelen van deze neoliberale ontwikkelingsagenda overeen met de doelen van Israels settler-colonial project. Het laatste gedeelte van dit artikel bespreekt hoe een mogelijk alternatief model van agrarische ontwikkeling
in Palestina eruit zou kunnen zien. Dit artikel kijkt specifiek naar het Indigenous Food Sovereignty framework en bespreekt het potentieel van dit framework om settler colonialism en neoliberale ontwikkeling uit te dagen. Het doel van dit artikel is om een bijdrage te leveren aan de literatuur over de-olonisatie en ontwikkeling in Palestina. Om dit doel te bereiken maakt dit artikel gebruik van de literatuur over settler-colonialism, agrarische ontwikkeling en voedsel soevereiniteit.

Introduction and literature review
The colonization and occupation of Palestine has caused the local Palestinian agricultural sector to fall into steep decline. Policies of land confiscation, the control over resources and the uprooting of olive trees result in the growing decline of the agricultural sector. Although Palestine was historically predominantly an agricultural community, and agriculture is still deeply rooted in the national consciousness, less and less people can rely on agriculture for their livelihoods. Whereas in 2006 12.6% of the males and 35.1% of the women were employed in the agricultural sector, these numbers have even more declined due to restrictions imposed on the agricultural sector to 7% of the males and 9% of the women (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2016; Ministry of Agriculture, 2016). Although Palestine is one of the highest aid receivers worldwide, most development programs focus on providing food relief rather than development of the agricultural sector. The programs that do focus on the agricultural sector follow a neoliberal line of thought, and support the creation of an industrialized, export-driven agricultural sector. Farmers are turned into cheap unskilled labourers, and become dependent on Israel, as Israel controls the export market. Ironically, Palestine now produces for the export market while remaining dependent on foreign food aid. Farmers worldwide are facing the consequences of the neoliberalisation of the agricultural sector, and this has resulted in a peasant-driven movement that opposes the corporate food regime and prioritizes production for local markets and the community’s control over resources. This food sovereignty movement was initiated by the peasant organisation La Via Campesina and is now also gaining stronghold in Palestine. Palestinians throughout the West Bank and the Gaza strip establish farmer’s organisations, farming cooperatives and seedbanks, and advocate for food sovereignty for Palestinian farmers and changes to aid-giving practices and agricultural development programs.

Palestinian farmers are thus facing the consequences of the Israeli regime that tries to render their existence nearly impossible, and the consequences of neoliberal development programs that turn farmers into unskilled labourers. This article will discuss the importance of Israel’s strict control over the Palestinian agricultural sector for Israel’s settler colonial project and the consequences of the
neoliberalisation of what has remained of the Palestinian agricultural sector. I will argue that the neoliberalisation of the Palestinian agricultural sector does not represent a break with the past, but should be seen as part of the settler colonial project. The aim of this article is to show that settler colonialism and neoliberalism are interconnected structures, and that neoliberal development only strengthens settler colonial structures. This article will also engage with the question how an alternative agricultural development model should look like. I will look at the food sovereignty movement and ask the question whether this framework only offers an alternative to neoliberal development or if it also has the potential to unravel settler colonial structures? This article will end with a tentative alternative framework for agricultural development in Palestine based on Indigenous Food Sovereignty.

This article will use the settler colonial framework. Settler colonialism is a specific type of colonialism that tries to replace the existing population with a settler population (Wolfe, 2006). The settler colonial framework looks at settler colonialism not as an event that happened in the past but as an ongoing structure, and tries to unravel the underlying structures of settler colonialism. I will use this framework for two reasons. First of all, by looking at agriculture and agricultural development from the perspective of settler colonialism we will realise that settler colonialism is the root problem and not development itself. As will be discussed in this article scholars often take economic development as the end-goal, and not decolonization. The same can be said about many development programs; decolonization is not often mentioned with regard to development in Palestine. The settler colonial framework, on the other hand, takes decolonization as the end-goal and does accept the Israeli occupation as status quo. This article hopes to contribute to the literature on decolonization. Secondly, using the settler colonialism framework allows us to look beyond Palestinian exceptionalism (Collins, 2011; Salamanca, Qato, Rabie, & Samour, 2012; Veracini, 2013) and draw links between other settler colonial societies. Palestine is often treated as an exceptional case which has as a result that comparative studies are rare. The settler colonial framework allows us to draw on insights gained from other cases and unravel underlying structures of settler colonialism. Within indigenous studies, for example, there is a growing body of literature that presents a model of agricultural based on indigenous food sovereignty and discusses its potential for decolonization (Coté, 2016; Daigle, 2017; Grey & Patel, 2015; Kamal, Linklater, Thompson, & Dipple, 2015; Kepkiewicz et al., 2015; Kepkiewicz & Dale, 2018; Matties, 2016; 1 For notable exceptions see: Morgenson, S. L. (2013). Queer Settler Colonialism in Canada and Israel: Articulating Two-Spirit and Palestinian Queer Critiques. Settler Colonial Studies, 2(2), 167–190; Salaita, S. (2016). Inter/Nationalism: Decolonizing Native America and Palestine. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press; Tabar, L., & Desai, C. (2017). Decolonization is a global project: From Palestine to the Americas. Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education, & Society, 6(1), i–xix.


Whyte, 2016). This article will use insights from this literature to develop an argument on the food sovereignty framework and its potential to challenge neoliberal agricultural development and settler colonialism in Palestine.

As already mentioned, there are several studies that focus on the consequences of the Israeli occupation on the development of Palestine. These studies take development as the end-goal and discuss ways to make development aid more effective (see for example: Brynen, 2000; Sahliyeh, 1982). This literature takes conflict as an external factor and reveals little about the interaction between development aid and occupation. Rex Brynen, for example, discusses the shortcomings of donor assistance in Palestine as a result of the occupation, but concludes that without development aid there would not be a state of Palestine at all (Brynen, 2000). Recent literature on development in Palestine is more critical of development aid and describes how the neoliberalisation of the development sector actually undermines the development of Palestine. Adel Samara (2000) describes the PA’s adoption of neoliberal policies and argues that this kind of development does not serve the Palestinian population at all. Likewise, Raja Khalidi and Sobhi Samour (2011) describe how the PA’s statehood program follows a neoliberal line of thought and that this way of thinking ‘endangers the Palestinian national liberation agenda by errors both of commission and omission’ (Khalidi & Samour, 2011).

There is, however, also a growing body of literature that takes its critique on neoliberal development further and argues that neoliberal development programs are complicit in Israel’s colonial project (Hanieh, 2013a; Krieger, 2018; Turner, 2012; Wildeman & Tartir, 2014). Mandy Turner, for example, argues that neoliberal development programs led to inequality and poverty in Palestine and increased Palestine’s economic dependency on Israel. She concludes that neoliberal development legitimated Israel's control over Palestine as it is perceived by the international community as something positive. According to her colonialism is just as much a process of ‘exploitation/domination’ than of ‘development/modernisation’ (Turner, 2012). Likewise, Adam Hanieh, in his analysis of neoliberalism in Palestine, argues that neoliberalism enforces settler colonial structures. He focuses his analysis on labour and shows how the neoliberal logic in development programs turns Palestinians into cheap labourers and does not address the underlying structures of occupation at all (Hanieh, 2013).

While this literature shows that neoliberal development programs are complicit in Israel’s colonial project, it does not show how settler colonialism and neoliberalism are intersected and interwoven and re-enact each other. David Lloyd and Patrick Wolfe, on the other hand, look at neoliberal development from a settler colonial perspective and argue that neoliberalism should be understood as a continuation of the settler colonial project in the sense that both concepts can be seen as ways
to manage surplus populations. They explain that neoliberalism turns the Palestinian labour force into a largely unemployed surplus and thereby renders their existence obsolete, just like settler colonialism (Lloyd & Wolfe, 2016). In 2015 the Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung published a collection of articles on alternatives to neoliberal development in Palestine and here the authors likewise recognize the intersection of settler colonialism and neoliberal development. Linda Tabar and Omar Jabary Salamanca argue that development aid ‘not only became complicit in the Israel’s colonial project’, but also ‘subsidized the occupation, sustained and reproduces settler colonial structures of power and oppression’ (Tabar & Salamanca, 2015). The settler colonial framework reveals that neoliberal development not only works side by side with colonialism but that neoliberal development is an underlying structure of settler colonialism.

In light of this recent trend in the scholarship on development in Palestine, scholars are now looking for alternative modes of development in Palestine. In the 2015 volume of the Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung the writers look for alternatives to neoliberal development in Palestine that would assist Palestinians in their struggle against Israel’s enduring settler colonialism. What these alternative visions of development have in common is that they all centre on the notion of resistance. Furthermore, these scholars agree that economic life should be re-embedded in the social and political life, and that an alternative vision of development should tackle the fragmentation of Palestine imposed by occupation and neoliberal development (Burton, 2015; Haddad, 2015; Nagarajan, 2015; Tabar, 2015).

Other scholars focus on the concept of resistance economy as an alternative to neoliberal development. Tariq Dana’s take on alternative development is based on the concept of a ‘resistance economy’, which is a ‘counterhegemonic strategy that challenges the status quo’. According to Dana, bottom-up local initiatives are needed instead of a neoliberal top-down approach and interdependence and self-sufficiency should be the goal of these economic initiatives instead of economic growth (Dana, 2014). In line with the literature on resistance economies, the Journal für Entwicklungspolitik has devoted a volume to alternative development in Palestine. The articles in this volume deal with alternative development in response to neoliberal development and Israeli occupation and present an alternative model of development that is centred on agriculture cooperatives and the food sovereignty approach. These authors recognize the ‘power nexus’ of colonialism and neoliberalism and argue that agricultural cooperatives could resist neoliberal development and the occupation (Abdul Majeed, 2018; Krieger, 2018; Kuttab, 2018; Salzmann, 2018).

This article should be placed within the literature that recognizes the interconnectedness of settler colonialism and neoliberal development. This article will, however, focus specifically on the
agricultural sector. Farming and agricultural development in Palestine are still understudied. In the first part of this article I will argue that the destruction of the Palestinian agricultural sector is of vital importance to Israel’s settler colonial project. In this section I will introduce the concept of settler colonialism, discuss the role of agriculture in the settler colonial project, and discuss Israeli ways to control the Palestinian agricultural sector and force farmers to assimilate to settler colonial structures in. In the second section I will discuss how the neoliberal development logic became part of Israel’s settler colonial project and how neoliberal development works to further destroy the agricultural sector. Because agriculture is so important to the settler colonial project, agriculture should also be at the centre of alternative vision of development if such a vision were to contribute to the decolonizing struggle. The third sector will look at the food sovereignty framework and will discuss how indigenous studies have incorporated the framework in their decolonizing project. This article will end with a tentative framework of how an alternative model of agricultural development could look like.

**Settler Colonialism and Agriculture in Palestine**

Historically, Palestine used to be a predominantly agrarian society, which was characterized by subsistence production. This had drastically changed due to the settler colonial nature of the Zionist project in Palestine. Contrary to ‘regular’ colonialism, the object of settler colonialism is to settle permanently on the acquired land. The rationale behind the settler colonialism project is to completely leave behind one’s own homeland and create a new homeland. This new homeland not only refers to a geographical place, but also becomes associated with a new set of values and a newly defined past, present and future. A new story can only be defined if the old story of the land is erased from memory, from the living reality, and removed from a perspective of the future. This is clearly portrayed in the well-known Zionist slogan: ‘a land without people for a people without a land’. For settler colonialism to work, the native population, including the native’s history, tradition, and customs, have to be eliminated. Settler colonialism is therefore not an event, but a structure rooted in everyday life that will continue as long as the story of the Palestinians persists.

Settler colonial studies try to unravel the underlying structures of settler colonialism. As was mentioned in the introduction, the case of Palestine is often seen as an exception, and many scholars fail to refer to the settler colonial structure that guideline Israel’s occupation of Palestine and control everyday life of Palestinians. The settler colonial framework, however, is not new and already in the 1973 the French scholar Maxim Rodinson stated that it is only ‘an obvious diagnosis’ to call Israel a colonial state (Rodinson, 1973). Likewise Jamil Hilal argued around the same time that Israel is a settler colonial state and that Zionists strove ‘not to exploit the indigenous Palestinian
population but to displace it' (Hilal, 1974). Still, the settler colonial framework has largely fallen into disuse. Omar Jamary Salamanca et al. argue that this can partly be explained by looking at the dynamics of contemporary Palestinian politics and argue that Palestinian politics adapt to settler colonial structures and scholars therefore ‘tend to shy away from structural questions’ (Salamanca et al., 2012). In recent years the framework is making a comeback (Abdo & Yuval-Davis, 1995; Fiona Bateman & Pilkington, 2011; Collins, 2011; Makdisi, 2011; Salamanca et al., 2012; Tabar & Desai, 2017; Veracini, 2010, 2013), and many of these studies take Patrick Wolfe’s seminal piece on settler colonialism and ‘the elimination of the native’ as a starting point (Wolfe, 2006).

Wolfe centres his analysis of settler colonialism on what he calls ‘the logic of elimination’. This logic of elimination is not an event, but a structure rooted in all aspects of live in Palestine. There is both a negative and a positive dimension to the logic of elimination. Negatively, settler colonialism strives for the ‘dissolution’ of the native population. With this Wolfe means that settlers do not shy away from using violence to eliminate the native population. Positively, settler colonialism aims to create a new colonial society on the conquered land and in the positive sense the logic of elimination is applied through integration or assimilation of Indigenous people. Although “softer” than the negative dimension of the logic of elimination, the positive dimensions are not less eliminatory. Assimilation forces the indigenous people to give up on their shared past and customs and this eventually results in the elimination of the native (Wolfe, 2006).

Initially, the settler colonial projects starts off with the gradual control over land. Zionists bought pieces of land in Palestine and the territory they controlled gradually expanded. The expansion of the controlled territory is only possible if the settlers are able to maintain a self-sufficient way of life. This also explains the importance of agriculture to the settler colonial project. Wolfe has the following to say about agriculture: ‘In contrast to extractive industries, which rely on what just happens to be there, agriculture is a rational means/end calculus that is geared to vouchsafing its own reproduction, generating capital that projects into a future where it repeats itself’ (Wolfe, 2006). Agriculture not only ensures the self-sufficiency of the newly arrived settlers but also ensures that the settler population can continuously expand. For agriculture to flourish land is turned into a resource. A modernist property regime is applied that transforms land into a thing that can be owned, which includes mapping and recording of ownership. By making this land produce, the settler can justify its ownership of the land (Glenn, 2015). A civilization is created because, as Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang argue, civilization is defined ‘as the production in excess of the ‘natural’ world’. The settler turns his surroundings in a resources and lays claim over these resources and controls them (Tuck & Yang, 2012).
So what does this mean for the indigenous population? Can their agricultural sector be of any use to the settler colonial project? Just like agriculture means to the settler community that the community can maintain a self-sufficient way of life and expand its population, agriculture also ensures the livelihoods of the indigenous population. Agriculture connects people to their land and signifies independence and permanence. Especially this idea of permanence goes strongly against the settler colonial project of creating a new homeland (Wolfe, 2006). It is for this reason that settlers want to eliminate the indigenous farmers. Settlers want to make sure that they are the only population that can reap the benefits of the resources available and maintain a permanent connection to the land. The settler colonial project of eliminating the indigenous farmers often restores to the rhetoric of modernization. The indigenous farmer is presented in settler colonial discourse as backward, unsettled and unproductive. The settlers, on the other hand, introduce modernized, industrialized and efficient forms of agriculture that render the existence of a native agricultural sector unnecessary. Both negative and positive dimensions of the logic of elimination are at work here. Negative in the sense that the native population is forcibly removed from their land which is then turned into agricultural land. Negative also in the sense that Palestinians’ means of existence are destructed. Positively in the sense that farmers are forced to give up on their livelihoods and assimilate to the settler colonial agricultural society. Israel applies several policies that ensures the destruction of the Palestinian agricultural sector and the elimination of the Palestinian farmer. The Palestinian agricultural sector’s share of the GDP dropped from more than one third prior to 1967 to only 3.9 percent in 2014. Likewise, the agricultural sector’s share in the Palestinian labour force decreased from more than 32 percent in 1967 to less than 10 percent in 2015 (Awwad, 2016). Although scholarly research on the Palestinian agricultural sector is limited, several Palestinian organisations have published detailed reports on the weakening state of agricultural in Palestine as a result of the occupation. These studies mainly focus on land dispossession and the control of resources. A report by the MA’AN Development Center on ‘Farming the forbidden lands’ describes multiple Israeli means of land annexation and argues that these policies emphasise Israeli rural development ‘as a primary tool for territorial and resource colonisation’. These policies include the strategic zoning of land which means that as a result of land classification 70 percent of the land in Area C is unavailable to Palestinians. The strategic zoning of land furthermore has as a result that Palestinian farmers are prevented from accessing or cultivating their lands and that these lands becomes available to the benefit of the growing settler population.Ironically, this forces Palestinian farmers to give up on their livelihoods as farmers and start working as cheap labourers in the settlements. The policy of strategic zoning
result in the expulsion of Palestinian farmers from their land and forces them to assimilate to the settler colonial structure (MA’AN Development Center, 2014).

The farmers that do have access to their agricultural lands are put under enormous pressure to give up on their livelihoods as farmers. Another important policy used by the Israeli that results in the elimination of the native is Israel’s control over water resources. A report by Elizabeth Koek for al-Haq on the ‘discriminatory access and water-apartheid in the OPT’ shows that Israel has gained almost absolute control over water as a resource for the agricultural sector. According to Koek water is not and has not been scarce in Palestine, but Israeli policies create this scarcity by illegally laying claim on water supplies. In 1982 the Palestinian water infrastructure was transferred to Israel’s national water company Mekorot. As a result Palestinians have since then been dependent on Israel for their water supplies. Palestinian’s access to water is severely limited by Mekorot which has detrimental consequences for the Palestinian agricultural sector. In stark contrast to the Palestinian situation, the settlement plantations are flourishing and have plenty access to water (Koek, 2013). If we include agricultural usage, settler consumption of water is 18 times higher than a Palestinian usage of water in the West Bank. If Palestinians want to build a new water well they first have to apply for a permit, but these applications are often denied by Israel (MA’AN Development Center, 2014). The control of a vital resource such as water fits the settler colonial logic of elimination since control over a vital resource in a direct way means the control of the people that depend on the resource. The negative dimension of the logic of elimination is applied in the sense that Israel controls the population and its potential for growth. Positively, the control of water forces Palestinians to give up on their livelihoods as farmers, accept Israel as the provider of a vital resource, and assimilate to settler colonial society.

Although the Israeli policy of land control and resource annexation have a major impact on the agricultural sector we should remind ourselves that settler colonialism is not an event but a structure rooted in all aspects of daily life. This makes it difficult to fully grasp all the complex structures that are at play to ensure the expansion of the Israeli settler colonial project and the elimination of the native. Israeli policies that control the Palestinian agricultural sector are endless, and at the same time Israel has a wide range of practices that ensure the continuous expansion of the Israeli agricultural sector. Israel, for example, imposes restrictions on the import of products that are essential to farmers such as fertilizers, seeds, and agricultural equipment. Israel also controls the external borders of Palestine which means that Palestine cannot export its products without the permission of Israel and cannot import products without the permission of Israel (Awwad, 2016; Samara, 2000). Israel is very effective in the uprooting of olive trees, a national symbol of the Palestinians, and thereby effective at targeting the Palestinian identity (Braverman, 2009). Finally,
several instances have been reported of toxic waste dumping on Palestinian agricultural lands. This, combined with the sewage dumping on Palestinian grounds, means that the few lands that are available to Palestinian farmers become unusable and endanger the health of the Palestinian community. All these measures and policies show that the Palestinian agriculture is under full control of Israel and that Israel has the power to fully shot down the Palestinian agricultural sector (UNCTAD, 2015).

Settler Colonialism and Neoliberal Development

The destruction of the Palestinian agricultural sector is exemplary of the so-called ‘de-development’ (Roy, 1999) of Palestine. This has forced the international community to draw attention to the inhumane and deteriorating circumstances in the occupied territories. Palestine is one of the highest aid-recipients worldwide, and ironically receives donations from states and institutions that actually support the Israeli regime. Since the 1990s the development programs set up by the international community follow a neoliberal line of thought. The basic premise of neoliberal development is that unrestricted economic growth will bring prosperity to all. The economy is envisioned as disembedded from the social and the political, so the only factor that is taken into consideration in neoliberal thought is the level of restriction of the market. At the same time donors are seen as non-political entities. The neoliberal development model argues that governments should focus on privatization and deregulation to secure the freedom of the market. What does this neoliberal logic of development mean to Palestine? International development programs, steered by international financial institutions such as the World Bank and IMF, provide loans to the Palestinian Authority as long as the PA fulfils conditions such as deregulation and privatisation and support the creation of an export market. If we look at the agricultural sector this means that small-scale farmers have to make space for large-scale industrial agricultural projects and that the production for the local market has to make space for the production of luxury items for the export market. Moreover, these neoliberal development programs erase colonial relations of dominations from the development agenda. In other words, neoliberal development is successful in ‘depoliticizing’ development (Hanafi & Tabar, 2003).

A growing number of articles and books on development in Palestine discuss the negative consequences of the neoliberal development agenda to Palestine’s liberation struggle (Hanafi & Tabar, 2003; Hanieh, 2013a; Khalidi & Samour, 2011; Samara, 2000). The danger exists, however, that if we shift our focus too much on neoliberalism as a distinct phase in the political economy of Palestine we fail to understand the settler colonial structures of domination that shape neoliberal development. Neoliberalism development should not be seen as a policy implemented by the
Palestinian Authority’s elite nor as a development model imposed by the international community with the aim to foster global economic growth. Although neoliberalism refers to a distinct phase in global history with a corresponding reality, in the case of Palestine neoliberal development should rather be seen as a continuation of settler colonial structures of domination. As Linda Tabar and Omar Salamanca argue, ‘aid, development, and capitalism intersect, interact with and reinforce structures of power, and particularly Zionist settler colonial exploitation and subjugation’ (Tabar & Salamanca, 2015). If we look at agricultural development in this global period of neoliberalism, we see that the same settler colonial structures are at work that were discussed in the previous section. Ultimately, neoliberal development strengthens the development of a settler colonial state and follows the logic of elimination of the native.

Neoliberal development in Palestine took off after the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993. These are a set of agreements between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation organisation (PLO) and resulted in the creation of the Palestinian Authority, a Palestinian government with very limited powers. Although often framed as a peace process, Adam Hanieh shows that the signing of the Accords was mainly motivated by Israel’s and US’s wish to normalize trade relations with the Arab countries (Hanieh, 2013). The Oslo Accords formalized many of the policies discussed in the previous section that result in the elimination of the native Palestinian. The Accords divided the West Bank into Area A, B, and C which further increased the fragmentation of the Palestinians, enabled Israel to lay claim on Palestinian resources, resulted in Israel’s full control of the Palestinian economy and created an effective structure to control the Palestinian borders. In other words, the Oslo Accords enabled Israel to continue with its settler colonial project under the pretext of peace (Hanieh, 2013). More importantly, the Oslo Accords opened up relations with the international community. Israel created the perception that it would now be a partner of the PA and this opened up access to the international community and market. The Oslo Accords led to the international endorsement of Israel’s colonial project and opened the Palestinian economy to foreign intrusion. In a way Israel had made sure that the international community became even more complicit in the occupation of Palestine.

The World Bank, the IMF and the Ad Hoc Liason Committee (AHLC) were assigned the role of advisor to the PA and strongly influenced the economic direction the PA would take. The World Bank is also largely responsible for the allocation of donor funds. It therefore comes to no surprise that from the Oslo Accord onwards the PA adapted a neoliberal economic policy (Farsakh, 2008). The PA was severely restricted by the Oslo Accords and had therefore limited policy space to adapt to an alternative economic agenda. Neither could the international community have infiltrated Palestine’s public space to such a great extend if Israel had not allowed them to. Ultimately, many
of the implemented neoliberal policies resemble the goals of settler colonialism and are therefore a mere continuation of the settler colonial project. Broadly speaking this took place in three ways. First of all, security has always been high on the Israeli agenda. The creation of a settler colonial state and its gradual expansion could only take place if the native population was controlled and restricted in its freedoms. The neoliberal agenda of the donor community is an effective way to further control the Palestinian population. Neoliberal development places a lot of emphasis on ‘good governance’ to ensure that the market does not face any restrictions. Right after the instalment of the ad-Hoc Liaison Committee, the Coordinating Committee for International Assistance to the Palestinian People (COPP) was established. The primary goal of this committee was to establish a trained police force. ‘Good governance’ was furthermore enhanced by the EU Police Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Supprt (EUROL COPPS). Although often presented as state building mechanisms (Bouris, 2012; Kristoff, 2012) these projects ultimately have as a result that the Palestinian population can be controlled and governed (Nagarajan, 2015).

Secondly, a strong centralised Palestinian government is needed that could ensure the implementation of the agreements stipulated by the Oslo Accords. In line with the focus on a strong security apparatus, a stable government was needed that would leave no space for dissident voices. Although the original idea behind neoliberalism was that the role of the government in the economy and market should be restricted as much as possible, the so-called Post Washington Consensus that emerged at the end of the 1990s stresses the importance of accompanying market reform with institutional and legal reforms. According to this doctrine economic development should become less dependent on International Financial Institutes, and local government should now take the lead in freeing the market and creating the right incentives for a well-functioning market society (Haddad, 2015). The international community hoped that this process of state-building would create the right economic circumstances for profit seeking development programs. More importantly, however, the process of state-building in Palestine should be seen as a form of ‘political rent extraction’ (Haddad, 2015; Samara, 2000). Although bereft of any form of sovereignty at all, the state-building efforts of the international community aim to silence Palestinian national liberation demands. According to Toufic Haddad, Western government and IFIs are primarily investing in a political project: ‘securing the western ally of Israel, pacifying the rebellious Palestinian question and allowing for “business as usual” throughout the rest of the Arab world’ (Haddad, 2015). It is also for this reason that as long as the PA adheres to the outlines of the neoliberal agenda, the international community does not care much about corruption on the part of the PA. It is also for the same reason that the international community in its efforts to build a Palestinian state does not
address the Israeli occupation and Israeli settlements can expand and gradually take over native lands (Samara, 2000).

A third overlapping structure of settler colonialism and neoliberal development is the introduction of export-led growth as development indicator. The rationale behind this development theory is that a strong export market opens up access to the world market, increases economic growth and supports the development of a country. This rationale has led to the establishment of industrial zones and the introduction of luxury and cash-crops. These policies neglect small farmers and cooperative and undermines the agricultural production of goods for the local market. As a result, 57% of the Palestinian in Gaza is food insecure and 19% of the Palestinian population of the West Bank is food insecure. Food insecurity means that a population has limited or uncertain access to nutritionally adequate and safe foods. It is often assumed that food insecurity can be resolved by economic growth. A UNRWA press release on food insecurity in Palestine, for example, suggests that the high level of food insecurity is a result of negative economic growth and a decrease in funding of UN programmes (UNRWA, 2014). Such an approach, however, fails to take into account that only 1% of all funding to Palestine goes to the agricultural sector. Why provide food relief if that money could also go to Palestine’s farmers? It also fails to take into account the conscious effort of Israel to destruct the Palestinian agricultural sector and fails to take into account the consequences of the neoliberal development logic on the Palestinian agricultural sector. As George Kurzom puts it: ‘[t]he lack of food security means also a lack in national security, which cannot achieve when Israel and other external markets have control over whether we eat or starve’ (Kurzom, 2001). The conscious effort to make the Palestinians food insecure reflects the close connection between neoliberal development and the elimination of the native.

The international community, with its focus on neoliberal development, tries to foster the export market of Palestine. As a result, farmers are forced to no longer produce just for the local market, but to compete on the international market. Much of the PA’s current economic agenda is spelled out in the Palestine Reform and Development Program (PRDP), a development plan supported by International Financial Institutions, such as the World Bank, and other donors. On agricultural development the program has the following to say:

‘The ‘Agribusiness Development’ (AD) program will promote the cultivation of higher value-added cash crops (including organic produce), create agricultural post-harvest and marketing services, promote agricultural exports to regional and global markets (including Israel, Europe and Arab states), and improve trade infrastructure’. However, fragmented local production, highly competitive and demanding global markets, and susceptibility to closures and delays in movement of goods, make achieving growth in this
sector particularly challenging. Accordingly, alleviation of movement and access restrictions are critical to the success of the AD program. (Palestinian National Authority, 2008).

In other words, the report argues that Palestinian farmers should shift to the production of higher value-added crops and should thereby follow the demand of the international market. Efficient and low-cost agricultural production is only possible if farmers shift to monoculture, which means that farmers can no longer produce for their own consumption and remain dependent on foreign aid and Israeli imported products. The report recognizes the challenges the occupation poses on the globalization of the Palestinian agricultural market, but does not further question the occupation or realise how this new agricultural regime would undermine the sovereignty of the Palestinian farmer. Nor does it describe how it is impossible for Palestinian farmers to export their products without recognizing the sovereignty of Israel. After all, it is still Israel that controls the external borders of Palestine and consequently controls the Palestinian export market.

The consequences that this focus on the export of agricultural products has on the Palestinians becomes clear from the example of the agricultural production of flowers in the Gaza strip. Agriculture in Gaza is even more limited and restricted than in the West Bank, and as already mentioned a great part of the population remains food insecure and dependent on foreign aid. Since 2006 the Netherlands has a development program in Gaza called High Value Crops Export Program, which focuses on the production of high value agricultural crops such as strawberries and flowers for the export to Europe. This program does not focus on agricultural production for the local market, but aims to help farmers in Gaza meet the European agricultural production standards and help develop an export market (International Trade Centre, 2013). In a way this is a continuation of a strategy Israel already applied in the 1980s, since Israel also supported the creation of a flower agricultural sector in Gaza. This correlated with the requirements of the Israeli economy and the shift from the production of vital goods to luxury items contributed to Israel's settler colonial project to the extent that increased dependence of Palestinians on Israel meant that Israel could control the population numbers. The Netherlands took over this roll and supported the creation of a flower export market in Gaza. Such development programs can only take off if Israel gives a green light, since Israel controls the Palestinian export market. However, since 2007 Israel tightened its grip on Gaza, and as a result the exporting flower market closed down and the Netherlands massively cut down its subsidies. Palestinian farmers, although at first encourages to shift to the production of agricultural export products, now lose their means of existence. As we can see, Israeli incorporated neoliberal development in its settler colonial project with the aim of rendering the existence of Palestinian farmers impossible (Financial Tribute, 2015; Kurzom, 2001).
Equally supportive of Israel’s settler colonial project and the elimination of the native Palestinian farmer is the construction of so-called agro-industrial business parks. According to the PRDP, these parks are intended to have ‘a quick impact’ and will offer ‘an opportunity to demonstrate the commercial viability of Palestinian agriculture’ (Palestinian National Authority, 2008). The idea behind these industrial zones is that they would boost the economy and the agricultural sector in particular through investment and higher profits, and has therefore been put forward by international financial institutions such as the World Bank (The World Bank, 2018). These zones should create ‘tens of thousands of jobs’ and attract export-oriented businesses. Two of such industrial plans are under construction in Jenin and Jericho, and there are plans for another industrial park in Gaza. To establish these industrial zones, fertile agricultural land is being bought at compulsory low prices by the PA, which further diminishes the Palestinian agricultural sector. Furthermore, most of these factories are owned by Israeli or foreign companies, which means that the development potential of these zones for the Palestinian economy is very limited. Many would indeed argue that these agro-industrial business parks mostly benefit Israeli firms. Furthermore, the working of these zones depend on Israeli cooperation and therefore even further subordinate the Palestinian economy in the settler colonial economy of Israel (Cook, 2016; Hanieh, 2013b; Lagerquist, 2003; Sansour & Tartir, 2014).

Ultimately, the structures of neoliberal development and settler colonialism are strongly intertwined. Both are structures of domination and both structures ensure the elimination of the Palestinian farmer. Although neoliberalism is less instrumental in the physical elimination of Palestinian farmers, it does forces farmers to give up on their livelihoods and absorbs the Palestinian agricultural sector in the Israeli settler colonial structure. Accumulation and agricultural production is always tied to Israeli consent and thus comes at the price of compliance and assimilation to the settler colonial regime. Only a few Palestinian farmers can maintain their lives as farmers albeit with very limited freedom to choose what they produce. The majority of the Palestinian farmers is forced to give up their livelihoods as farmers and are turned into unskilled and cheap labourers.

**Food Sovereignty and Settler Colonialism**

Now that we have established the importance of agricultural dominance for the settler colonial project, and the interconnectedness of settler colonialism and neoliberal development, we can start to think about alternative conceptions of development that can untangle settler colonial structures in Palestine. What should have become clear by now is that a mere alternative development model

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to neoliberalism is not enough. Development is not the issue at stake, but settler colonialism is. Settler colonialism remains the ruling structure in Palestine, and as long as an alternative development model does not tackle settler colonial structures it will not bring much change to the Palestinians nor will it end the destruction of Palestinian society. After all, the introduction of neoliberal development in Palestine has altered the character of the settler colonial project, but it has not changed its intended outcome of the creation of a settler homeland eliminated of the entire native population.

There are studies that propose alternative models of development that are centred on the issue of decolonization. In a volume published by the Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung on alternative models of development, the writers look for alternatives to neoliberal development in Palestine that would assist Palestinians in their struggle against Israel's enduring settler colonialism, and agree that liberation should be at the forefront of development policies (Tabar & Salamanca, 2015). Toufic Haddad focuses on political rent extraction as discussed in the previous sector and argues that an alternative development program should reject the importance of political stability and reject the status quo. We should start off by recognizing Israel as the oppressor and colonizer, and Palestine as the oppressed and colonized. This means that resistance should be central to an alternative model of development (Haddad, 2015). Nithya Nagarajan suggests that an alternative model of development should re-embed the economy back in the social and political. Neoliberalism presents the economy as a neutral space that functions independently of its political context. Nagarajan, however, argues that only if we recognize the economy as a non-neutral space, can we grasp the settler-colonial logic rooted in neoliberal development (Nagarajan, 2015). Linda Tabar looks at the First Intifada and draws lessons from this resistance struggle on how an alternative model of development should look like. According to Tabar, the Palestinian people should be the ‘locus of power’ and reclaim their power subjugated to the colonial system. She focuses on collective forms of resistance and argues, in line with the literature on resistance economies, for the building of a popular based national economy (Tabar, 2015).

These studies offer an alternative vision of how development in Palestine should look like if development were to have a potential for decolonization. Settler-colonialism is, however, a complex structure rooted in all aspects of daily life in Palestine. I will therefore now turn to the question how agricultural development should look like if it were to set free from the restraints of settler colonial structures and neoliberal development as discussed in the previous two sections of this article. So what are the main issues for Palestinian farmers? How should alternative agricultural development look like? An alternative vision of agricultural development should offer a pathway for farmers to regain their presence on the land. Farmers should no longer be dictated as to what they produce.
Furthermore, farmers should be able to produce for the local market and should not be forced to follow the demands of the global market. Most of all, an alternative model of agricultural development should recognize the settler colonial structures at work, and defy these structures. This would free the farmers from the constrains of settler colonial society and bring a halt to the settler colonial elimination of the native, to the extent that farmers will no longer be forced to assimilate to settler colonial structures, and Israel and the international community no longer control the amount of food that goes to Palestine. Furthermore, as Linda Tabar and Chandni Desai argue, ties to land are ‘powerful forms of resistance’. Farming means permanence and a strong independent agricultural sector ‘destabilizes [settlers] mythologies and claims to land’ (Tabar & Desai, 2017).

The remainder of this article will look at the food sovereignty framework and offer a tentative argument as for why this framework could have the potential for decolonizing the agricultural sector. The food sovereignty movement is mainly praised for its attack on neoliberal development and its creation of a strong, global social movement. As we have established, however, neoliberal development is not the main issue at stake since it is strongly connected to settler colonialism and can be seen as a means to maintain settler colonial structures. Indigenous scholars, however, have embraced the framework for its potential for decolonization in settler colonial society, so what lessons can we draw from this literature? How does the food sovereignty framework deal with the interconnectedness of neoliberal development and settler colonialism? Although there is some disagreement about the origins of the concept (Edelman, 2013), the role of the peasant organisation La Via Campesina in spreading the concept has been widely recognized. La Via Campesia is a group of marginalised people within the food system that wants us to rethink the way we organise agricultural production and trade, and wants us to rethink how we make use of land and resources. The concept of food sovereignty was proposed in opposition to food security: whereas food security does not focus on where food comes from, food sovereignty advocates for the sovereignty of the producers to control agricultural production. It does not only argues for access to food but also for the democratic control of the food system. At the forum for food sovereignty in Mali in 2007, food sovereignty was defined as following:

“Food sovereignty is the right of peoples to healthy and culturally appropriate food produced through ecologically sound and sustainable methods, and their right to define their own food and agricultural systems. It puts those who produce, distribute and consume food at the heart of food systems and policies rather than the demands of markets and corporations. […] Food sovereignty implies new social relations free of oppression and inequality between men and women, peoples, racial groups, social classes and generations” (Via Campesina, 2009).
Via Campesina has been successful in creating a political space in which to advocate for food sovereignty. In 2008 Ecuador included a reference to food sovereignty in its constitutions, and several countries such as Bolivia, Nepal, Senegal and Mali have made food sovereignty part of national policy (Provost, 2013). Scholars have also taken up the food sovereignty framework and these scholars place the peasant at the centre of their analyses. Admittedly, especially early scholarly accounts of the food sovereignty framework, using the words of Edelman et. al, involved ‘a considerable dose of idealistic righteousness’ and were built on a romanticized view of the peasant. Recent accounts on the framework, however, pay more attention to policy implications and recognize the need for case-specific approaches (Edelman, 2013; Jansen, 2014). The movement itself also recognized that the movement cannot offer a one-size-fits-all solution, and La Via Campesina, in a recent paper, presents the food sovereignty movement as ‘a process in action, an invitation to citizens to exercise our capacity to organize ourselves and improve our conditions and societies together’. Food sovereignty should no longer be seen as a global strategy but as a way of thinking and organizing that centres on the peasant and adapts to the people and places where it is put into practice (European Coordination via Campesina, 2018).

In Palestine, the food sovereignty movement is taking off as well. The Union of Agricultural Workers Committee (UAWC), an organisation established in 1986 with the aim to protect and empower small farmers, is the only ‘Middle Eastern’ member of La Via Campesina. In 2014 the UAWC received the food sovereignty prize for its continuous support of farming cooperatives, the establishment of a seed bank in Hebron, and the establishment of a store to market agricultural products produced by the cooperatives (Rothchild, 2017). Palestinian grassroots organisations also argue for the importance of food sovereignty. A report written by Ines Abdel Razek-Faoder and Muna Dajani for The International Institute for Nonviolent Action argues that food sovereignty is one of the most vital rights of Palestinians and that it could achieve the creation of a resistance economy (Razek-Faoder & Dajani, 2013). The food sovereignty framework in Palestine, however, has only attracted limited scholarly attention. A recent volume published by the Journal für Entwicklungspolitik contains articles on agricultural cooperatives and food sovereignty in Palestine, and argues that agricultural cooperatives ‘hold the key to developing a sustainable, collective, resistant and self-reliant mode of production’ that could address the power nexus of settler colonialism and neoliberalism (Krieger, 2018). In this volume, Phillip Salzmann argues that food sovereignty presents a strategy that could resist both the occupation and the neoliberal project
since it stresses the need for the local community to have access to and control natural resources (Salzmann, 2018).

Still, the use of the food sovereignty framework has also been widely criticized. Two types of criticism are often heard. First, a lot of criticism on the framework revolves around the question sovereignty to whom? Henry Bernstein questions the usefulness of ‘peasant’ as a concept and questions whether small farmers, medium-scale farmers, farm workers and indigenous communities are all synonyms. Bernstein concludes that there is no such thing as a peasant, and for this reason he disregards the food sovereignty movement as such (Bernstein, 2014). In a similar way, Bina Agarwal wonders whether the food sovereignty movement is fighting for national self-sufficiency or local-self-sufficiency and questions whether the sovereignty of farmers on a local level matches the interest of the population on a national level. Who should gain sovereignty and in whose interest? (Agarwal, 2014). Secondly, several scholars questions the realistic nature of the food sovereignty vision. Among others, Phillip Aerni argues that farming no longer is possible without access to global markets. Farmers have to rely on technology and need access to adequate resources to sustain their livelihoods. Aerni therefore argues that it is falls to believe that if farmers would regain sovereignty over food production this would actually elevate hunger (Aerni, 2011).

Within indigenous studies an indigenous food sovereignty framework is emerging that has found ways to deal with these arguments against the usefulness of the framework. Indigenous Food Sovereignty approaches the food sovereignty framework from the particular perspective of indigenous people and defines food sovereignty as a strategy of resistance to settler colonialism. The movement has four guiding principles: 1) the right to food is sacred and is maintained by nurturing healthy relationships with the land; 2) the maintenance of food sovereignty as a living reality requires participation at the level of the individual, family, community and the region; 3) indigenous people should have the ability to respond to their own needs for ‘healthy, culturally adapted Indigenous foods’; 4) Indigenous Food Sovereignty attempts to ‘reconcile Indigenous food and cultural values with colonial laws and policies and mainstream economic activities’. It is clear that for the Indigenous Food Sovereignty Framework sovereignty should be achieved for the indigenous populations of settler colonized lands. But as Charlotte Cote describes, it seems odd for indigenous scholars to utilize the term ‘sovereignty’, as this term implies state authority and control, values often opposed by indigenous philosophies. Cote argues that sovereignty does matter for indigenous people, and that indigenous people should indigenize the term so that the term sovereignty is reframed within indigenous people’s struggles for self-sufficiency and

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Likewise, Sam Grey and Raj Patel argues that although the term has imperial roots, successor terms such as self-determination and self-sufficiency retain the core idea of sovereignty (Grey & Patel, 2015). Indigenous Food Sovereignty is often discussed as having the potential for decolonization. The distinction between Indigenous Food Sovereignty and Food Sovereignty lays for one in the indigenous’ dealing with land. In opposition to notions of land as private property put forward by settler colonial states, indigenous people view land as a ‘system of reciprocal relations and obligations [that] can teach us about living our lives in relation to one another and the natural world in non-dominating and non-exploitative terms’ (Coulthard, 2014). The indigenous relationships to their land are based on ‘creation stories, not colonization stories, about how we/they came to be in a particular place – indeed how we/they came to be a place’ (Tuck & Yang, 2012). Indigenous Food Sovereignty focuses on the reciprocal relationship between land and its people, and does not see land as a property that can be owned. According to Sam Grey and Raj Patel, just like people have a right to their land, ‘the land has a right to its people’. What this implies is that to indigenous people food sovereignty is more than just the right to define agricultural policies, it is also the right to be indigenous. In this regard, Indigenous Food Sovereignty is a continuation of the anti-colonial struggle as it not only pushes for the right of farmers to control the agricultural sector but also for the right of indigenous people to define their relation to the land (Grey & Patel, 2015).

Indigenous Food Sovereignty scholars deal with the criticism on food sovereignty that it is unfeasible by recognizing that food sovereignty offers a strategy for decolonization rather than static end-point. Kyle Powys White describes how settler colonialism’s project of creating a new homeland is first of all a process of inscription: ‘origin, religious and cultural narratives, social ways of life, and political and economic systems are physically incised and engraved into the waters, soils, air and other environmental dimensions of the landscape’ (Whyte, 2016). Indigenous Food Sovereignty offers indigenous people with a strategy to inscribe their stories and their culture on the land, and reconnect with the land. In this regard, Indigenous Food Sovereignty is not really based on ideals of self-sufficient, but offers a strategy to resist structures of oppression that seek to erase indigenous people’s relationship to the land. It forces us to reconsider settlers’ and indigenous’ conceptions of land and examine ways the agricultural sector is colonized and ruled by settler food ways. (Matties, 2016; Whyte, 2016). Indigenous Food Sovereignty is put into practice by reclaiming land for hunting and fishing, agricultural programs that reintroduce foods removed from the agricultural sector by settlers, and the establishment of community-based food programs that secure the community’s access to culturally appropriate food. In the Canadian context, special education projects have been established, that instills children with an understanding of the
community’s relationship to the land. Ultimately, the goal of Indigenous Food Sovereignty is to re-establish a community’s relationship with the land, a relationship that has been and is constantly being obstructed by settler colonialism (Kamal et al., 2015)

What lessons can we draw from this if we want to formulate an alternative conception of agricultural development in Palestine? First of all, this discussion of Indigenous Food Sovereignty shows us the complexity of ways settler colonialism penetrates the Palestinian agricultural sector. As becomes clear from the framework, settler colonialism works to remove all relations indigenous people have with their land. It smashes indigenous systems of food production and consumption, and replaces it with settler colonial visions of food production and consumption. Similarly to the destruction of certain crops, for example wild rice, by settlers in North America, Israeli settlers destruct olive trees and obstruct any viable relations Palestinians have with their land. Secondly, although the food sovereignty framework offers an alternative vision of development that centres on notions of self-sufficiency and farmer sovereignty, it is only when food sovereignty initiatives challenge settler colonial models of agriculture and re-establish native’s relationships to their land, that food sovereignty can have a truly decolonizing impact. Food sovereignty initiatives else face the risk of accepting the status quo and working towards a self-sufficient model of agriculture that is not rooted in Palestinian agricultural practices, but settler colonial agricultural practices.

Conclusion
The main goal of this article was to draw attention to the state of agriculture in Palestine, and the ways Palestinian farmers are suffering from the occupation and neoliberal development programs. As we have seen, neoliberal development, albeit in a different form, is a mere continuation of settler colonial structures. Settler colonialism is deeply rooted in everyday life in Palestine, and only when we look at Palestine from the perspective of settler colonialism can we piece by piece start to unravel these settler colonial structures. This article has shown that agriculture is the way for settlers to vouchsafe their connection to the land and secures the reproduction of the population. At the same time, native agriculture means permanence and the destruction of the native agricultural sector is therefore of vital importance to the settler colonial project. Israeli policies that result in the elimination of the native farmers are manifold, and range from policies of land confiscation, to the restricted access of fertilizers. As a result, Palestinians can no longer live self-sufficient lives, and are forced to assimilate to settler colonial structures. Although neoliberal development is often presented as a global structures imposed by International Financial Institutions, this paper has shown that in the Palestinian context, neoliberal policy has comparable outcomes to settler colonialism. With its focus on security and ‘good governance’ a security system
is imposed on the Palestinians that restricts dissident and the development of alternative political structures. If we look specifically at agricultural development, the neoliberal establishment of an agricultural export market only further restricts Palestinian farmers’ sovereignty and the local Palestinian agricultural sector. Likewise, the creation of agro-industrial parks removed Palestinian farmers from their lands and forces them to give up their livelihoods and become unskilled labourers, dependent on Israel.

An alternative vision of agricultural development, therefore, cannot just be an alternative to neoliberalism. An alternative vision of agricultural development should tackle structures set in place by settler colonialism and enable Palestinian farmers to rebuild relationships with their land. Although the regular food sovereignty framework is instrumental in envisioning a model of development that opposes neoliberalism and advocates for the creation of a self-sufficient Palestine, Indigenous Food Sovereignty takes this further and argues for the re-instalment of native’s specific relation to the land. This is also in line with what Linda Tabar and Chandi Desai have to say about decolonization: ‘decolonization is about imagining modes of life and futures that are rooted in indigenous Palestinian epistemologies, memory and relations to land, place and the body, and not solely just about replacing the colonial state and racial economy’ (Tabar & Desai, 2017). Consequently, this also means that Toufic Haddad is right to say that ‘how, where, using which strategies and tactics – […] remain to be determined by its adherents and agents’ (Haddad, 2015). After all, only Palestinians know their true relationship to their land. This article hoped to offer a theoretical contribution to the literature on decolonization and settler colonialism. More in-depth study into food sovereignty initiatives, however, is necessary to establish its full potential for decolonization.
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