



Universiteit Gent
Faculteit Letteren en Wijsbegeerte
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The Darśanasāra by Devasena
On the Perception of the Other

Heleen De Jonckheere

Promotor: Prof. Dr. Eva De Clercq
Copromotor: Dr. Marie-Hélène Gorisse
Masterproef voorgedragen tot het behalen van de graad
Master of Arts in de Oosterse Talen en Culturen (India)



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“...the true contribution of a culture consists, not in the list of inventions which it has personally produced, but in its difference from others.”

Claude Lévi-Strauss

Acknowledgments

Writing a Master's dissertation asks much effort, blood, sweat and tears of a person. And it is the Master student herself who has to suffer this sweat and these tears. Luckily for the student, there is always someone to wipe of her sweat and dry her tears.

Therefore it only seems appropriate to reserve some space in this dissertation to thank the people that helped me through this process.

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शुक्रिया !

Abstract

In the academic field of Jain Studies the *Darśanasāra* by the tenth century author Devasena is a quite often referred to text. Scholars use the text that describes and refutes Indian *saṃghas*, to broaden their knowledge of the history of medieval Digambara *saṃghas*. However, up till now no one has examined the text really thoroughly. This dissertation is the first to give an English translation of the *Darśanasāra* and furthermore contains an examination of questions related to the text that arose after the translation was made. The guiding problem in this dissertation is the search for the best approach towards this text, around which all questions are structured. In the first chapter the text is examined from a philosophical perspective. The next chapter uses a historical approach towards the text. In the last chapter the *Darśanasāra* is analysed through the theory of ‘othering’. Since the *Darśanasāra* does not refute the different *saṃghas* on a philosophical basis, the first approach was not constructive. The ‘standard’ historical perspective was also not productive, because of the lack of comparable source material. Approaching the *Darśanasāra* from the theory of ‘othering’ proved to be the most effective and truthful methodology. It showed how the text can be seen as a way of ascertaining the own identity through the refutation of others. By examining the *Darśanasāra* thoroughly I showed that most conclusions previously made are not really valuable. Instead of using the ‘standard’ historical methodology towards primary sources it might overall be better for scholars of Jainism to focus on the author’s own position.

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Introduction

The *Darśanasāra* by Devasena came to my attention last year at the beginning of July thanks to professor Eva De Clercq. I went to her office to ask if she knew a good subject for my dissertation. She had plenty of ideas especially related to Jain Studies, as this is one of her specialties. One of the topics seemed very interesting to me: to examine a Prakrit text that talks about several *darśanas* and thus has a philosophical basis. This would be the *Darśanasāra*. Although later the text appeared to be a bit different than what I expected, I still found it interesting and therefore chose to stay with this subject for my dissertation.

Because it is a text around which everything revolves in this dissertation I chose to not complicate my main title by picking one that contains only two items, namely *Darśanasāra* (the text) and Devasena (its author). These items obviously need to be explained. In this introduction I will first say some words about the author, before explaining what the text is and how it is build up.

Devasena was a Digambara monk (*ācārya*) who lived around the tenth century CE¹ He probably lived in the city or near the city of Dhārā and stayed at least for a while in the Pārśvanātha temple there.² The city Dhārā can be situated in the west of present-day Madhya Pradesh, in the Mālava region. It became thriving and famous under the rule of the Paramāras, especially under king Bhoja I, who made it into the capital of his kingdom. The king lived only a bit later than Devasena and in his time (and also earlier) Dhārā was made into a center of art and philosophy, thus being an ideal climate for a person like Devasena to write his ideas down (Bhattacharyya 1977: 167). Devasena was probably a student of a certain Vimalasena and belonged to the Mūla Saṃgha of the Digambara affiliation (Premi 1942: 170). Next to the *Darśanasāra* he also wrote the *Tattvasāra* and *Ārādhanasāra*. Premi ascribes two more works to Devasena: the *Dharmasaṃgraha* and the *Bhāvasaṃgraha*. The *Dharmasaṃgraha* is a work that was ascribed to Devasena by Shivañilāl but the work itself was never found (or does not exist). The *Bhāvasaṃgraha* is a text by a Devasena of whom it is not sure if he is the same Devasena as the one from the *Darśanasāra*. Premi thinks this is the same person because in

¹ This information is from the *Darśanasāra* itself, which states that Devasena wrote this text in 990 V.S. (Vikrama Saṃvat). As 990 V.S. accords with 933/934 A.D, Devasena must have lived in the tenth century CE In none of his other works he gives the date in which they were written (Premi 1942: 170). This can be seen as a sign that part of his intention here is to offer a historical account on the origin of the different *saṃghas* at his time.

² This also comes directly from the *Darśanasāra*. All other information on Devasena come from Premi (1942: 169-171).

the *Bhāvasaṃgraha* several verses are used that also occur in the *Darśanasāra* (1942: 171). More than that is not known about Devasena.

Concerning the title '*Darśanasāra*', the word itself is made up out of two words, namely *darśana* and *sāra*. *Sāra* can be translated as 'essence' or 'summary', while *darśana* is a word with many possible translations. It comes from the root *√dṛś* and literally means something like 'seeing'. From that is derived the translation 'view' and thus 'philosophical system', understood as a given perspective on the world, but also 'belief' is a possible interpretation of *darśana*. Furthermore the word *darśana* is often present in the titles of the Indian doxographies, so maybe the central text of my dissertation can be seen as a doxography. The question of what *darśana* means here in Devasena's text and the question whether this text is a doxography (and what a doxography is), will be handled in the course of this dissertation.

After explaining the word, I now want to continue with explaining briefly the content of the *Darśanasāra*. The *Darśanasāra* is a text consisting of fifty-one verses in Prakrit written from the perspective of a Mūla Saṃgha (Digambara) monk. The main part of the text is devoted to the refutation of beliefs of other religious communities (*saṃghas*).³ Devasena authorises his ideas by claiming them to be the words of previous *ācāryas*. He starts by saying that the corruption of the path of right belief started with Marīci (the grandson of Jina Rṣabha) and that from there all kinds of objectionable *saṃghas* arose. The refutations are not really of a philosophical nature, although from the word *darśana* a philosophical treatment was expected, but rather of a practical one. So the concern of this text is, in Western terminology, more of orthopraxy than of orthodoxy.⁴ The *saṃghas* that are mentioned in the *Darśanasāra* are, in the following order: the Buddhists, the Śvetāmbaras, the Viparītavādins, the Vainayikas, the Ajñānavādins, the Drāviḍa Saṃgha, the Yāpanīyas, the Kāṣṭha Saṃgha, the Māthura Saṃgha and the Bhillaka Saṃgha.

Although it is difficult to see a clear structure in this text, I would suggest that the text can be roughly structured in two parts. The first part contains Devasena's refutations of the first five *saṃghas* (the Buddhists, Śvetāmbaras, Viparītavādins, Vainayikas and Ajñānavādins), which can be defined as 'general Indian *saṃghas*'. The second part consists of the refutations of five Digambara *saṃghas* (Drāviḍa Saṃgha, Yāpanīyas, Kāṣṭha Saṃgha, Māthura Saṃgha and

³ Throughout this dissertation I will be using community as a synonym for *saṃgha*. Important to know is that this refers to an ascetic community.

⁴ In this way the *Darśanasāra* underlines what is problematic in strictly separating orthodoxy from orthopraxy or ideological doctrine from praxis, as is mostly done in Western thought. The question arises if in India the terms can be set apart, if there isn't the need to see them as intertwined and often simultaneously operating.

Bhillaka Saṃgha). Here the structure becomes a bit blurry because the Drāviḍas, Kāṣṭhas and Māthuras are certainly Digambaras, but it is unsure what kind of Jains the Yāpanīyas were and how Devasena saw the future-arising Bhillakas. I chose to determine this structure in two parts for the sake of examining the *Darśanasāra* more easily. Under the first part we can see another structure. Devasena structures the first five *saṃghas* according to the five types of *mithyātva* ('false belief'). He links each community with a certain type of false belief and thus links the text to Jain karma theory. How this theory functions and what the meaning of the *mithyātvās* is in it, will also be explained in my dissertation.

According to Upadhye the *Darśanasāra* is quite popular in orthodox Digambara circles (1933-34: 198). However according to dr. Tillo Detige nowadays Digambara monks usually do not read the text.⁵ In the academic world of Jain Studies at least, the *Darśanasāra* is not unknown. On Google Books for example the word 'darsanasara' gets almost four-hundred hits.⁶ The title of this work appears in books about Jainism in general as Dundas' *The Jains* and von Glasenapp's *Jainism: An Indian Religion of Salvation*, books on (South-)Indian history, books on Buddhist or Jain literature, books about Indian philosophy, ... So wherefrom comes this broad interest in the *Darśanasāra*?

The main reason for which the *Darśanasāra* is referred to is for the information it gives on the several Digambara *saṃghas* in medieval times. As Flügel notes (2006: 378):

Apart from the available inscriptions, *praśastis* and nineteenth century *paṭṭāvalīs*, the two main sources on the history of the Digambara traditions are Deva Sena's *Darśanasāra* of 933 CE and the Śvetāmbara monk Guṇa Ratna's fifteenth century commentary to Haribhadra's *Saḍḍarśanamuccaya*.

Indeed interesting to the *Darśanasāra* is that it names four Digambara *saṃghas* and gives for each of them the names of their founders, the dates of their foundation and the place where it was founded. Moreover, for some *saṃghas* the *Darśanasāra* is the only source in which something is said about the practices or beliefs of these traditions. For example for the Drāviḍa Saṃgha there are inscriptions giving some dates or names that are associated with this tradition, but the inscriptions do not mention what kind of conduct their monks had. So the *Darśanasāra* is important primarily on a historical level. Although many authors refer to

⁵ Dr. Tillo Detige told me this after reading Upadhye's sentence.

⁶ These hits do not all refer to Devasena's text, but at least fifty percent of them do.

this text, up till now no one has endeavoured a translation of the text into English, nor has anyone except for Premi (1917) tried to make a thorough examination of it. This dissertation contains the first translation of the text and tries to interpret Devasena's intention philosophically. By also questioning Devasena's supposedly historical informal, it can give more insight into the historicity of his statements.

My research on Devasena's *Darśanasāra* starts evidently with a translation of the Prakrit text into English. This translation is based on the edition of the text by Upadhye (1933-34) on which I will say some words before the actual translation is given. After this follows an examination of the questions I asked myself while I was translating the text. These questions are 'What is *darśana* in the *Darśanasāra*?', 'Should I see this text as a doxography?', 'What are the five *mithyātvās* that are referred to?', 'What is the historicity of Devasena's statements on the five non-Digambara traditions?', 'What can I say historically on the mentioned Digambara traditions?', 'Does the text give a clue about Devasena's own *saṃgha*?'. These questions can be organised into three parts, each relating to a type of analysis of the text. The first three questions are discussed in the chapter 'A Philosophical Approach' because they relate to philosophical issues as karma theory and the concept of *darśana*. In the second chapter I turn to 'A Historical Approach' when examining the positive historical value of the text (the fourth and fifth question), which is relevant for all secondary literature that has referred to the *Darśanasāra*. In the final chapter I show that this text is even more interesting in the perspective of a third approach and opt for 'An Other Approach'. I discuss the theory of 'othering' and the concept of the proximate other, and I show how the *Darśanasāra* tells more about the own identity formation than about the history of Devasena's others.

The Darśanasāra translated

The following translation of the *Darśanasāra* is based upon Upadhye's critical edition of the text. Before I found this edition I had already made a rough translation of Premi's edition of the text. This last edition is very interesting for a student only making her first steps in the field of Prakrit translation, because next to the original Prakrit text it contains a Sanskrit *chāyā*⁷ and also a Hindi paraphrase. Premi does not say where he got the *chāyā* or the Hindi paraphrase, but the most probable option is that he found the Sanskrit *chāyā* in a manuscript and that he himself constructed the Hindi sentences. Other than the text itself Premi's edition also contains critical and historical notes which were very instructive for my research. I did not include notes on where Premi's edition differs from Upadhye's edition, because Upadhye incorporates Premi's text in his own critical edition. In his edition Upadhye constituted a critical text with variant readings after collating almost half a dozen manuscripts (1933-34: 198). All manuscripts are paper manuscripts and some contain (partly) a Sanskrit *chāyā*. Among the several manuscripts Upadhye could not identify anything like families (1933-34: 200). I have translated Upadhye's main text and for the sake of time did not include the variant readings in this English translation. I also transcribed the Prakrit verses and the Sanskrit *chāyā* (by Premi), which I edited myself in accordance with Upadhye's Prakrit text. This transcription can be found in the appendix. So here is my translation.

The Essence of [some] Viewpoints

- 1 After greeting the many gods and the great Jina Mahāvīra who is honoured and who has pure knowledge, I will recite the Darśanasāra as it was past on by the old sages (*ācāryas*).⁸
- 2 In the time of Bharata [was the time] of the formakers (*tīrthāṅkaras*) who were praised by Devendra, Nāga and Garuḍa. In these times [however] there are some people who proclaim false beliefs.
- 3 The grandson of Jina Rṣhabha, who is defiled by such false beliefs and who is full of illusion, is reckoned as chief of all these thinkers by the old sages.

⁷ *Chāyā* literally means shadow. In this context, it refers to Sanskrit verses 'shadowing' the original Prakrit verses. Thus, a *chāyā* is a Sanskrit gloss on a Prakrit text.

⁸ I have chosen to clarify some words by referring to Sanskrit terms that are a Sanskrit version of the used Prakrit terms. I have chosen to give the words in Sanskrit, because Sanskrit is the common language in an inter-systemic context such as this one.

4 And by him a strange kind of view, one that is mixed and combined, was made up. Therefore there is now a trace of damage on the path of right belief caused by others.

5 By the old sages false belief (*mithyātva*), which is full of illusion, is indicated as one-sided (*ekānta*), doubtful (*sāṃśayika*), contradictory (*viparīta*), indiscriminately inclusive (*vinayaja*), or without knowledge (*ajñāna*).

And it was said:⁹

There are one-hundred-and-eighty of the activist views (*kriyavāda*)¹⁰, eighty-four of the inactivist views (*akriyavāda*)¹¹, sixty-seven [views] caused by scepticism (*ajñāna*) and thirty-two [views] by validating all doctrines equally (*venayika*).

[The Buddhists]¹²

6 In the ford (*tīrtha*) of Śrī Pārṣvanātha at the bank of the Sarayūriver there was the highly praised ascetic (*muni*) Buddhakīrti, who was a student of Pihitāsrava and lived in the city of Palāśa.

7 He, although ordained, was unconsiderable by abundantly eating fish; having put on a red garment, a one-sided doctrine was established by him.

8 “There is no soul in meat, nor in fruit, yoghurt, milk and sugar. Therefore longing for it and eating it is not the worst.

9 Alcoholic drinks are not condemned, they are just like water.” Having proclaimed this in the world, his [theory] objectionable for all was spread.

10 One performs an act, the other bears its consequences. After forming such a theory and immediately subordinating [people], he went to hell.

[The Śvetāmbaras]

⁹ ‘uktaṃ ca’ (“And it was said”) actually introduces the sixth verse (“In the ford...”). The verse that now follows ‘uktaṃ ca’ and that I left unnumbered was only found in one manuscript by Upadhye. All other manuscripts write ‘uktaṃ ca’ directly followed by verse number six.

¹⁰ By ‘activist’ I mean the views according to which human beings are actors of their destiny, who have the power to change their lives.

¹¹ By ‘inactivist’ I mean the views according to which human beings are not actors properly speaking of their destiny.

¹² These subtitles are my own interpolations. I chose to do this to give the text some more structure. Premi in his edition also gives Hindi subtitles and my titles are mostly alike. However, at some points I found Premi’s subtitles a bit misleading. For example, Premi writes ‘काष्ठसंघ की उत्पत्ति’ (i.e. The arising of the Kāṣṭha Saṃgha) above verse 30, while the first three verses below this title refer to *ācāryas* belonging the Sena Gaṇa.

11 In 136 after king Vikrama had reached death, the whiteclad community emerged in Valabhī in Saurāṣṭra.

12 There was a student of the teacher Śrī Bhadrabāhu named Śānti Ācārya, and he had a wicked student Jinacandra who behaved foolishly.

13 He implemented the idea that for women liberation in this life is possible and that furthermore those who have perfect knowledge (*kevalin*) can eat food and have disease.

14 [He also said that] even an ascetic wearing clothes obtains mokṣa, that Mahavīra was transplanted from one womb [to another], that liberation is possible in another tradition and that one should always eat lifeless food.

15 And another such thing, after composing false scriptures that corrupt the [original] āgamas, his soul got stuck in the first hell.

[The followers of viparītamata]

16 In Suvrata's ford (*tīrtha*) in Ayodhya there was one named Kṣīrakadamba, who was pleasing and pure. He had a bad student Parvata Vaktra who was also his son.

17 After forming the contradictory view (*viparīta mithyātva*), he destroyed all self-restraint in the world and thereupon all obtained the seventh hell "The Mahāghora".

[The Vainayikas]

18 In all fords (*tīrtha*) there is the revival of those who validate all paths equally (*vainayika*). Some of them have dreadlocks, some have a bald head, some have one hairlock (*śikhin*), some are naked.

19 In a bad and also in a virtuous person equally there is reverence (*bhakti*) and bowing to all gods as if it were a punishment. By those fools this is urged onto people.

[The followers of ajñānamata]

20 In the ford (*tīrtha*) of Śrī Viranātha there was a very renowned student of the leader of the Parśva-community. This sage Maskari-Pūraṇa proclaimed ignorance (*ajñāna*) in the world.

21 He said: “mokṣa is [obtained] in the absence of knowledge, there is no knowledge. For the liberated souls there is no rebirth of the soul, nor does it wander around in birth after birth.

22 Of all living beings there is one conscious creator.” Empty meditation and the disobedience of castes is taught by him.

23 Having considered such a truth that diverges from the path of the jinas, he himself, with his sinful thoughts, addicted to all kinds of intoxicatives, reached the Nitya Nigoda.

[The Drāviḍa Saṃgha]

24 The student of Śrī Pūjyapāda, named Vajranandi who knew the tradition and was highly praised, was the sinful founder of the Drāviḍa Saṃgha.

25 He, was not even stopped by the mendicants (*muni*) from the sin of eating unacceptable¹³ chickpeas [and from making] a composition that was contradictory, different and that questioned the classdivision.

26 [According to him] there is no life in seeds, there is no eating while standing, there is no appropriateness of food for monks (*prāśuka*). He certainly does not believe in anything objectionable and does not take into account the notion of building a house (*gṛha-kalpita*).

27 After building a morass, a field, an abode and establishing trade, while being alive, and after having bathe in cool water, he collected many sins.

28 In 536 after the death of king Vikrama, arose in Southern Mathura the fully deluded Drāviḍa Saṃgha .

¹³ It was very difficult to find a suitable translation for the word ‘a-ppāsuya’ or its unnegated version ‘phāsuga’ (as in verse 26). According to the Prakrit dictionary (Sheth 1963) the word ‘phāsuga’ or ‘phāsuya’ means lifeless or soulless. This interpretation however posed a problem in verse 26, because if Devasena would say that “there is no life in seeds”, while at the same time saying “there is nothing lifeless” (‘phāsugaṃ natthi’), then this would be contradictory. When I tried to find the Sanskrit version of this word, which is ‘prāśuka’ according to the *chāyā*, I could only find one reference to this word. In the book *Die Erlösungslehre der Jaina: Legenden, Parabeln, Erzählungen* the word was interpreted with relation to food as ‘what is acceptable for Jain monks to eat’. So it refers to special food for monks. In the negative version (‘appāsuya’) it refers then to food unacceptable for monks. I chose to follow this interpretation.

[The Yāpanīya Saṃgha]

29 When the excellent city Kalyāṇa arose in 205 V.S.¹⁴, [then] arose the Yāpanīya Saṃgha by Śrī Kalaśa who was adorned with a white robe.

[Righteous precursors]¹⁵

30 Jinasena the student of Śrī Vīrasena who knew all śāstras, was after Śrī Padmanandi clever to extricate four communities (*saṃghas*).

31 And he had a student Guṇabhadra who was accomplished in the divine knowledge, had done a 14-days-fast, had a good mind, was full of tapas and furnished with the sign of excellence.

32 This [Guṇabhadra] then having learned about the death of monk (*muni*) Vinayasena, declared his own text and went to heaven.

[The Kāstha Saṃgha]

33 In Nanditaṭa there was a Kumārasena who was initiated by Vinayasena . And he by destroying renunciation was born without taking consecration (*dīkṣa*) again.

34 After removing the peacock's feather and taking a Yak's tail as chowrie, driven by delusion, he accumulated the wrong path in all regions of Bāgaḍ.

35 [There was] the restored consecration of women, the going on almsrounds (*vīracarya*) for the Kṣullakas¹⁶, the taking of rough hair and what is named the sixth *guṇavrata*¹⁷.

36 The *āgamas*, the *śāstras*, the *purāṇas* and the *prayaścitta*-texts [were amended] in somewhat other ways. After having contrived [all such], he promoted this perversity to the stupified people.

¹⁴ Duṇṇisae is only found in a footnote in the edition by Premi (1917). All other manuscripts write *sattasae* and thus say "705 years later". Upadhye adapted Premi's emendation because of the impossibility of 705 years. Premi found the reading *duṇṇisae* in one text that for the rest contained many faults.

¹⁵ I chose for this subtitle, because Devasena refers here first to the lineage of the Sena Gaṇa. It seems from the text that Devasena saw them as righteous leaders.

¹⁶ Dr. Tillo Detige told me that a Kṣullaka is someone who has decided to become a monk, but who is in a preliminary stage, somewhere between a layman and a monk. He lives with monks, but wears clothes and has the eating partly of a monk and partly of a layman.

¹⁷ Premi writes in his edition of the *Darśanasāra* that the sixth *guṇavrata* is the vow of abandoning eating at night (1917: 16).

37 This Kumārasena indeed blinded by his doctrine, was sentenced by the mendicant community and having abonded calmness [of mind], horribly, he formed the Kāṣṭha Saṃgha.

38 In 753 after the death of king Vikrama in the splendid village of Nanditaṭa should the Kāṣṭha Saṃgha have been known.

39 In the splendid village of Nanditaṭa Kumārasena who knew the *sāstras* founded the Kāṣṭha Saṃgha with its corrupted view at the time of Sallekhanā.

[The Māthura Saṃgha]

40 Then after 200 years there was in Mathura a guru of the Māthura Saṃgha named Rāmasena. He praised ‘the not carrying of a chowrie’.

41 He stated that false belief (*mithyātvā*) is primary to true belief (*samyaktva*), which is associated with the notion of attachment to the images of the jinas and to devotion of other souls.

42 “He should be my guru and not another one” this [thought] turning over in his head, [he also proclaimed] proudness for his own community and the decay in other [communities].

[Devasena’s opinion]

43 If Padmanandi with the knowledge of Sīmandhara Svāmi is not awakened, then how can ascetics understand the righteous way.

44 The doctrine (*dharma*) that the two monks (*muni*) Bhūtabali and Puṣpadanta taught in the southern regions and also in the north, that is the truth without any alternative.

[The Bhillaka Saṃgha]

45 In the southern region in Puṣkara in the Vindhya ridge will live the *ācārya* Vīracandra. He will found the Bhillaka Saṃgha when 1800 years have past.

46 Having formed his own community (*gaccha*) he, by demolishing the *pratikramaṇa* ritual and contending the practice of classdivision, will completely destroy the way of the jinas.

[Concluding words]

- 47 Then the chiefs, the heads of the assemblage and the teachers will not declare any other falsity and at the end of fifth timeperiod the false views (*mithyā-darśana*) will be annihilated.
- 48 There is one ascetic named Virangaja who has the basic qualities. Though he knows little, he will awaken the people, like the great Mahāvīra.
- 49-50 Having collected in one [composition] these verses that were created by the old teachers, the monk (*gaṇi*) Śrī Devasena who lives in Dhārā composed the Darśanasāra, a carrier for the living souls (*bhavya*)¹⁸, in 990¹⁹ in the 10th month, the pure Māgha, in the perfectly pure temple of Śrī Pārśvanātha.
- 51 Let them be offended or let them be pleased when a man declares the truth. Should a king throw of his clothes because he is scared of lice?

¹⁸ The bhavya souls are the souls that are capable of reaching mokṣa. The *Darśanasāra* carries these souls to liberation.

¹⁹ It is not completely clear if the Prakrit word ‘naüe’ means ninety or nine. Therefore the date in which the *Darśanasāra* was written can be either 990 or 909. Premi chose to render the date as 909 (1917: 21), after emending the word ‘naüe’ into ‘navae’ (Upadhye 1933-34: 206). Upadhye acknowledges the uncertainty in the interpretation of the word and writes that the *Darśanasāra* was compiled in 909 or 990 V.S. (1983: 192).

1. A Philosophical Approach

1.1 The concept *darśana*

When I first heard about this text, I did not yet know what to expect from it. What the content would be or in what context the *Darśanasāra* was to be placed, were questions I would deal with after translating it. But based on what my promotor professor Eva De Clercq told me, the text would discuss several assemblies and their ideology. This sounded logical to me as the title is *Darśana-sāra*, the essence or summary of *darśanas*. Before actually reading the text, the thought I had on *darśana* was in its meaning of philosophy or philosophical view. Therefore I had the idea that this text, 'A summary of philosophical views', would be a kind of Jain doxography, which is a type of literature that describes the points of view of several schools or philosophies. After translating the *Darśanasāra*, however, it seemed that there wasn't too much philosophical (as we know it in the Western sense) about the text. So the question arose: If the text does not discuss philosophical views, how should I then understand the concept of *darśana* here and how should I translate this word? I also wanted to know if the *Darśanasāra* could still be considered as a doxography, or if it belongs to another kind of literature.

That is why I'll start with a discussion on the use of the term *darśana*. This discussion will be based on Folkert's chapter "Faith and System: Darśana in the Jain Tradition" (1993: 113-152). In the general Indian tradition, the word *darśana* is strongly associated with its root $\sqrt{drś}$ (to see) and then means something like *Weltanschauung*, which refers not to a set of ideas but rather to a vision that is transformable. In Jain texts two kind of occurrences of *darśana* can broadly be distinguished: in most settings *darśana* is translated as 'faith', but in the Jain doxographies it is commonly translated as 'philosophical system' or 'viewpoint'. The first kind of occurrence, that refers to the *mokṣamārga*, seems to be typical for the Jain context, while the second seems to have a closer link to the general Indian context. But actually, both translations are related to each other, since in all Indian contexts faith and philosophy are essentially connected. Looking at the development of the use of the term *darśana* will help clarify how these two occurrences are related.

An important part of the complexity of the term *darśana* in the Jain tradition is its association with *samyaktva* and *mithyātva*, right and wrong belief – this last term, by the way, often

occurs in the *Darśanasāra*. In the early history of the word, *darśana* is strongly intertwined with *samyak* and *mithyā*, and this relationship is formulated in terms of karma.²⁰ In this context *darśana* is the object of a specific type of karma, namely *darśanamohanīya karma*, karma that deludes the soul's natural disposition of having the right view or faith (Folkert 1993: 116).²¹

Moreover, Folkert suggests that the eight-fold karma scheme, and thus the link of *darśana* with a specific type of karma, is later than the consistent connection of *darśana* with *samyak* and *mithyā* and with karma in general (1993: 117). Indeed the earliest references of *darśana*, like in the oldest parts of the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*,²² mostly use the term in the expressions *samyakdarśana* or *mithyādarśana* (especially this last word is used). These expressions then refer to a karmic condition of the soul, existing in several stages in which the soul can gradually move from the condition of *mithyādarśana* (having wrong view or belief) to several varieties of *samyakdarśana*. *Samyakdarśana* here consists of the removal of karma that was piled up in *mithyādarśana* and that prevents the soul from enjoying its natural faculty of *darśana*. So in this very early use, *darśana* refers to a state of the soul.

However, in later portions of the same text, the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga*, the term seems to obtain a slightly different meaning. The text is speaking of men possessed of various *ditṭhis* (or *darśanas*), and talks about teachers who each put forth their own *darśana*. It even mentions the way (*magga*) of the speaker's own *darśana* (Folkert 1993: 119). These occurrences mark a definit shift in the meaning of *darśana*. It is not used anymore only as a condition of the soul, but also as an abstract element, external to the soul.

Another side of this same development of *darśana* is that the term seems to gradually lose its connection to karma and refers more and more to a certain viewpoint, which can be qualified either as *samyak* or as *mithyā*. All terms (*darśana*, *samyaktva* and *mithyātva*) thus become more independent of each other, although they do keep a certain relationship. In this relationship *darśana* is someone's viewpoint and *samyaktva* and *mithyātva* are qualifiers of this viewpoint.

Now we can see how the translation of *darśana* as viewpoint is indeed related to its translation as faith in the *mokṣamārga* (path to liberation). *Darśana* in the *mokṣamārga*,

²⁰ A more fully developed explanation on the theory of karma in Jain thought will follow later in this dissertation. For now it is enough to know that karma is a kind of matter that can be attached to the soul (*jīva*), and that this attachment is obstructing the soul to attain liberation, which is the ultimate goal. Also, one needs to have the correct view or knowledge to remove this karma from the soul.

²¹ In fact, considering the eight types of karma (see section 1.3), this type co-exists with the *darśanāvaraṇa karma*: karma that obscures perception; this shows that a distinction between *darśana* as faith and as perception is an early feature of Jain thought (Folkert 1993: 116).

²² The *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* is the second *Aṅga* of the Śvetāmbara canon and thus one of the oldest Jain texts.

which is a later use of the term, is also a product of the development of *darśana* becoming an element external to the soul, that is not a cognitive state anymore. Right faith (*samyakdarśana*) is one of the three essential elements (three jewels) needed on the path to liberation, next to right conduct, and right knowledge. It is explained as the relationship between a person and the Jain categories of truth or *tattvas*, that become more and more prominent in the Jain thought.²³ Just like in its meaning of viewpoint, this use of *darśana* in the *mokṣamārga* with its prominence of the *tattvas* was made possible by the above described process in which the link between karma and *darśana* was considerably loosened, and *samyak* and *mithyā* became independent elements, qualifiers of *darśana*. However, in this context *darśana* seems to be solely linked to *samyak* and not to *mithyā*.

As we have now seen how the concept of *darśana* in the Jain tradition changed over time, it would be suitable to start comparing the foregoing explanation with Devasena's text. But before doing that, I would first like to say something more about *darśana* in the Jain doxographies, because this might be guiding in the understanding of *darśana* in the *Darśanasāra*.

The fact that the use of *darśana* shifts from an internal condition of the soul, to an external view or belief of a certain person or even school has its consequences for the Jain doxographies, in which *darśana* is almost exclusively translated as view or system. Because when *darśana* is disconnected from the soul's inner area of karma, then there arises a need to discuss what exactly makes up a right or a wrong *darśana* (*samyaktva* or *mithyātva*).²⁴ To answer this the Jain authors formulated several marks or aspects of *samyaktva* (i.e. *samyak darśana*) or made lists of the elements that caused transgressions against *samyaktva*, i.e. *mithyātva*. Examples of such marks of *samyaktva* are: the Jina, the scriptures (*āgama*), the categories of truth (*tattva*), the right *deva*, the right guru, etc. The Digambara notion of six non-abodes of *samyaktva*, thus being *mithyātva*, also serve as a good example to understand what makes up a *darśana*. These are (Folkert 1993: 122):

- 1) false divinities (*kudeva*)
- 2) false ascetics (*kuliṅgin*)

²³ The *tattvas* are explained in a further section (*The Five Mithyātvās*), but roughly refer to what someone believes to be true or existent. In a certain tradition they are the principles of that tradition. So in the Jain context a person has *samyakdarśana* when he adheres to these *tattvas*.

²⁴ In the earlier meaning of the term *darśana* the answer on the question what makes up the state of *mithyādarśana* is the view-deluding karma, because it is the attachment of this karma to the soul, that causes the soul to be in this state.

- 3) false scriptures (*kuśāstra*)
- 4) worship of false divinities (*kudevasevā*)
- 5) worship of false ascetics (*kuliṅgisevā*)
- 6) worship of false scriptures (*kuśāstrasevā*)

The Jain doxographies reproduced some of these aspects to build their explanation of several *darśanas* or views around. But because most doxographies lack refutation of other views (according to Folkert), they do not qualify these aspects with *samyak* or *mithyā*.²⁵ It is also important to know that the authors of the doxographies never explicitly say what they mean with *darśana*, so these marks are almost the only clues to understand the significance of *darśana* in these texts.

So what marks of *darśana* do we find in the doxographies? Haribhadra writes in his *Ṣaḍdarśanamuccaya* that there are six *darśanas* (systems) and that they are to be known according to differences in *devatā* and *tattva*. *Devatā* refers here not to ‘gods’ but to the ‘accomplished beings’ according to a certain *darśana*. So for example, the Nyāya view is marked by Śiva as *devatā* and the sixteen categories as *tattvas*, while the Jain view is marked by the Jinās as *devatā* and the seven categories as *tattvas* (Folkert 1993: 124). In the doxography of Rājaśekhara, which also has the title *Ṣaḍdarśanamuccaya*, we find a more expanded set of marks for a *darśana*. Next to *devatā* and *tattva* the text makes use of mark (*liṅga*, the symbol or object associated with a particular school), dress, conduct (ascetic praxis), guru, means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*), the nature of liberation (*mokṣa*), and logic (*tarka*) as aspects of a *darśana* (Folkert 1993:127). Merutuṅga in his *Ṣaḍdarśananirṇaya* also names *devatā* and *tattva* as indication of a *darśana*, but then puts three more marks into this framework: *deva*, *guru*, and *dharma*, which is described as ‘that which arises as the result of the declaration of the all-knowing one’ (Folkert 1993: 140-141). In contrast to the two above Merutuṅga does refute other *darśanas* on these grounds. Other than these Folkert discusses two more doxographies, in which there is a greater emphasis on *tattva* as mark of *darśana*.²⁶ According to Folkert this shows the growing role of *tattva* in the development of Jain thought which was gradually moving away from the analytical approach dominated by karma towards establishing a set of categories and means of knowledge (1993: 134). It is obvious from discussing these marks of *darśana* that when we talk about a view or a system in the Jain tradition, it is not the same as a view or a system (a philosophy) in Western thought. *Darśana*

²⁵ Which again proves the independence of *darśana* from *mithyā* and *samyak* and thus from the soul.

²⁶ The two other doxographies are the *Vivekavilāsa* by Jinadatta and the anonymous *Sarvasiddhāntapraveśaka*.

in this translation is very close to *darśana* as faith in the *mokṣamārga* and it might even be translated with the same word (although not having the same connotation).

Now I'll turn to the main subject of this dissertation and try to build up an understanding of what is meant by the term *darśana* in the *Darśanasāra*. A good way to start is by trying to find elements that could be identified as marks of *darśana* in comparison to the marks stated above. Devasena does not state in his introduction, as Haribhadra or Rājaśekhara do, what makes a certain *darśana* different from another one. That is why I will examine on what basis Devasena refutes other communities and will generalise these accusations into marks of *darśana*.

One basis of refutation is eating or drinking habits. This is described in verse seven, when Devasena talks about Buddhakīrti. Another refutable habit is the carrying of the wrong kind of chowrie, namely one made of a yak's tail instead of peacock feathers, or not carrying a chowrie. In the same category is having a fixed abode (verse twenty-seven), and performing the wrong rituals (verse forty-six). All these accusations have to do with how an ascetic behaves. Therefore I would place them under the mark of conduct as in Rājaśekhara's text. What a monk wears or more that a monk wears clothes, like in verse fourteen and twenty-nine, are also related to conduct, but as Rājaśekhara separates this as a mark, I'll name 'dress' as a mark of *darśana*. Devasena further refutes on the basis of having false scriptures (verse fifteen and thirty-six) and following a bad guru (verse forty-two). These are marks of *darśana* on their own. 'Bowling to the wrong gods' (verse nineteen) can be seen as representing the mark *devatā*, and resembles strongly number four of the six non-abodes of *samyaktva* for Digambaras. Then there are some refutable things that are rather dogmatic but do not accord with *tattvas*, like the idea that women can obtain liberation (verse thirteen) or that there is no rebirth (verse twenty-one). I would place them under the mark *dharma* as in Merutuṅga's description. Unlike the discussed doxographies Devasena does not seem to stress the concept of *tattva* too much. He uses this word only in two verses. In verse twenty-two it does indeed seem like *tattva* is synonymous of *darśana*. This verse also show that the *mokṣamārga* does play a role, because he says "a *tattva* that diverges from the path of the jinas", which is the path to liberation. In the second occurrence (verse forty-four) *tattva* seems to mean mere truth, and does not refer to any principle or category of truth.

What really is at stake in the *Darśanasāra* is whether and how a community is to be qualified as having wrong belief, *mithyātva*. So if we think again of how the term *darśana* changed over time and how it was cut loose from the soul and its karmic state, it is obvious that

darśana in the *Darśanasāra* belongs to the later conceptualisation. *Darśana* in Devasena's text is indeed an abstract, external element, because it can be qualified as either *mithyātva* (all the discussed communities in the text), or as *samyaktva* (Devasena's own community that is not discussed). As said above Folkert identifies in this development of *darśana* a shift away from the area of karma, but I think he is overstating the case. Maybe it is true that *darśana* lost its influence of or obstruction by the karmic matter, but *darśana* and *mithyātva* (or *mithyādarśana*) still have a strong link with karma theory. At least they do in the *Darśanasāra*, where there is reference to the subtypes of *mohanīya* karma (see 'The Five types of *mithyātva*'). The explanation on how *darśana* is to be understood in the doxographies is very applicable here. This is shown by the fact that marks of *darśana* similar to the ones given in the doxographies, are found in the *Darśanasāra*. These are: conduct, dress, guru, scriptures, *devatā*, and *dharma*. *Darśana-Sāra* can thus be translated as 'The Essence of [certain] Viewpoints'. But, as I have said, a viewpoint in the Jain tradition (and the Indian tradition in general) is not the same as what is called a philosophy in the West. Here a viewpoint is to be understood as a group that has certain beliefs on the above described aspects. And if this belief is right then it will guide someone on the way to liberation.

1.2 The *Darśanasāra* as a doxography (?)

From the analysis on the concept of *darśana* it is clear that the *Darśanasāra* has at least some similarity with the Jain doxographies, namely the fact that both in the *Darśanasāra* and in the doxographies *darśana* is an abstract complex that loosened its link with karma, that is external to the soul, and is characterized by a set of practices, principles, recognised deities, gurus etc. But can the *Darśanasāra* be categorised as a doxography or not? To answer this question, it is first needed to have a better knowledge on the Jain doxographies themselves.

The term doxography was first coined by the German scholar Hermann Alexander Diels. He created this neologism, that combines *δόξα* (opinion, vision) and *γράφειν*, to refer to Greek and Roman texts that describe the viewpoints of previous philosophers or philosophies. But, it has also been adopted to refer to a group of texts that have been produced in India, mostly in Sanskrit (Nicholson 2012: 103). Of the few scholars who wrote on this topic, not all have the same idea of what may be placed under this category. Halbfass, for example, says that the bulk of these Indian texts were written either by Jains or by Advaita Vedāntins. Among the

Jain authors he names Haribhadra, Merutuṅga and Rājaśekhara with their works as named above, while famous Advaita Vedānta works were those by Mādhava-Vidyāraṇya and Śaṅkara, the *Ṣaḍdarśanīśiddhāntasamgraha* and the *Sarvamatasamgraha* (Halbfass 1988: 351). Qvarnström says that doxographic treatises are mostly found in the Mādhyamika tradition of Mahāyāna Buddhism, the Śvetāmbara tradition of Jainism and the Advaita Vedānta tradition of Brāhmaṇism (Qvarnström 1999: 174). He includes more works under the category of doxographies and divides this category into three types. The first two types contain texts that phrase their own doctrinal position in relation to that of the opponent, a device that was already used in the Upaniṣads and the early Jain and Buddhist scriptures. They differ in the fact that type one displays a fictitious dialogue between the author and his opponent or opponents, while the texts of the second type present first the vision of the opponent and then in the same chapter give the answer or critique by the author. The third type contains texts that simply outline one system after the other in separate chapters, without giving a refutation of these positions (Qvarnström 1999: 174). It seems that Halbfass does not reckon these first two types as doxographies. The works he names all have the structure of the third type. Of these works the Jain texts (except for that of Merutuṅga) seem to be neutral about other positions. The Advaita Vedānta authors indeed do not systematically refute their opponents, but they do structure their works hierarchically. Śaṅkara's *Sarvasiddhāntasamgraha*, for example, starts with the Lokāyata system (as lowest system), then describes the Jain, the Buddhist, the Vaiśeṣika, the Nyāya system, and goes on with the Mīmāṃsā, the Sāṃkhya, Yoga, and the Vedavyāsa doctrine, to end with the 'perfect' Advaita Vedānta system (Halbfass 1988: 351-352).

Next to these formal characteristics Qvarnström recognizes some generic properties in the category of doxographies. The most striking feature is their lack of assigning historicity to the several *darśanas*: the philosophical strands are all treated as if they are eternally fixed system and not products of history (1999: 174). Folkert acknowledges this for the Jain doxographies (1993: 343). Another property is that no doxographic treatise is critical towards Yoga, probably because most Indian traditions have integrated the yoga practice. Further, the Buddhist and Jain doxographies written in the first millennium CE do not include the Vedāntins in their texts, possibly because the Vedānta system had not yet gained enough public or academic recognition (Qvarnström 1999: 175).

What interests us the most, of course, are the Jain doxographies. They discuss several schools and various known issues of Indian thought. Their approach can be described as descriptive,

and even historical (even though they do present the systems as eternally fixed).²⁷ Almost all of the Jain doxographies contain no refutations of the discussed positions (Merutuṅga's work being an exception). That is why they are often given as an example of the tolerance that is seen as typical in Indian thought. But such an analysis is based on the tendency to see the doxographies in the light of what one is seeking, it is a teleological conclusion.

Another such conclusion is that the doxographies represent the beginnings of some notion of a history of philosophy (Folkert 1993: 341). Most of these doxographies are oriented around six *darśanas*. They often have the number six (*ṣaḍ-*) in their title, but sometimes discuss the Materialists (Lokāyata) as seventh school of thought. Halbfass explains the importance of the number by referring to the fact that the number six also figures in other classifications of traditional branches of learning, like the six Vedic auxiliary sciences and the six medical schools (1988: 352). Traditionally in Jain doxographies the six *darśanas* are: Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika (if considered as one), Sāṃkhya, Buddhist, Mīmāṃsā, Jaina and Lokāyata.

If we now look again at the *Darśanasāra* it seems that, although the word 'doxography' in its literal meaning would be a proper term for this type of literature, the text is not really comparable to what scholars understand with the category of doxographies. Firstly, Devasena describes not six but ten *darśanas*. And even as this number six is not imperative, it is distinctive that six of Devasena's *darśanas* are subdivisions of the Jain strand, while the other authors refer to the Jains in general. If we then assess the *Darśanasāra* on the generic properties as described by Qvarnström, the text does not pass the test. Indeed there is no mention of Vedānta or Yoga, but that is because there is no differentiation at all between what we know as the several *āstika* systems.²⁸ So these two features are not applicable. For the third generic property, the *Darśanasāra* does precisely the opposite, as it gives the names and dates of the founders of the several described *darśanas*. The historical layer in this text is exactly what has interested most scholars to look at the *Darśanasāra*. Structurally the text

²⁷ This probably needs some explanation, because if the doxographies present the systems as eternally fixed, then how can their approach be historical? It is Folkert who writes that the doxographies can be seen as having a historical approach (1993: 341). I think he means that we scholars, or students of Indian thought can see some historical aspects in the doxographies. We can make historical assumptions about some *darśanas* based on the doxographies. The doxographies themselves however do indeed present the systems as if they are eternally fixed. No dates are given, nor is any evolution of thought ascribed to them.

²⁸ *Āstika* is a term used to differentiate two kinds of systems: the *āstika* and the *nāstika* traditions. *Āstika* refers to those traditions that accept the authority of the Vedas. The *āstika* thinking consists of the Mīmāṃsā, Vedānta, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Yoga and Sāṃkhya schools. The *nāstikas* do not adhere to the Vedas. They are the Jainas, Buddhists and materialists.

describes one system after the other, like a doxography. But it is not neutral: denouncing other views is essential in this work.

In order to have a more direct and even fuller insight into what a doxography is, I have read the translations of the Jain doxographies given by Folkert (1993: 341-409) and Qvarnström (1999: 189-199). From this I can conclude that the real difference with the *Darśanasāra* is that doxographies are very systematic and to the point and that what we would call doctrinal principles are central in these texts. With systematic I mean that the doxographies discuss the same aspects of each *darśana* in the same order. For example, Haribhadra in his *Ṣaḍdarśanamuccaya* starts each chapter with the *devatā* of the *darśana* and then describes its *tattvas*. The texts are also ‘list-like’: they give the different principles and their subcategories with only a concise explanation. The best example for this ‘list-style’ is Jinadatta’s *Vivekavilāsa*. He writes (Folkert 1993: 403):

258. For the Bauddha, Sugata is the deity,
and everything is a momentary flux;
Their *tattva* is tetrad, called the noble truths,
is ordered as follows:
259. There is sorrow, and the basis (*āyatana*);
from it is held to come the arising (*samudaya*);
There is also the way (*mārga*); let be heard
the explanation of this, in this way:
260. Sorrow consists in the transient *skandhas*,
and they are declared to be five:
Vijñāna, vedanā, samjñā,
saṃskara, and rūpa.
- [...]

This quote also shows what kind of principles most doxographies discuss: they are doctrinal principles like the ontological categories or the means of knowledge. Devasena’s text on the other hand puts much more stress on behavioural principles than on *tattvas*. As I have said in the discussion on the marks of *darśana*, Rājaśekhara does say something about how the monks of a *darśana* behave and what kind of clothes they wear (if they wear any). He even writes on the divisions among Digambaras, because they have a different opinion on the

whisk they carry. Still, the way Rājaśekhara describes this is very systematic, unlike Devasena's text, because for every *darśana* he presents the 'darśana-marks' as he stated them in his introduction. The given division among Jains comes from the fact that they differ in these *darśana*-marks.

Putting all this information together I can say that the *Darśanasāra* by Devasena is not a doxography. The term *darśana* is indeed to be taken in the same meaning as in the doxographies: an abstract, external concept that refers to a certain opinion, view or even belief. But the explanation on the *darśanas* is different. Most contrasting is that the *Darśanasāra* tries to give a historical account and that it does not give a neutral and systematic description. On this lack of neutrality one could say that Merutuṅga's doxography is not neutral either, but this text refutes other views on a logical basis in a pragmatic way. Devasena's work is more morally and maybe even emotionally loaded, as it contains words like *duṣṭa* (wicked), *manda* (foolish), *mūḍha* (stupid), *pāpa* (sin), *mahāghora* (very horrible), and *bhraṣṭa* (corrupt). Examining the *Darśanasāra* in the light of the doxographic literature is thus not a good way to analyse this text.

To finalise this section I want to make two more observations. Firstly I want to raise the question of how Devasena himself wanted to present his literature; with what other literary works did he want to compare his *Darśanasāra*? He might have chosen to use the word *darśana* in his title to give his work more authority, because the word seems to carry some objectivity in it. Or, Devasena might have known Haribhadra's *Ṣaḍdarśanamuccaya* and was inspired by it. I cannot answer this question, but I think it is an interesting question to ask and to keep in mind while assessing the foregoing section. The second remark I want to make is that the category of doxographic literature is a category created by nowadays scholars. The Indian authors did never place the texts I mentioned in one category; they did not see them as similar (maybe the Jain authors internally did) and certainly never thought of something like the concept 'doxography'. Moreover in present scholarship there is no agreement on what the doxographic category exactly includes. As I have said, Qvarnström has a much wider idea of the category than Halbfass for example. His conceptualization primarily lays stress on the philosophical element in doxographies. The only requirement for a text to be included in this category seems to be that it mentions more than one real philosophy.²⁹ If we can broaden Halbfass' conceptualization of a doxography (which is 'a text that explains several systems systematically and neutrally'), I could also suggest another way of opening up this category.

²⁹ With 'real philosophy' I mean the idea of philosophy as we see it in the West; with a logically explained doctrine, with an ontology and epistemology, etc.

In my conceptualization the category of doxographies could then include all texts that describe several *darśanas* one after the other in a doctrinal or praxis-related way, neutrally or not neutrally. Such conceptualization could be especially interesting for the Indian context where the separation of doctrine and praxis seems hard to maintain. This category of doxographies would then comprise all the texts Halbfass sees as doxographies, but also texts like Devasena's *Darśanasāra*. Here, I will not actually defend this thesis further because I'm not a specialist in doxographic literature and thus don't want to mingle in the debate. But it is at least important to question the efficacy of the categorisation of doxographies in analysing Indian literature.

1.3 The five types of *mithyātva*

In the two previous subchapters I have said some words about the framework of the *Darśanasāra* from a philosophical perspective. Now I want to examine other philosophical references Devasena makes in the text itself. Actually in my opinion there is only one 'big' philosophical issue that needs to be explained and contextualized, because it makes up part of the structure of the text. In the fifth verse of the *Darśanasāra* Devasena says that false belief (*mithyātva*) can either be *ekānta*, *sāṃśāyika*, *viparīta*, *vinayaja* or *ajñāna*. What do these terms mean? In what context can they be placed? A good strategy is to try to find them in other (preferably Digambara) Jain texts. I found references to these five kinds of false belief in a commentary on the *Tattvārthasūtra* and in the *Gommatasāra*. From these references I could conclude that this verse must be placed in the context of karma-theory, more specifically in the context of the mechanisms of bondage. In the following sentences I'll give a general explanation about the Jain conception of karma and rebirth, and then go deeper into the mechanisms of bondage to explain the five types of *mithyātva* (as told by Devasena). This description is first of all based on Jaini's chapter on the mechanisms of bondage (1979: 107-133). But I also used primary sources as the *Tattvārthasūtra* and one of its commentaries the *Sarvārthasiddhi*. The *Tattvārthasūtra*, 'A Manual for Understanding That Which Is', is a work written by the Jain thinker Umāsvāti or Umāsvāmi³⁰ whose date is placed between the first and the sixth century C.E. (Tatia: 2007: vii). The text is accepted as authoritative by all Jain affiliations and is commented upon by great Jain thinkers. In his foreword Tatia, who

³⁰ The Digambara Jains traditionally call him Umāsvāmi, while the Śvetāmbaras refer to him as Umāsvāti (Hoernle 1891: 352).

translated the *Tattvārthasūtra*, writes that this text “encapsulates the religious, ethical and philosophical contents of the Jain scriptures and places them in the context of the schools of logic and philosophy that flourished in India in the second century” (Tatia 2007: xxi). Although in the *Tattvārthasūtra* reference is made to *mithyātva*, the text does not mention the five kinds of *mithyātva*. Therefore I had to turn to the *Sarvārthasiddhi*, ‘An Exposition of Reality’, which is a commentary written by Pūjyapāda Devanandi. This version of the *sūtras* and their explanation is considered by the Digambaras as a faithful rendering of the *Tattvārthasūtra* (Tatia 2007: xxvii).

Other than that, I used the *Gommatasāra Jīvakāṇḍa* written by Nemicandra Siddhānta Cakravarti. According to its Sanskrit commentaries this work together with the *Gommatasāra Karmakāṇḍa* is a compilation of the answers given by the author to the questions of Rājā Cāmuṇḍa Rāya. He asked Nemicandra to enumerate the subclasses of bodymaking karma, and to explain their existence, bondage, non-bondage, and cessation of bondage with regard to the spiritual stages of souls in various conditions of life from the completely undeveloped vegetable soul, to the fully developed rational beings. From what we know, the answers would be based on the ancient manuscripts Dhavala, Jaya Dhavala and Mahā Dhavala. The work was probably named *Gommatasāra* because Cāmuṇḍa Rāya was also called Rājā Gommata. The work was probably written at the end of the tenth century, thus a bit later than Devasena’s *Darśanasāra* (Nemicandra 1927: 5-6). Therefore it is especially interesting to see what the *Gommatasāra* has to say about the five *mithātvas* in comparison to Devasena’s words.

We now have sufficient materials in mind to investigate Jain karma-theory and its links with Devasena’s text. As in most Indian traditions human and non-human beings are in a constant cycle of rebirth. Their souls can be reborn in several forms ranging from microscopically small creatures to gods. This last category obviously being superior to the first. But the ultimate goal is of course getting out of this samsaric cycle. To know how one can obtain this state of liberation Jain scholars established a precise analysis of karma. To understand this karma-analysis fully, it is best to start from the seven *tattvas* or categories of truth as given in the *Tattvārthasūtra*. Knowledge of and faith in the *tattvas* is essential to obtain true insight and thus progress on the path to liberation. The seven categories of truth (*tattvas*) are: (1) souls (*jīva*), (2) non-sentient entities (*ajīva*), (3) influx of karmic particles to the soul (*āsrava*), (4) binding of the karmic particles to the soul (*bandha*), (5) stopping the inflow of karmic particles (*saṃvara*), (6) falling away of the karmic particles (*nirjarā*), (7) liberation from

karmic bondage (*mokṣa*) (Tatia 2007: 6). I'll only go deeper into the first four *tattvas* because the three last *tattvas* are not needed to understand *mithyātva* and its five types. The *jīva* is the soul that gets reborn each time in a different body and there is an infinite number of these souls in space. Of *ajīva*, the non-sentient entities, an important kind is matter and karma is understood by Jains as such material *ajīva*. Karmic particles float about in space, but can be attached to the soul. This is what causes rebirth.³¹ I'll now turn to the third and fourth *tattva*, to explain how this process works. Because the soul has always been impure - an impurity conditioned by its previous life - there is a continuous interaction between karma and soul. From the soul's impurity arises an energy that causes vibrations (*yoga*). These vibrations are reflected in the actual activities of beings. The vibrations then cause an influx (*āsrava*) of karma, the third category of truth (i.e. the third *tattva*). But this influx doesn't mean that the karma sticks to the soul, there is no real bondage (*bandha*). For that the soul needs to be "moistened", as Jaini expresses so eloquently, by passions. That is why in the state of *vītarāgatā* (passionless-ness) karma cannot bind to the soul (1979: 112). However, the explanation of karma-theory or karmic bondage is even more complicated.

There are eight types of karmas, which can be divided into two groups: *ghātiyā* (destructive karmas) and *aghātiyā* (non-destructive or secondary karmas). The eight types are: (1) perception-obscuring (*darśana-āvaranīya*), (2) knowledge-obscuring (*jñāna-āvaranīya*), (3) obstructing (*antarāya*), (4) deluding (*mohanīya*), (5) feeling (of pleasure or pain) (*vedanīya*), (6) body-determining (*nāma*), (7) age-determining (*āyu*), and (8) family- or environment-determining (*gotra*). These eight types of material karmas correspond with the eight types of karmic bondage as given in verse 8.5 of the *Tattvārthasūtra* (Tatia 2007: 191). The first four are *ghātiyā*, the other four are *aghātiyā*. Actually, it is not that the destructive karmas impose destruction upon the soul, because karmas cannot impose anything upon the soul. It is rather so that these karmas, when bound to it, trigger the soul to change in a negative way. Furthermore most karmas (like the three first) just act to obstruct the qualities of the soul, like dust may obscure the reflective power of a mirror. Only the *mohanīya* karmas can cause defilement of the soul. Moreover, before the first three *ghātiyā* karmas can exert their influence, the soul must have obtained such defilement (Jaini 1979: 117). The *mohanīya* karmas cause the soul to be confused and desirous and are basically of two types: *darśana-mohanīya* (view-deluding) and *cāritra-mohanīya* (conduct-deluding) *karma*. The first type functions to prevent a soul's insight into its own nature, while the second type generates the

³¹ Attachment is more like an association between karma and soul, as there cannot be real contact between the two because of their different nature (Jaini 1979: 113-114).

passions that constitute desire in the soul (Jaini 1979: 118). It is only the first type that is of importance regarding the *Darśanasāra*. Of this type of view-deluding karmas there are three subtypes, namely false belief or the deluded worldview (*mithyātva mohaniya*), the nearly perfect enlightened worldview (*samyaktva mohaniya*) and a mixture of these two (Tatia 2007: 193). Glasenapp explains these three subtypes and what happens when they are bound to the soul nicely in the following description (1942: 8):

1. *mithyātva-k*. This causes complete unbelief or heterodoxy. If it realizes itself, the *jīva* does not believe in the truths as proclaimed by Mahāvīra ; he believes false prophets to be saints and enjoins false doctrines.
2. *samyagmithyātva-(miśra-) k*. This produces a mixed belief, i.e., if it operates the soul waves to and fro betwixt true and false ; it is indifferent to the religion of the Jina and has no predilection for, nor hatred against it.
3. *samyaktva-k*. This induces the correct belief. This *samyaktva* is, however, not the correct faith in its completeness, but only in a preliminary degree ; it is a so-called *mithyātva*, from which the *mithyātva*-quality has been abstracted, a *mithyātva* free from poison (Kṛ. I. 35a, 113a). The true belief in its perfection is only obtained, when the atoms of the *samyaktva-mohaniya-k* have disappeared, even as milk which is covered by quite clear water only becomes perfectly pure after the water has been poured off.

Devasena only talks about the subtype of *mithyātva mohaniya karma*. The explanation by Glasenapp is in my opinion a good way to have a basic understanding of what happens when someone proclaims *mithyātva* (false belief) and is thus under the influence of *mithyātva mohaniya karma*. Let us now have a look at what a contemporary text, the *Gommatasāra Jīvakāṇḍa* says about this in its fifteenth verse (Nemicandra 1927: 12):

(The delusion stage) or wrong belief-thought-activity (Mithyātva) is caused by the operation of the wrong-belief, (Mithyātva) sub-class of the right-belief-deluding Karma. It consists in not having belief in things as they are (Tattvārtha) (i.e., the seven Principles, Tattvas of Jainism). Wrong-belief is of 5 kinds: --

- (1) One-sided belief (Ekanta)
- (2) Perverse belief (Viparīta).
- (3) Veneration (of false creeds- Vinaya).
- (4) Doubtful belief (Samshaya)

(5) Indiscriminate belief (Ajnāna).

First of all this verse says that the *mithyātva*-subtype of the view-deluding karma causes the soul to remain in the *mithyātva* stage (the delusion stage). This refers to the fourteen stages of spiritual development for the soul to attain liberation. *Mithyātva* or *mithyā-dṛṣṭi* is the first and lowest of these fourteen *guṇasthānas*.³² Secondly, with this verse we finally get to understand why a clear understanding of the Jain karma-theory is relevant for the discussion concerning Devasena's intention in the fifth verse of the *Darśanasāra*. Here the five *mithyātvās* are said to be five kinds of the false-belief-stage (the first *guṇasthāna*) caused by the view-deluding karma. The *Sarvārthasiddhi* however, gives this division of five when it commentates upon the verse of the *Tattvārthasūtra* on the causes of bondage. This verse (of the *Tattvārthasūtra*) says "The five causes of bondage are: deluded world-view, non-abstinence, laxity, passions and the actions of the body, speech and mind." (Tatia 2007: 189). According to the *Sarvārthasiddhi* the first cause of bondage (*mithyā-darśana*) can broadly be divided into those deluded views which are natural and those produced by instruction of others. The deluded views produced by others then, can be further divided into five types: *ekānta*, *viparīta*, *saṃśaya*, *vinaya*, and *ajñāna* (Tatia 2007: 189). So while the *Gommatasāra* explains these five types as being subtypes of the first *guṇasthāna* (i.e. the false-belief-stage) caused by karma already attached to the soul, the *Sarvārthasiddhi* describes them as being subtypes of causes for karma to be bound to the soul. I would explain this paradox in the following way: Before karmas other than the *mohanīya karma* can be bound to the soul, the soul must be defiled by *mohanīya karma*. So *mohanīya karma* is an indirect cause for karmic bondage. When this type of karma is bound to a soul, this soul is in the stage of *mithyātva*. In this way the stage of *mithyātva* (or *mithyā-darśana*) is an indirect cause for karmic bondage.

This whole explanation is complicated by the fact that the word *mithyātva* is used on at least two levels: *mithyātva* as material karma, subtype of *darśana-mohanīya karma*, and *mithyātva* as a condition, a stage (*guṇasthāna*) of the soul which is caused by that type of karma.

I'll try to summarize this complicated story on *mithyātva* and its five subtypes by following Jaini's explanation. It is the *mithyātva* kind of the *darśana mohanīya karma* that engenders the first stage of spiritual development called *mithyātva* or *mithyā-dṛṣṭi*. A soul in this stage has a fundamental tendency to see things other than as they really are. And this tendency is

³² Here I will not elaborate on this subject in the present dissertation. For those who want to know more about the *guṇasthānas*, Jaini gives an overview of the fourteen stages at the end of the eighth chapter of his *Jaina Path of Purification* (1979: 141; 272-273).

developed from an individual's experience into the five varieties of erroneous views (*mithyātva*): *ekānta*, *viparīta*, *saṁśaya*, *vinaya*, and *ajñāna* (1979: 131).

Now what does it mean to have *ekānta* or *viparīta mithyātva* etc?

(1) *Ekānta* or extremism, as Jaini translates, is when someone takes a one-sided position about the nature of existents. This can be eternalist as well as annihilationist (1979: 118). The *Sarvārthasiddhi* states that someone takes a one-sided position when he says for example that the supreme being alone is everything, or that everything is permanent or everything is momentary (Pūjyapāda 1960: 216). The *Gommatasāra* does not really explain the meaning of *ekānta*, but interestingly says that one-sided belief is “as in Buddhists” (Nemicandra 1927: 12). In fact, for all five kinds of *mithyātva* the *Gomattasāra* states a correspondent ideology. This is interesting because in the *Darśanasāra* Devasena also writes about the Buddha that he established a one-sided doctrine. So both texts explicitly relate *ekānta mithyātva* with Buddhism. The texts themselves do not explain why Buddhism should be seen as one-sided. A possible explanation could be that Buddhist say that everything is subject to change, everything is conditioned which is also a reason why they reject the idea of a self. Jains on the other hand, say that it is true that the soul changes, but it does exist, there is some permanence in the soul. The Buddhist view that everything is conditioned could be seen as a one-sided view to reality.

(2) Having contradictory or *viparīta* belief is when someone imputes to a thing certain characteristics which are contradictory to that thing's nature (Jaini 1979: 118). Examples of such belief are: “The unbound ascetic may keep material possessions.”, “The omniscient consume food.”, etc (Tatia 2007: 190). According to the *Gommatasāra* Brahmans adhere to the contradictory view (Nemicandra 1927: 12). The *Darśanasāra* does not directly refer to Brahmans, but names Parvata Vaktra as founder of the *viparīta* view.³³

(3) *saṁśaya* or doubt should be explained as skepticism or lack of conviction about the truths one has learned (Jaini 1979: 118). In the *Sarvārthasiddhi* we read that this type of *mithyātva* occurs when for example someone is not sure whether right faith, right knowledge and right conduct (the tree gems of Jainism) may or may not lead to liberation. In the *Gommatasāra* is written that followers of Indra have such doubtful belief (Nemicandra 1927: 13). Commentators of this work believe that ‘followers of Indra’ refers to the Śvetāmbaras. But this fact is very uncertain, because no Śvetāmbara saint named Indra is known and also in the

³³ More will be said on Parvata Vaktra in section 2.1.

Darśanasāra there is no mention of any Indra (Premi 1917: 26). Devasena instead mentions a Jinacandra as founder of the Śvetāmbaras. On the other hand, Devasena does mention in his text every kind of *mithyātva* except for *saṃśāyika mithyātva* and if the text follows the order of *mithyātvās* in verse five, then the part on the whiteclad community should correspond to *saṃśāya*.

(4) *vinaya* or indiscriminating inclusiveness is the wrong view of someone who accepts all religious paths as equally correct, when actually they are not (Jaini 1979: 118). According to the *Gommatasāra* those who perform tapas are defiled with *vinaya mithyātva* (Nemicandra 1927: 14). On these *vainayikas* the *Darśanasāra* says that they bow to all gods equally, so indeed they do not discriminate between religious paths. It also says that they bow “as if it were a punishment”. This might refer to the *Gommatasāra*’s statement that *vainayikas* perform mortification (*tapas*).

(5) Not-by-knowledge or *ajñāna* can be signified as denying the possibility of a distinction between good and bad doctrines (Tatia 2007: 190). Followers of Maskari are said to deny knowledge in this way in the *Gommatasāra* (Nemicandra 1927: 14). The *Darśanasāra* agrees with the *Gommatasāra* in this. It states that the not-by-knowledge view was founded by the sage Maskari-Pūraṇa. Actually this is not one sage, but it refers to two ascetics: Makkhali Gosala (Maskari) and Pūraṇa Kassapa. According to the *Darśanasāra* he, and thus those who have the *ajñāna* view, believes that liberation is attained in the absence of knowledge. This is indeed how the *Sarvārthasiddhi* explains *ajñāna*.

In my translation there is one verse without number immediately following verse five (that was discussed above). This verse is unnumbered because it occurs in only one manuscript. The verse contains an enumeration and just like verse five is to be understood in the context of karma-theory. It comes straight from the *Sarvārthasiddhi* in the same part as the one in which the five kinds of *mithyātva* are explained. Actually when the *Sarvārthasiddhi* comments on the *Tattvārthasūtra*’s verse about the causes of bondage, it says that the deluded views (first cause) produced by others are divided into four or five types. The division into five types refers to what I have explained above, the division into four types is mentioned in the unnumbered verse. So when *mithyātva* as cause of bondage is divided into four types, the *Sarvārthasiddhi* says they are: “(1) activism³⁴, of which there are 180 varieties, (2) inactivism³⁵, of which there are eighty-four varieties, (3) agnosticism, of which there are

³⁴ “Belief in liberation but not in the other categories of truth (*tattva*)” (Tatia 2008: 189).

³⁵ “Disbelief in the distinction between beneficial and harmful karma” (Tatia 2008: 189).

sixty-seven varieties, (4) equal validity of all doctrines, of which there are thirty-two varieties” (Tatia 2008: 189).

I think this verse was not part of Devasena’s original text. In my opinion this verse was added by a copyist for the purpose of completeness; to ensure the fact that the *Darśanasāra* would in this context completely accord with the *Sarvārthasiddhi* or other texts that refer to these four types of *mithyātva*. In my opinion Devasena’s motive for not including this verse, is that he his intention was to refer to the five types of *mithyātva*, not to the four ones.

From the discussion on *darśana* and especially from the comparison with the known Jain doxographies it appeared that the *Darśanasāra* does not really fit into the study of Jain philosophy. And even though Devasena does refer to the Jain karma-theory, this involves only a very little part of the whole text. From this it can be asked why Devasena even mentions the five *mithyātvās*. A possible answer might be found in the Jain’s general tendency to perform reasoned classifications. In this way Devasena might have had the intention to present the five *mithyātvās* as the limited number of ways to be mistaken, just as there is a limited number of ways to know (further developed in the theory of viewpoints, *nayavāda*). By linking the *saṃghas* to karma-theory Devasena produces not only a historical but also a reasoned classification of *saṃghas*.

2. A Historical Approach

If in the *Darśanasāra* not the doctrinal points of the several communities are central, what could then be a more suitable approach to this text? It seems that the author wants to stress firstly the practices of a certain community, and secondly the foundation of that community. For most *saṃghas* he tells us who founded the community and where it arose. It is only for the Vainayikas that he mentions no founder or place of foundation. The *Darśanasāra* also often specifies at what date a certain community arose. So in that way it appears that the text is more concerned with painting a historical picture, than with setting out a fully developed philosophical reasoning. In this dynamic, it would be interesting to approach the text from a historical perspective. By consulting other sources and comparing their knowledge with that given in the *Darśanasāra* I tried to answer these questions: are the dates of foundation given by Devasena historically correct or do they approach the time at which a certain community probably arose? can we historically link the names of *ācāryas* that are mentioned in the text with that *saṃgha*? do the placenames given by Devasena correspond to the places where the *saṃgha* probably arose or was most active? are the mentioned beliefs and practices for a certain community indeed what that community believed and practiced at the time? or can some new historical things be learned from the *Darśanasāra*?

What I thus want examine in this part is: does the *Darśanasāra* contain any historical facticity? Following the structure of the text I will first briefly discuss the Buddhists, the Śvetāmbaras, the followers of the Viparītamata, the Vainayikas and the Ajñānins, and then elaborate on the Digambara groups: the Drāviḍa Saṃgha, the Yāpanīyas, the Kāṣṭha Saṃgha, the Māthura Saṃgha and the Bhillaka Saṃgha.³⁶ At the end of this chapter I will also write some words on what *saṃgha* Devasena himself belonged to and what it meant in the course of history.

2.1 The non-Digambara Saṃghas

Starting from verse six up to verse twenty-three the *Darśanasāra* talks about five communities that do not belong to Digambara Jainism. The first two communities that Devasena discusses are the Buddhists and the Śvetāmbaras. Since there is more than enough

³⁶ As I will show below it is not sure if the Yāpanīya Saṃgha was part of the wider Digambara Jain affiliation. I chose to discuss them under the title ‘The Digambara Saṃghas’ because in that way I’m following the structure of the text itself.

information available on these two groups, I will not write about their specific histories here, but will rather focus on the facts that Devasena attributes to them, in the light of their historicity.

On the Buddhists. According to Devasena the Buddha (who he calls Buddhakīrti) was first a student under a Jain teacher Pihitāsrava who was a follower of Pārśvanātha. I have not found any other reference to this story. But it is not uncommon that the Buddha was seen as originally following the Jain path. In the same verse it is also said that he stayed near the banks of the Sarayu river. This statement only shows that Devasena did have an idea of the Buddha's origin, because the Sarayu flows in the utter north of India near the border with Nepal, which is the region of Buddha's supposed hometown. About the Buddhist practices Devasena writes that the Buddha wore a reddish garment. What colour the clothes of the earliest Buddhists were is unknown or not specified, but it is historically true that they, in opposition to the Digambaras, wore some garment. For the rest Devasena's statements on the Buddhist are not really of historical value. That the Buddha ate fish and drank alcohol is not what is generally ascribed to him. The Buddhist rules (*vinaya*) explicitly prohibit the consummation of alcohol, especially for monks. On the matter of eating fish it is probable that the Buddha avoided eating meat or fish, but did not turn such food down if it was offered to him. Actually the whole section on the Buddhists in the *Darśanasāra* is clearly written from the opponent's perspective. Especially verse eight shows this, because it says that the Buddha did not abstain from eating certain food products on the ground that they do not have a soul. This kind of argument is typically Jain because for a Jain certain foods are not allowed to be eaten if they have a soul; for eating it would cause harming that soul. But the Buddhist are not concerned with the soul, so they would never refute eating certain things on that basis. Therefore we cannot ascribe historical value to what the *Darśanasāra* says about the Buddhists.

On the Śvetāmbaras. The Śvetāmbaras are said to have been founded in the year 136 V.S. (i.e. Vikrama Saṃvat) at Valabhī. I could not find another reference which indicates that this is the year generally claimed by the Digambaras for the Śvetāmbara-Digambara split. I did find that the year given traditionally in Śvetāmbara accounts lies very close to this rendering. The Śvetāmbaras say that the Digambaras separated 609 years after Mahāvīra, which is in 139 V.S. (Premi 1917: 28). Despite this conformity between the stories of the two big groups of Jainism, it is unlikely that these stories contain historicity. As the account of the Śvetāmbaras

dates from about the fifth century CE and the oldest literary version of the Digambaras goes back to the tenth century CE, the stories serve more as indices of sectarian bitterness than as historical accounts (Dundas 2002: 47). Devasena relates the arising (or rather the detachment) of the Śvetāmbaras to the council at Valabhī. This important event is seen as the “catalyst for the final hardening of boundaries between the Śvetāmbaras and the Digambaras”. However, depending on the reckoning the council took place either in 453 or 466 CE (Dundas 2002: 49). It seems that Devasena got the historical events mixed up, because he places this council some 300 years too early. Another story about the Śvetāmbara-Digambara schism which the author wants to add in his mix-up is the story of the migration to the south. He refers to this story by naming Bhadrabāhu. According to Dundas this story is the traditional Digambara account of the split between the two large groups. It tells how during a famine in the north of India a part of the original Jain community (the later Digambaras) migrated to the south under the leadership of Bhadrabāhu. The part that stayed in the north could not keep on the ‘true path’ and gradually became the apostate Śvetāmbara community (Dundas 2002: 47). In contrast to Devasena’s account the traditional Digambara rendering does not name any particular individual as founder of the group. Devasena’s description is thus probably more a piling up of authoritative stories than a historical account of what happened. The beliefs that Devasena ascribes to the Śvetāmbaras are indeed what is commonly said to be the differences between the Digambaras and Śvetāmbaras. Especially the belief in direct liberation for women and the fact that the omniscient (*kevalin*) still eats are major points of divergence. I’m not going deeper into these beliefs, because this is sufficient to understand Devasena’s text.

On the Viparītas. The next community that Devasena mentions is the community of those who have *viparīta mithyātva*. This is not the name of a known community, but probably the author wants to refer to an existing Indian group by characterizing them as contradictory (*viparīta*). As I have said above the tenth century author of the *Gommatasāra*, Nemicandra, claims that the Brahmans are those who have *viparīta mithyātva*. I cannot be sure that this is also what Devasena had in mind, but I can have look at the person he mentions: Parvata Vaktra. There is one story about a certain Parvata or Parvataka who is the student and son of a Kṣīrakadamba. The story appears in the Jain version of the Rāmāyaṇa as told by Hemacandra in his *Triṣaṣṭīśalākāpuruṣacarita*. During one of his expeditions, Rāvaṇa is disgusted by a king who performs animal sacrifice and thereafter asks his companion Nārada about the origin of these horrible sacrifices. Nārada explains that there was a guru Kṣīrakadamba who had three students: his son Parvata, prince Vasu and Nārada himself. One night Kṣīrakadamba

overheard two flying ascetics who were talking to each other about how one of the students of the guru would go the heaven while the other two would go to hell. Kṣīrakadamba was devastated and wanted to test his pupils. He gave each of them a cock and told them to kill the animal where no one would see it. Both Parvata and prince Vasu went to a desolate place and killed the cock. Nārada however realised that there would always be the Khecaras, the Lokapālas and jñānins to see his acts and that harming an animal cannot be right conduct. When the three returned Kṣīrakadamba was very proud of Nārada, but became sad when hearing about Parvata's and prince Vasu's decision. He felt as if he failed as guru and decided to become a mendicant (Johnson 1962: 143-145).

Relating this story to the *Darśanasāra* it can be said that those who have contradictory belief are those who believe that animal sacrifice is good. This is obviously a strong violation of the Jain doctrine of *ahiṃsā*. So if we ask ourselves which community Devasena wanted to refer to with *viparīta mithyātva* it is indeed possible that this is the Brāhmaṇa community. It is generally known that in the Vedic religion the Brāhmaṇas performed animal sacrifices like the *aśvamedha*. Moreover in Hemaçandra's *Rāmāyaṇa* the king who performs the animal sacrifice, to the disgust of Rāvaṇa, was ordered to do this by Brāhmaṇas. Here again, more can be said on how Devasena relates the arising of a certain group to a well-known story, than on the historical formation of that group..

On the Vainayikas. Because Devasena mentions no names, places or dates for the Vainayikas, I cannot say anything on their historicity. The only insight we can learn from the *Darśanasāra* is how they dressed and the fact that they did reverence. So I can just repeat what I have said in the section on the *mithyātvās*: that they might be ascetics who performed *tapas*. Further than this account from the *Darśanasāra* the Vainayikas are clouded in mystery.

On the Ajñānins. Starting from verse twenty Devasena presents the view of the Ajñānins, firstly saying that this community was founded by the sage Maskari-Pūraṇa. What Devasena here sees as one sage, are actually two separate but contemporary thinkers, namely Maskari (or Makkhali) Gosāla and Pūraṇa Kassapa.³⁷ The Buddhist Pali canon mentions them both as two of the important (but heretical) teachers who lived in the time of the Buddha. Makkhali Gosāla is best known as the greatest leader of the Ājivikas, one of the *nāstika* systems which

³⁷ These names are probably titles instead of real names of persons (Bronkhorst 2012: 823)

maintained a fatalistic doctrine. There are no sources coming directly from the Ājīvikas. What is known about them and about Makkhali Gosāla comes from Buddhist and Jain sources. For example in the Śvetāmbara sūtras the story about the name and the birth of Makkhali Gosāla is told. According to that story Makkhali was named Gosāla because he was born in a cowshed (*gośāla*).³⁸ I don't want to elaborate on the life of Makkhali Gosāla because the *Darśanasāra* doesn't discuss this (especially since the text sees him together with Pūraṇa Kassapa).³⁹ Information on Pūraṇa Kassapa is found mostly in the Buddhist Pali canon. Actually there is no detailed reference to him in the Jain scriptures. Therefore, our knowledge of Pūraṇa's life is more fragmentary than that of Makkhali Gosāla (Basham 1951: 82). For Pūraṇa Kassapa also, there exists a story accounting for his name: he was born as the hundredth slave in the household of his master and therefore was named Pūraṇa ("completer"). In the life stories of Pūraṇa Kassapa and Makkhali Gosāla I have found another similarity. Of both men it is said that they fled away from the house of their masters. On doing that the clothes of Makkhali Gosāla were taken away from him by his master, while in the story of Pūraṇa Kassapa his clothes were stolen by some thieves. After that both men kept wandering around completely naked. The similarity does not end here: not only Makkhali Gosāla was a leader of the Ājīvikas, but according to Basham, also Pūraṇa Kassapa must be identified with the Ājīvikas. Basham suggests that Pūraṇa was an older leader of the fatalistic doctrine who came into contact with the younger Gosāla. Gosāla advocated for the same kind of philosophical view and might have even learned under Pūraṇa. But he acquired a greater reputation than his predecessor and therefore was seen overtime as foremost leader of the Ājīvikas (Basham 1951: 90). This whole narrative shows how it was possible for Devasena to mix up both persons and see them as one figure.

Now what can we say about the beliefs Devasena ascribes to these Ājīvikas? The first belief he attributes to them, is that they think that liberation comes without knowledge, there is no knowledge. This view can be explained from the fact that the Ājīvikas believed that everything is predestined by fate. As Makkhali Gosāla would have said (Basham 1951: 13-14):

There is neither cause nor basis for the sins of living beings; they become sinful without cause or basis. Neither is there cause or basis for the purity of living beings; they become pure without cause or basis. [...] All beings, all that have breath, all that are born, all that have life,

³⁸ The whole story is told in Premi's 'outroduction' on the *Darśanasāra* (1917: 34).

³⁹ Basham wrote a lengthy chapter on him in his book *History and Doctrines of the Ājīvikas, a Vanished Indian Religion* (1951).

are without power, strength, or virtue, but are developed by destiny, chance, and nature, and experience joy and sorrow in the six classes [of existence].

So if there is no difference between (the consequences of) a good or a bad action then there is also no need to know what actions might lead to liberation, nor what actions might generate the opposite. Although Devasena and Nemicandra in the *Gommatasāra* are, as far as my knowledge goes, the only ones to call the Ājīvikas *ajñānins*, it is obvious from this quote that this is not a completely illogical naming. The other beliefs that Devasena ascribes to the followers of Maskari and Pūraṇa seem to be less grounded. Unlike the *Darśanasāra*, the Śvetāmbara *Bhagavatīsūtra* (among other sources) does ascribe the belief in rebirth to them, as it says that Gosāla taught that “All those who have reached or are reaching or will reach salvation must finish in order 8,400,000 *mahākappas* (Skt. *mahākalpas*), 7 divine births, 7 groups, 7 sentient births, [...]” (Bronkhorst 2012: 824). The *Darśanasāra* seems also to be faulty in ascribing the belief in a conscious creator to them. As said before, the Ājīvikas believed that destiny is what determines life; destiny as an unconscious force. So they couldn’t have believed in a conscious creator.

Again it is clear that Devasena’s statements contain very little historical facts, but are rather ways of disapproving of certain *saṃghas* and ways of sketching a supposedly historical portrait in which well-known stories and persons from important texts take central stage. Therefore, by reading the *Darśanasāra*, one rather learns about the way a Jain *ācārya* like Devasena was perceiving other ascetic communities.

2.2 The Digambara Saṃghas

After explaining the origin of the five *saṃghas* that are characterized by one of the five *mithyātvās*, Devasena writes from verse twenty-four till verse forty-three about the arising of some Digambara *saṃghas* and why they are condemnable. He names four *saṃghas*: the Drāviḍa Saṃgha, the Yāpanīya Saṃgha, the Kāṣṭha Saṃgha, and the Māthura Saṃgha. Actually, we do not know if the Yāpanīya Saṃgha was a Digambara *saṃgha*, a Śvetāmbara *saṃgha* or a third branch, but this will be discussed a little bit further in this section.

On the Drāviḍa Saṃgha. According to the *Darśanasāra* the Drāviḍa Saṃgha was founded in 536 V.S. by Vajranandi who was a student of Śrī Pūjyapāda. Actually not all manuscripts

give the same date for this foundation. The edition by Premi for example gives 526 V.S. as date, and Upadhye writes in his notes about another manuscript that dates the foundation in 532 V.S. (1933-34: 204). Even if the exact date is not certain, all these dates do lie close to each other. Also, an important scholar on the history of the South and especially Karnāṭaka, K.V. Pāṭhak, writes that Śrī Pūjyapāda had a king as student named Durvinīta. This Durvinīta reigned from 535 till 570 V.S. (Premi 1917: 38). Therefore if both Vajranandi and Rājā Durvinīta were students of Pūjyapāda they had to live in about the same period. This leads us only to conclude that if Vajranandi existed, then he must have lived in the first half of the sixth century V.S. He probably did exist, or at least he was commonly linked with the Drāviḍa Saṃgha, because in the Epigrāphiya Karnāṭaka there are also some inscriptions that refer to Vajranandi as one of the early *ācāryas* of the Drāviḍa Saṃgha (Rice 1904 6: 72) Still we cannot say with certainty that he was indeed the founder of the Drāviḍa Saṃgha.

In the *Darśanasāra* we further read that the Drāviḍa Saṃgha arose in Southern Mathura. This city is nowadays called Madurai and is to be found Tamil Nadu (Hamilton 1828: 153). Inscriptions from the Epigrāphiya Karnāṭaka suggest that this Saṃgha must have been present in the regions of Karnataka and Mysore (Jain 1975: 130). The inscriptions are mostly from after the tenth century CE, so this *saṃgha* was probably still existent in the time of Devasena. Interestingly one of these inscriptions dated about 1040 CE characterises the community as a branch of the Mūla Saṃgha (Rice 1904 6: 61), while Devasena himself wants to distinguish them from the Mūla Saṃgha.

From Devasena's perspective the Drāviḍa Saṃgha's conduct was condemnable because their monks ate food items that were seen as inappropriate in the Mūla Saṃgha, and because they had a fixed abode and undertook trade which made them independent from alms. Also condemnable in Devasena's view was the fact that they bathed in cool water, since bathing is forbidden for monks and especially since cold water can still contain living creatures. I have found a description of these behavioural characteristics of the Drāviḍas only in the *Darśanasāra*, no other (secondary) source confirms this conduct.⁴⁰ Overall very little is known about them, and Devasena's text is the only source (as far as my knowledge goes) to say something about their practices.

⁴⁰ Actually, dr. Tillo Detige told me that the *Buddhivilāsa* of Bakhtarāma ascribes similar aspects to this *saṃgha*. The text would say that the monks of the Drāviḍa Saṃgha do farming and trade. This might suggest that Bakhtarāma based this information in the *Buddhivilāsa* on the *Darśanasāra*, or that both text were based on another common source.

On the Yāpanīya Saṃgha. As for the Yāpanīya Saṃgha, there is only one verse in the *Darśanasāra*. It says that the Yāpanīya Saṃgha was founded by a certain Śrī Kalaśa in the city of Kalyāṇa. As date of foundation most manuscripts of the *Darśanasāra* give 705 V.S. Only in one manuscript another date was found, namely 205 V.S., but this manuscript contains a lot of faults and thus is not reliable. According to Premi, the dating of 705 V.S. is problematic because reference to this Saṃgha was also found in Haribhadra's *Lalitavistara* and he supposedly lived in the sixth century V.S. (1917: 38). That is why Upadhye adopted the version of 205 V.S. in his critical edition. However, since the dating of Haribhadra is contested, this does not appear to me as a sufficient reason to discard 705 V.S. as date of foundation. Still there is other evidence that shows the impossibility of this date. In 1974 Upadhye has compiled a chronological survey of the inscriptions that record the names of scores of mendicants and a few laymen affiliated with the Yāpanīya Saṃgha. These inscriptions date from the fifth to the fourteenth centuries CE and thus render the dating of 705 V.S (or 648/649 CE) impossible (Jaini 1991: 42).

Not much is known about the Yāpanīya Saṃgha (also called the Gopyas) and most research on this group is quite recent. What is more, from the fact that Devasena only writes one verse on this saṃgha it seems that also for him the Yāpanīyas were shrouded in mystery. If Devasena did logically structure his work, then he seems to be placing the Yāpanīya Saṃgha within the Digambara affiliation of Jainism, because the verse is situated in the second part of the *Darśanasāra* which for the rest only describes Digambara *saṃghas*. On the other hand, he writes about the founder Kalaśa that he wore a white robe, which leads us to suspect that Devasena thought they belong to the Śvetāmbara affiliation. Devasena's intention here is as unsure as the historical identity of the Yāpanīyas. In support of the first interpretation of how Devasena saw them, the Jain author Rājaśekhara also writes in his *Ṣaḍdarśanamuccaya* that there are four divisions among the Digambaras, one of them being the Gopyaka Saṃgha (i.e. Yāpanīya Saṃgha).⁴¹ Most scholars nowadays believe that the Yāpanīyas were a group separate from Digambaras or Śvetāmbaras. This would be plausible if the date Devasena gives for its foundation was correct (205 V.S.); as it is such an early dating.⁴² But of course we cannot be sure whether this dating is quite accurate or completely wrong. Still, in texts of both Digambaras and Śvetāmbaras we find reference to this community describing them as

⁴¹ Rājaśekhara was a Śvetāmbara monk. Therefore it is not really surprising that he places the Yāpanīyas under the Digambara strand, since he did not want to associate them with his own affiliation. On the other hand, Rājaśekhara's *Ṣaḍdarśanamuccaya* is believed to be quite neutral, although this view can be questioned.

⁴² It is not sure if this was the date originally given by Devasena. All manuscripts found by Upadhye gave the date 705 V.S. Upadhye chose to use 205 V.S. after an emendation by Premi.

objectionable. So maybe the Yāpanīyas were a third branch in Jainism. Or maybe we should even reconsider the split between Digambaras and Śvetāmbaras, firstly concentrating on the smaller different communities that existed earlier than the Digambara-Śvetāmbara division, as Folkert suggests (1993: 52). This could lead to a better understanding of the Yāpanīyas.

Other than that, it can be deduced from inscriptions that the Yāpanīya Saṃgha was mostly active in the region of Karnataka, especially in the present-day districts of Belgaum, Dharwar and Gulbarga. The lay members of the community were probably quite affluent and the monks put much effort into the installation of images of the Jinas in the richly endowed temples (Jaini 1991: 42). Kings of the Kadamba and Rashtrakuta dynasties, who ruled in South West India, also donated pieces of land to the community and its monks (Premi 1942: 42). So the Yāpanīya Saṃgha seems to have flourished in the Karnataka area for over a thousand years. They became extinct by the fifteenth century, probably after gradually assimilating with the surrounding Digambaras (Jaini 1991: 42). An example that confirms this idea is the Jain temple called ‘Doḍḍa Bastī’ in Belgaum. In that temple there is an image of Neminātha with the inscription that it was installed by the Yāpanīyas, but nowadays it is worshipped by the Digambaras (Premi 1942: 42). Indeed, like the Digambaras’ their statues were all naked and there is an inscription that describes a Yāpanīya monk as *jātarūpadhara*, which means ‘having the same form as when one is born’, i.e. being naked. This explains why the Śvetāmbara *ācārya* Guṇaratna considered them to be a Digambara subdivision (Jaini 1991: 42), while Digambaras themselves, as Devasena demonstrates, repudiated them. The commentator Śubhadra for example says that Yāpanīya mendicants may appear as Digambaras, but they also accept certain Śvetāmbara scriptures like the texts on mendicant discipline (Jaini 1991: 43). As this quote comes from an author rival to the Yāpanīyas it is not a trustworthy source on the practices or beliefs of the Yāpanīya Saṃgha. However, from the little existing literature ascribed to this Saṃgha, there is a text that confirms that Yāpanīyas shared some ideas with the Śvetāmbaras. The *Strīnirvāṇaprakaraṇa* by Śākaṭāyaṇa is a short treatise dedicated solely to defend women’s ability of attaining mokṣa, a doctrinal view also promoted by Śvetāmbaras. According to Jaini this work was roughly based on the *Yāpanīyatantra*, an anonymous text that is no longer existent but that Haribhadra quoted in his *Lalitavistarā*. He quotes from this text when he wants to prove why women also can attain liberation. The fact that he quotes a Yāpanīya author and not an author of his own community (Śvetāmbara) shows that the Yāpanīyas were probably the first to deal with the challenge posed by the Digambaras (1991: 45-46). So the Yāpanīyas were probably a separate group with beliefs and practices somewhere in between the Digambara and Śvetāmbara branches of

Jainism, as their monks walked around naked while believing in liberation for women in this life.

On the Kāṣṭha Saṃgha. In the edition of the *Darśanasāra* by Premi (1917) the part from verse thirty to thirty-nine is designated as ‘The arising of the Kāṣṭha Saṃgha’. In these verses we read that there was a Vīrasena who had a student named Jinasena. This Jinasena was the teacher of a certain Guṇabhadra and there was also a monk named Vinayasena, who initiated Kumārasena. Actually all the monks named above (except for Kumārasena) are from the community known as the Senagaṇa (Jain 1975: 88). In the lineage of this gaṇa Vīrasena, who lived at the beginning of the ninth century CE, was the leading *ācārya* and both Jinasena and Vinayasena were students of him. In the introduction of his commentary on *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgama* (written by Puṣpadanta and Bhūtabalī), Vīrasena himself names two other *ācāryas* who preceded him: Candrasena and Āryanandi (Joharāpurakara 1958: 27). In other words, Devasena starts this part with explaining the lineage of the Senagaṇa. Moreover from a relatively early stage but more regularly from the fifteenth century onwards, the Senagaṇa was also called the Mūla Saṃgha (De Clercq 2011: 64). The same designation was used for the *saṃgha* Devasena belonged to. What Devasena is thus doing here is starting with naming a lineage of good *ācāryas*, who taught the right path. And then from verse thirty-three he mentions how the student Kumārasena diverged from this lineage and ultimately founded the Kāṣṭha Saṃgha.

In the *Darśanasāra* it is written that the Kāṣṭha Saṃgha was founded in 753 V.S. which is 697/696 CE. There is an obvious problem with this; because if Kumārasena was a student of the student of Vīrasena, of whom we know he was still alive in 816 CE (Jain 1975: 88), then how can he have lived around 697/696 A.D? So either the Kumārasena who studied under Vinayasena was not the founder of the Kāṣṭha Saṃgha and there was another Kumārasena who founded this community, either the date given by Devasena is not the correct date of the foundation of the Kāṣṭha Saṃgha. The reference in the *Darśanasāra* actually is the first that mentions this Saṃgha. Of the origin of the Kāṣṭhas there is a later version that narrates how *ācārya* Loha I from the Nandi Saṃgha of the Balātkāra Gaṇa (Mūla Saṃgha) founded the *saṃgha* some 515 years after Mahāvīra. The story tells that he converted 125000 members of the Agravāla castes in Agrohā and used wooden (*kāṣṭha*) images for the *pūjā* ritual. This version however is not likely to be correct as it contradicts other legends about the Saṃgha’s origin (Flügel 2006: 378, note 152). Joharāpurakara believes that the name of the Kāṣṭha Saṃgha comes from a village near Delhi that was quite thriving during the twelfth century

(1958: 211). Another name for the community was Gopuccha Saṃgha (Flügel 2006: 379, note 152). This name refers to the practice of carrying a bovine whisk instead of one made out of peacock feathers, as Devasena confirms. Another practice the Kāṣṭhas would have promoted according to Devasena was the strict observation of the sixth *guṇavrata*, which is abstinence of food and drinks at night. By the fourteenth century the *saṃgha* was subdivided into four *gacchas*: Māthuragaccha, Lāḍabāgaḍagaccha, Bāgaḍagaccha and Nandītaḍagaccha. But until at least the twelfth century these *gacchas* were referred to as independent *saṃghas*. In the same way Devasena also mentions the Māthura Saṃgha. Besides this we may as well see some suggestion of the other three *gacchas* when the *Darśanasāra* mentions that the path of the Kāṣṭha Saṃgha was spread in the whole region of Bāgaḍa and that Kumārasena founded his community in Nandītaḍa. So maybe there was already a closer link between these three *gacchas* and the Kāṣṭha Saṃgha by the time of Devasena.

On the Māthura Saṃgha. After discussing the Kāṣṭha Saṃgha Devasena writes about the arising of the Māthura Saṃgha. The first thing he says is that this *saṃgha* arose two hundred years after the Kāṣṭha Saṃgha was founded. This would mean that it arose in 953 V.S., which is just a few years before the *Darśanasāra* was supposedly written. In fact, if the dating of the *Darśanasāra* is not 990 V.S. as I have translated it, but 909 V.S. as Premi has rendered it (see footnote 19), we would have to conclude that the Saṃgha arose after the text was written, which is impossible. So there might to be a difficulty with the given date of this Saṃgha. Devasena names Rāmasena as the founder of the Māthura Saṃgha. This is confirmed in the *Subhāṣita Ratnasamḍoha* by *ācārya* Amitagati II of the Māthura Saṃgha, who lived around 1050 V.S. He mentions five *ācāryas* who came before him: Vīrasena, Devasena, Amitagati I, Nemiṣena and Mādhavasena. If we consider that each monk was head of the community for about twenty years, this would mean that the first *ācārya* (Vīrasena) lived around 950 V.S. But in this lineage Rāmasena is not yet mentioned. Hence the actual foundation of the *saṃgha* should have taken place a few generations earlier (Premi 1917: 40). So the dating of the Māthura Saṃgha is very hard and there is no agreement on this. Moreover Amitagati II is the first *ācārya* for whom we are sure that he existed and belonged to the Māthuragaccha. Before him the first reference of this community seems to be Devasena's *Darśanasāra*, which gives us a minimum of clues about their practices.

Probably the most widely known practice of the Māthura Saṃgha was their beings against carrying a chowrie, which also caused them to be sometimes called the Niṣpicchaka Saṃgha. Other than the *Darśanasāra* also Rājaśekhara's *Saḍḍarśanamuccaya* for example mentions

this (Folkert 1993: 41). Another practice of them would be veneration of the images of the Jinas and veneration of one's own guru.

As already mentioned the Māthura Saṃgha was first independent but then became a subdivision of the Kāṣṭha Saṃgha. The first record of them being a subdivision dates from 1386 and the last attested leader of this Māthuragaccha died in 1895 (De Clercq 2011: 4).

On the Bhillaka Saṃgha. After describing these four *saṃghas* Devasena also mentions a Bhillaka Saṃgha. This is quite a special reference because Devasena here seems to make a prophecy. He says that when 1800 years have gone by, a certain Vīracandra will found another false community in the South, near Puṣkara. He even tells us what mistaken practices they will promote. However the two verses on the Bhillaka Saṃgha do not refer to anything known otherwise, because in no other source we find the name of the Bhillaka Saṃgha, nor the name of a Vīracandra who will establish a future community. This statement thus hasn't got any historicity, it cannot even be linked with a known story, it seems to be unique to the *Darśanasāra*.

Before examining the community Devasena belonged to, I think it can already be concluded that a historical approach to the *Darśanasāra* is not the most profitable way of looking at the text. At first sight this seems the best approach towards this text, because many dates, names and supposedly historical events or practices are named in it. But upon looking closer it appears that some events are just recontextualisations of well-known stories, and that it is difficult to verify the historicity of the given dates and names. Furthermore one needs to keep in mind that the *Darśanasāra* was written from the opponent's perspective. Therefore I will suggest another approach to the text that shows better than the two previous approaches what the *Darśanasāra* can teach us. Before doing so, I will try to determine Devasena's own affiliation to a given *saṃgha*.

2.3 The Mūla Saṃgha

Until now we have discussed the several different *saṃghas* that Devasena wants to refute. Now, we can wonder what *saṃgha* Devasena did not find mistaken. What *saṃgha* did he adhere to?

Although Devasena nowhere mentions his own group, he does leave us some clues. In verse forty-three he shows that he is a follower of Padmanandi (i.e. *ācārya* Kundakunda), because Devasena claims that Padmanandi must have obtained liberation as he was given the knowledge of reaching *mokṣa* by Sīmandhara Svāmī.⁴³ From this reference it can be concluded that Devasena was a member of the Mūla Saṃgha, the ‘Root Assembly’ that claimed to directly descent from Mahāvīra through Kundakunda.

As the name suggests, this community is seen by the Digambara tradition to be the pure community, in some way replacing the Nirgrantha Sampradāya (‘Bondless Lineage’) that is supposed to be the pristine line of undifferentiated descent from Mahāvīra (Dundas 2002: 121). Of course claims to such a true lineal descent cannot be seen as historically true. Gradually in time, the designation became little more than an artificial designation to legitimate and give authority to a certain monk, his writings, or a certain group. So it is not because Devasena excludes the Kāṣṭha, Māthura, Drāviḍa and Yāpanīya Saṃgha from the ‘Root Community’ that these communities didn’t see themselves as pure. The monks of the Mūla Saṃgha exerted the dominant and most longstanding influence in the Digambara affiliation. Inscriptions that refer to this *saṃgha* were found from the fifth and sixth century, when the name still referred to a fixed group, till the nineteenth century, when the designation must have been a hollow one (Dundas 2002: 121).

Having a deeper look into the Mūla Saṃgha, at first I thought that this was the community that also went by the name Balātkāra Gaṇa or Sarasvatī Gaccha. This first impression I had, came from reading Jain (1975) and De Clercq (2011) who based her paper on Joharāpurakara (1958). In her paper on Raīdhu’s writings De Clercq says that the monastic designation of the Balātkāra Gaṇa “was often supplemented or replaced with the term Mūla Saṃgha” (2011: 3). This can indeed be found in the inscriptions that Joharāpurakara collected (1958: 41). However, as De Clercq writes, also the Sena Gaṇa was sometimes referred to with the name Mūla Saṃgha (2011: 3). So if Devasena is a follower of Kundakunda, what exact monastic unit, which Mūla Saṃgha, was he part of? First, I turned to Jain (1975) to read that “the earliest reference to Balātkāragāṇa is made by Ācārya Śrīcandra”, who lived in Dhārā in Mālavā (1975: 89). This is the same city as where Devasena had his residence less than a

⁴³ Sīmandhara Svāmī is believed to be a living *tīrthaṅkara* living on Mahāvideha Kṣetra, which is a region of the Jambudvīpa continent in Jain cosmology. There is the idea in Jain thought that there are in this time several *tīrthaṅkaras* living in various regions of the Middle World. Sīmandhara Svāmī is one of the four *tīrthaṅkaras* living in the region Mahāvideha. It is also believed that during his life Kundakunda visited this region to hear Sīmandhara’s preaching. Actually, according to Dundas verse forty-three of the Darśanasāra was the first account of this idea that Kundakunda gained his knowledge from Sīmandhara Svāmī. Later writers developed this story further (Dundas 2002: 269).

century earlier. So it seemed to me probable that Devasena was a member of the same unit as Śrīcandra: the Balātkāra Gaṇa. This idea was confirmed by Hoernle's research on two paṭṭāvalīs (records of a lineage) of the Sarasvatī Gaccha (Balātkāra Gaṇa) that lay great stress on the descend from Kundakunda and name him as the fifth pontiff in their lineage (1891: 342). But when I looked at the *ācāryas* of the Balātkāra Gaṇa I came upon something problematic. The *Darśanasāra* names in verse thirty to thirty-two several *ācāryas* that do not belong to the Balātkāra Gaṇa, namely Vīrasena, Jinasena, Guṇabhadra and Vinayasena. In contrast to most *ācāryas* that Devasena mentions in his text, he does speak positively about these monks. These *ācāryas* are all found in inscriptions as leaders of the Sena Gaṇa. In the lineage of the Sena Gaṇa Vīrasena is the oldest of the four, followed by Vinayasena and then Jinasena and Gunabhadra. Should I therefore consider Devasena a member of the Sena Gaṇa even though he lived in Dhārā and Kundakunda was most strongly associated with the Balātkāra Gaṇa?

There is the story that the Root Community (Mūla Saṃgha) of the Jains⁴⁴ stayed undivided up to the leadership of Ardhabalin. When his disciples succeeded him, supposedly in the year 21 BCE, each of his four disciples established a sub-group which afterwards developed into four independent traditions: Māghanandin founded the Nandi Saṃgha, Jinasena the Sena Saṃgha (or Gaṇa), Siṃha founded the Siṃha Saṃgha and Deva the Deva Saṃgha (Flügel 2006: 343). So according to this narrative these four monastic units should all be seen as Mūla Saṃgha. Still it generates the image that Devasena should have been part of only one of these four groups. The narrative however is unlikely to be based on historical truth since the earliest references to it are inscriptions in Śravaṇabelagoḷā dated 1398 and 1492 CE. For this reason it can be suggested that in the tenth century the Mūla Saṃgha was not yet divided into these four groups and that when it was divided the monks of a certain group wanted to explain and authorise this division. However, the earliest reference to the Sena Gaṇa is found in the *Uttarapurāṇa* which is dated in the ninth century, so before Devasena. Another possibility is that the divisions in Digambara Jainism were not as rigidly fixed as Jain's dissertation (1975) suggests. Rather, there was the concept of Mūla Saṃgha that was probably claimed by most Digambara groups and next to that, there was one group generally accepted as Mūla Saṃgha in which it was acknowledged that groups as the Kāṣṭhas and the Yāpanīyas were their others. In this Mūla Saṃgha were several sub-groups that were not permanent nor in opposition to each other. So if we ask ourselves whether Devasena belonged either to the Balātkāra Gaṇa or

⁴⁴ This is not really the root community but rather what some Digambara monks saw as being the real and pure Jain community.

to the Sena Gaṇa, I think it is better to lose this opposition and think of them as names for two parts of a group that is diverse and reflexive while having a coherent identity; that is to say a community that has changing sub-groups claiming certain lineages that are not eternally fixed, but rather negotiated in time. Of course later paṭṭāvalīs were developed for one separate community (e.g. Sarasvatī Gaccha). But even they cannot ascertain that this gaccha has always been separate or that there is even a difference with for example the Sena Gaṇa. As a paṭṭāvalī from the nineteenth century translated by Hoernle states (1891: 72):

The above-mentioned four Saṅghas into which the Mūla Saṅgha is divided, if any one make a difference between the Ācāryas, he is devoid of truth and is a heretic; moreover such people have for a long time been leading a worldly life. Therefore in these four Saṅghas there is no difference of images, nor any difference in penitential and other practices, nor any differences of rules, nor any difference in their teaching and in their scriptures; in no single point is there any difference between them; they are all alike.

So coming back to the question what ascetic community Devasena adhered to, it is my opinion that he was part of the Mūla Saṅgha. I further think that this Mūla Saṅgha created its identity by opposing itself with the Kāṣṭha, the Māthura and the Yāpanīya Saṅgha (next to the Śvetāmbaras and other non-Jain groups), and by claiming a lineage that goes back to Kundakunda. In Devasena's time there must have existed several sub-groups of those who called themselves Mūla Saṅgha, but I don't think that these sub-groups really differed from each other nor that the division into four was a historical reality. It is an important insight that the image rendered by works as Joharāpurakara's *Bhaṭṭāraka Sampradāya*, of *saṅghas* that are strictly separated, is unlikely to be historically correct. As I have explained, it is more likely that the composition of these ascetic communities changed over time. As for the Mūla Saṅgha, it is probably best to follow the view of Dundas in seeing the term Mūla Saṅgha more as a claim of authority than as a real fixed lineage of *ācāryas*.

3. An ‘Other’ Approach

Discussing the *Darśanasāra* both on a philosophical or historical level, appeared not to be a constructive way of analyzing the text. Because the work does not seriously discuss or describe doctrinal principles or philosophical theories, nor does it contain historical facts. Sure it tries to claim historical truths by dating and naming monks that started several *darśanas*, but we cannot be certain if the monks actually existed, not if the given dates are correct and certainly not if their ascribed view was indeed the opinion of the monks themselves. We cannot be sure that what Devasena writes comes from historical facticity or rather from concern for the tradition. Therefore it might be better to find another perspective or methodological tool to appreciate the text.

A subject that has become more and more popular over the past decades is the concern with the ‘other’ and with ‘difference’. The interest in this subject came from the increasing belief that a definition of identity should be a dialectal non-essential one. From the 1970s and 1980s onwards a growing number of studies on religion “started to question how religious communities saw themselves though their others, how they have been dealing with the problem of these others, or how religious communities have been articulating a distinct identity in relation to these very others” (Maes 2015: 2). John Cort has explored this idea of ‘other’ and ‘difference’ for Jain studies in his book *Open Boundaries: Jain Communities and Cultures in Indian History* (1998). The goal of the book was to do away with the fact that Jain Studies are often marginalized from South Asian Studies by examining the interaction of the Jains with the larger non-Jain world on different levels. Because the identity of the Jains is never constructed in isolation from its others in the South Asian world. To present it more theoretically: the (Jain-)self is in a constant dialectal relationship with the not-self.

Thus we come to the methodological tool by which I want to look at the *Darśanasāra*: the process of ‘othering’. ‘Othering’ is here defined as the on-going dynamic process of placing sameness and difference while negotiating one’s identity.⁴⁵ This can be the individual’s identity as well as the collective identity of a community. The identity of a person or a group is always dependent on one’s environment. It is constructed and continuously adjusted by relating, in terms of sameness or difference, to the subjects of this environment. For the Jain community this means that it developed its notion of the self in a constant dialogue with its environment. So instead of looking at the Jains as a community with one ‘founding father’, Mahāvīra, who installed a doctrine that was solidified in the Jain Scripture and was never

⁴⁵ I took this definition from Claire Maes’ article on the Pāli *Vinaya* of the Theravādins (2015: 1).

reinterpreted or changed, we can see how the Jain community did modify its identity through time.⁴⁶ It is indeed exactly from the perspective of ‘othering’ that one can acknowledge that the idea of *the* Jain tradition should be modified, because whatever falls under the denomination of Jainism is not a static, single entity, but a diverse group that continuously negotiates and reflects on what establishes this group in opposition to others. Using the process of ‘othering’ as a methodological tool thus integrates the postcolonial critique against essentializing non-western cultures and religions (Maes 2015: 3).

Already in itself, the *Darśanasāra* of Devasena supports the fact that the Jain community is diverse, because it directly names several Jain *saṃghas*. What is more, the *Darśanasāra* is an ideal text to analyse through the methodology of ‘othering’, as it almost exclusively talks about others (Jains and non-Jains). My goal here is to look at how one *ācārya* of the Jain community, Devasena, and his affiliation, the Mūla Saṃgha of the Digambaras, portrayed these others. From that I want to draw some conclusions on how he and the *saṃgha* identified themselves through this process of ‘othering’. So rather than seeing the comments on the several other *saṃghas* as historical actualities, I want to treat them as ways of negotiating the own identity at a certain time. The acknowledgement that an identity is constructed in a certain way only at a certain time is another advantage gained from using the process of ‘othering’ as a methodological tool.

The term ‘othering’ implies that there should be someone or something that is in opposition with another. But what is this other? The other does not exist without the self. He is always generated by the opposition in/out. The other exists only because the self wants to draw boundaries and wants to limit what is to be contained within the self and what is to be excluded from the self. So when Devasena is disapproving of the several communities, he is actually showing what kind cannot be included within his own *saṃgha*. Creating these boundaries is not something that is typical for religious communities only. It is in fact central to every identity formation, because in a sense, there can also not be a self without a notion of the other (the non-self). This binary opposition of we/they is a universal worldview according to Robert Redfield. He says (Smith 2004: 231)

⁴⁶ Actually, the Jains do not see Mahāvīra as the real founder of Jainism, at least not in the Western sense. According to Jain tradition Jainism has always existed, but needs to be re-initiated from time to time by a *tīrthaṅkara*. Mahāvīra is believed to be the twenty-fourth *tīrthaṅkara* of our current cycle, who re-initiated the current Jain religion (Long 2009: 29). Therefore he is sometimes seen as founder of Jainism.

It is probably safe to say that among the groupings of people in every society are always some that distinguish people who are my people, or are more my people, from people who are not so much my people.

So looking at the *Darśanasāra* along the lines of ‘othering’ not only enables to avoid an essential view on the Jains as a distinct entity having one single recognisable identity⁴⁷, it also establishes a link to the universal need to oppose ourselves from the other.⁴⁸ What is more, with respect to drawing boundaries there is also the idea of pollution that plays its part. The other is not only what lies outside of the self, but also what is threatening to the self. There is always the danger that the polluting other will cross the boundaries and affect the self. This notion of pollution can be seen in the introduction of the *Darśanasāra* when it says that first there was the pure path of the *tīrthaṅkaras*, but then there were some who proclaimed false beliefs (verse three); and in verse four which states that there is damage of the path of right belief. To protect the boundaries of the self, as a community or an individual, the self needs to continuously reclaim or adjust its boundaries. And this can be done, not just by stating one’s own position, but by characterizing the other. Looking at the history of the western imagination of the other Smith found that three basic models of the other were used: “(1) The ‘other’ represented metonymically in terms of the presence or absence of one or more cultural traits. (2) The ‘other’ represented topographically in terms of centre and periphery. (3) The ‘other’ represented linguistically and/or intellectually in terms of intelligibility.”(Smith 2004: 231).

I think a variant of this first model is what can be best applied to the *Darśanasāra*. Generally this model most frequently occurs in connection with naming. One group distinguishes itself from another by lifting up a cultural feature. The other is then said to lack some familiar cultural trait, to use some unfamiliar cultural object (e.g. “fish-eaters”) or to have a specific physical feature (e.g. “whites”, “blacks”) (Smith 2004: 232). Here, the relevance of this model of presenting the other does not really lie in metonymical denominations, but rather in the fact that Devasena characterizes his others mainly in terms of cultural traits, as for example in verse four, where he claims that the Buddha was abundantly eating fish. The denominations he uses for his others are mostly one-to-one denominations, like *sevaḍo* (for the Śvetāmbaras), *drāviḍa*, *yāpanīya*, *kāṣṭha* and *māthura*. Maes describes these one-to-one denominations as

⁴⁷ Actually, the text itself already establishes such a non-essential view, because it refutes several *saṃghas* that are part of the Jain system. In that way, the text on its own shows the diversity within this system.

⁴⁸ It must be said that, although the opposition we/they seems to be universal, the way in which this opposition is established, is not always the same for every society or individual.

“terms having an explicit correspondence with an individual or a group of individuals belonging to the historical ascetic landscape of the early Indian Buddhist ascetic community” (2015: 12). To fit this definition into the context of this dissertation, one could replace ‘the early Indian Buddhist ascetic community’ with ‘the tenth century Mūla Saṃgha’. These one-to-one denominations were used by members of the community in question to name themselves, or were commonly used by many others to denominate a specific community. Because of that, they are not of interest in our examination of how Devasena portrayed the identity of his *saṃgha* through others. Maes also describes two other types of denominations: generic and metonymical denominations. Generic denominations are “terms referring to individuals or communities supposedly belonging to the historical landscape” of the tenth century Mūla Saṃgha, “but whose ascetic affiliation is uncertain” (Maes 2015: 13). *Viparīta* (“contradictory group”) possible describing the Brahmans, and *vainayika* (“reverencers”) are such terms. In the third category of metonymical denominations, which is a special kind of generic denomination, we could maybe only place the term *vainayika*, but I’m not sure of this because it being a metonym depends on how one interprets this word. It is these generic denominations, and especially the metonymical ones, that can say most on how the self identifies itself. But because most terms referring to the other *saṃghas* are one-to-one denominations and not names containing a cultural trait that are not commonly used for a certain *saṃgha*, I prefer to look at what characteristics Devasena ascribes to his others instead of the names he uses for them.

Ascribing a cultural trait to another is not only “a rhetorical act for taking one marked feature for the whole”. In the description of the other lies “a complex structure of reciprocal determination” (Smith 2004: 232). The ascribed label should also correlate to some piece of the self that is believed to prominently display the self’s identity. Only in this way the difference of the other is significant and meaningful. Therefore, William Scott Green and Smith are speaking of a ‘double metonymy’ (Smith 2004: 232):⁴⁹

In creating its others, a society confuses some part of its neighbor with its neighbour and a piece of itself with itself, and construes each in terms of the other. Although designed to mark and certify divergence and discontinuity, such correspondences can forge enduring reciprocal patterns.... They can reshape the naming society’s picture of itself, expose its points of vulnerability, and spark in it awareness of, or reflection about, the possibility or the reality of

⁴⁹ The theoretical explanation is still centred around how metonyms are relevant in the process of ‘othering’, but it will be obvious how this theoretical background is also interesting in the light of just ascribing cultural traits to another.

otherness within. The boastful proposition ‘we are men and they are crocodiles’ implies that ‘we were, or could have been, or might yet be crocodiles too.’

Symbolizing the other by a cultural characteristic is thus not just a matter of domination. It is also a “means by which societies explore their internal ambiguities and interstices, experiment with alternative values ... and question their own structures and mechanisms.” (Smith 2004: 233). Now let us look at an example from the *Darśanasāra* where Devasena describes the Māthura Saṃgha in the following way (verse forty):

Then after 200 years there was in Mathura a guru of the Māthura Saṃgha named Rāmasena. He praised ‘the not carrying of a chowrie’

This is the first verse he writes on this *saṃgha*. Generally what comes first is that with which an author wants to characterize the other the most. The fact that he says that the members of the Māthura Saṃgha do not carry a chowrie, does not mean that this cultural trait is the most important identity-marker for the Māthura Saṃgha itself. It merely means that this characteristic must be very important for Devasena. Analogous to the crocodile example, I can say that Devasena’s statement ‘we carry a chowrie of peacock feathers, they carry no chowrie’ implies that ‘we haven’t carried a chowrie, or maybe won’t carry a chowrie anymore’. By establishing the other (the not-self) as those who do not carry a chowrie, he establishes his own *saṃgha* as those who do carry a chowrie. Devasena takes ‘the chowrie’ as a marker of difference, because he wants to do away with any doubt about carrying a chowrie in his own *saṃgha*. He wants to contain and reclaim the identity of his *saṃgha* as those who carry a chowrie of peacock feathers.

Up till now, I have constantly talked about the other and ‘othering’. But as Smith remarks, there is something troublesome in this determination. ‘Other’ is a dualistic term (‘the other of two’) and thus supposes an ultimate opposition with its other (i.e. the self). But what I have called above ‘the process of othering’ always implies a reciprocal relationship. Therefore a term that insists on utter separation, alienation, and estrangement is not the best determination for such a process. Smith suggests to use the term ‘difference’ instead of ‘other’, because this is a relational and relative terminology, while ‘other’ is absolute. Indeed defining someone as the other ends the discussion; difference invites negotiation and intellection (Smith 2004: 241). Difference makes us ask what is different in those who differ.

Now let us ask this question for the *Darśanasāra*. How does Devasena mark difference with his others and how does he signify a reciprocal relationship between self and other; what does this all mean for the *saṃgha*'s picture of itself? With regards to this, I want to stress again that Devasena does not present his others in a neutral way; he explicitly says that they are faulty. In the following table I will schematically list how Devasena identifies his others and then I'll try to conclude what this means for the identity of the Mūla Saṃgha in that time. It will be clear that these identity-markers are more or less the same as what I have called previously 'markers of *darśana*'. It should also be noted that all these markers identify monks and not laymen.

table 1

community	identity-markers/ markers of difference⁵⁰
Buddhist	<i>ekānta</i> ; karmatheory: another bears the consequences of one's act; fish-eater; no soul in meat, sugar, fruit, yoghurt, milk; alcoholic drinks; red garment.
Śvetāmbara	liberation for women; liberation for another tradition; <i>arhats</i> can eat and be sick; Mahāvīra underwent womb transplantation. false scriptures; whiteclads, wearing clothes; eating lifeless food;
<i>saṃgha</i> of Parvata Vaktra	<i>viparīta</i> ("contradictory")
<i>vainayikas</i>	<i>vainayika</i> (reverence to all gods); bald, <i>śikhin</i> or dreadlocks.

⁵⁰ These markers of identity tell what the others believed in or what they did in terms of behaviour according to Devasena.

<i>saṃgha</i> of Maskari-Pūraṇa	<i>ajñāna</i> (“not by knowledge”); no rebirth; conscious creator; empty meditation; disobedience of castes; consuming intoxicatives.
Drāviḍa Saṃgha	no special food-rules for monks; no life in seeds; not eating in standing position; permanent residence, trade, agriculture; bath in cool water.
Yāpanīya Saṃgha	whiteclad
Kāṣṭha Saṃgha	chowrie of Yak’s tail; restored consecration of women; ⁵¹ going on almsrounds (<i>vīracārya</i>) for a Kṣullaka; taking rough hair; sixth <i>guṇavrata</i> ; amendment of authoritative texts; abandoning calmness of mind.
Māthura Saṃgha	no chowrie; attachment to images of the <i>jina</i> ; devotion to other souls.
Bhillaka	no <i>pratikramaṇa</i> ritual; against classdivision.

What does this mean in light of the process of ‘othering’ or creating difference? What does the way Devasena portrays his others tell about the way he sees the identity of his own *saṃgha* or how he wants this identity to be?

⁵¹ I could not find out what Devasena means by ‘the restored consecration of women’.

Something that reoccurs several times in the text is that others are wearing clothes. This is said of the Buddhist, the Śvetāmbaras and the Yāpanīyas. If, like Smith and Green say, this representation of the other implies a reciprocal relation, then it means that Devasena and his community did not wear clothes, they were naked. Moreover it means that this nakedness was a piece of the self that prominently displayed their identity. If it was not seen as an important part of the self, then Devasena wouldn't have mentioned this mark of difference so many times. Another important feature of the Mūla Saṃgha, at least according to Devasena, is their dietary habits. Some products cannot be eaten on the ground of having a soul. Indeed, Devasena refutes the Buddhists because they eat fish, meat, yoghurt etc. believing that these products do not have a soul. This statement is quite surprising as it goes against common knowledge on the Buddhists. But to be clear, Devasena's words don't indicate that Buddhists in the tenth century actually ate meat, fish etc. It solely indicates that Devasena and his community didn't or shouldn't eat these products. From applying the idea of reflexivity in the process of 'othering' on the above mentioned marks, I can further conclude that in Devasena's idea of the Mūla Saṃgha the community's specific identity is determined by not believing that women can attain liberation in this life, not believing in a creator, following the doctrine of manifold aspects (*anekāntavāda*), adhering to a certain corpus of texts, not having a fixed abode, etc. The last aspect of the Mūla Saṃgha I want to mention as being important is carrying a chowrie of peacock feathers. Of the Kāṣṭha and Māthura Saṃgha Devasena respectively says that they carry a chowrie of a Yak's tail or carry no chowrie at all. In fact the Kāṣṭhas were sometimes called the Gopucchikas ("those having a bovine chowrie") and the Māthuras were called the Niṣpicchas ("those without chowrie") by the monks of the Mūla Saṃgha. These metonymical denominations and Devasena's words show that there was discussion about the chowrie within the Digambara community and probably also within the Mūla Saṃgha. Indeed the Kāṣṭhas did have a well-founded argument that a whisk made out of a cow's tail is less adhesive and less likely to pick up small insects than one made out of peacock feathers, thus minimising injury to life-forms. And the Māthuras had a fair claim that carrying no chowrie accords better to the rule that monks should have no possessions at all (Dundas 2002: 122). The Mūla Saṃgha must have debated around this topic and then concluded that they would carry a whisk of peacock feathers unlike their others. 'Othering' the Kāṣṭhas and Māthuras, as in the *Darśanasāra*, shows the concern of the Mūla Saṃgha with the chowrie as part of their identity.

This last matter, the fact that Devasena wants to ensure difference with the Kāṣṭha and Māthura Saṃgha, shows how he is concerned with ‘othering’ those near to him, namely Digambara communities other than his own Mūla Saṃgha. Indeed the Buddhist, the Śvetāmbaras and other Indian religio-philosophical communities were also quite close to the Mūla Saṃgha. They all shared geographical, social and political space. But still most close were those groups that shared or claimed to share scriptures and previous *ācāryas* with Devasena’s *saṃgha*. For this reason it was most important for Devasena to make these very proximate groups into his ‘proximate others’.

The concept of the ‘proximate other’ was developed by Jonathan Smith in his essays “Differential Equations: on Constructing the Other.” and “What a Difference a Difference Makes.” (2004: 230-250, 251-302). The basic idea behind this concept is that it is not the ideological (or geographical) remote other (as for Devasena the Byzantine Christians would have been) that is of importance, but the proximate other that demands and effects a process of ‘othering’. Because the proximate other challenges the intact world-view of the self, it is this other that makes the self reflect on its own identity and then reestablish its identity. The radically other is merely other, and not worth being mentioned. As Smith so aptly explains (2004: 245):

Rather than the remote ‘other’ being perceived as problematic and/or dangerous, it is the proximate ‘other’, the near neighbor, who is most troublesome. That is to say, while difference or ‘otherness’ may be perceived as being either LIKE-US or NOT-LIKE-US, it becomes most problematic when it is TOO-MUCH-LIKE-US or when it claims to BE-US. It is here that the real urgency of theories of the ‘other’ emerges, called forth not so much by a requirement to place difference, but rather by an effort to situate ourselves. This, then, is not matter of the ‘far’ but preeminently of the ‘near’. The deepest intellectual issues are not based upon perceptions of alterity, but, rather, of similarity, at times, even, of identity.

Smith applies this concept on the history of the western imagination of the other, but says himself that “the issue of problematic similarity or identity seems to be particularly prevalent in religious discourse and imagination” (2004: 245). Actually it was the article by Claire Maes (2015) that pointed out to me how the ‘proximate other’ is highly relevant in the Indian religio-philosophical context. She shows how for the Buddhists their others were the Jains and had thus to be differed from themselves. I could do the reverse with Devasena’s text, because here we find how a monk of the Jain Mūla Saṃgha defines the Buddhists as his others. In the

Darśanasāra there are even more proximate others, because the author differs himself and his community also from other Digambara groups.

From reading the *Darśanasāra* I would indeed conclude that the Buddhists were seen as proximate and maybe too proximate from the perspective of the Mūla Saṃgha. The Jains mostly lived in the same geographical area (e.g. in the same district and city) as other Indian communities and so there was a lot of direct and indirect contact between them. In this way it seems not unlikely that in this contact there was a mutual influence of the *saṃghas*. Scholars of the nineteenth century investigating the ‘original’ Buddhism and Jainism found that there were many similarities between these two and the brahmanic communities and therefore concluded that the Jains and Buddhist must have borrowed extensively from the brahmanic thought, not considering the possibility of the reverse (Maes 2015: 15). Consequently the Jains and Buddhist were and are often studied by the same scholars or even in the same books. The proximity between the Jains and Buddhists expressed in Western scholarly work is not completely misplaced. It is possible that the influence and similarities between the *śramaṇa*⁵² traditions was greater than between a *sramaṇa* and a Vedic tradition, because they all shared the position of opposing the Vedic establishment. Furthermore the different *śramaṇa* communities seemed to have a detailed knowledge of each other’s organization, doctrines and practices (Maes 2015: 16). Going back to my text, the *Darśanasāra* definitely confirms the closeness between Devasena’s Digambara Jain community and the Buddhists. In the first verse on the Buddhists the text teaches that the Buddha was originally ordained as a Jain monk. He supposedly followed the line of Pārśvanātha under the teacher Pihitāsrava. So Devasena is here depicting his proximate other as originally part of the self, before he distinguishes himself from this other by attributing practices to him that are horrible in Devasena’s opinion. The identification of the Buddha with Devasena’s own community shows how proximate the Buddhists were and the impact they must have had on the Mūla Saṃgha. They could not be ignored and therefore had to be excluded far away from the Mūla Saṃgha’s identity. Although the Buddhist had already declined quite a bit at the time of Devasena’s writing, they were still worth of being mentioned according to Devasena and were thus still seen as his close opponents.

Next to the Buddhists another ‘proximate other’ is the Śvetāmbara community. Just like the Mūla Saṃgha, they consider themselves as Jains, followers of Mahāvīra, having the correct āgamas. As they claim the same things as the Digambara Mūla Saṃgha, they are extremely

⁵² The *śramaṇa* traditions are the systems that are not part of the ‘orthodox’ Vedic systems. The Jains, Buddhists and Ājīvikas are examples of such traditions.

proximate to Devasena's community. Yet, they do have other practices and believes and thus cannot be considered as part of the self. They are seen as a threatening proximate other. Devasena considers them as originally being part of the same community, but then there was one monk Jinacandra who corrupted the original teachings and that was the start of a false Jain community. Like with the Buddhists, the Śvetāmbaras first had the same identity but then challenged this 'true' identity and therefore they had to be removed from the self. Devasena needed to ascertain that the Śvetāmbaras did not belong to his group. Although proximate and having much in common, the Śvetāmbaras were his others.

The groups that Devasena calls in his text the Viparītas, Vainayikas and Ajñānins must also have been in the proximity of the Mūla Saṃgha. If they were remote others, Devasena would probably not have bothered to mention them.⁵³ They would not have posed a threat or challenge to the Mūla Saṃgha and therefore Devasena would have been indifferent towards them. But as he does care to mention these communities, it seems that they must have had some influence on the Mūla Saṃgha, although in my opinion they were not as proximate as for example the Buddhists. I conclude this from the fact that Devasena does not elaborate on these groups as much as he does for others. Indeed on the Ajñānavādins (i.e. the Ājīvikas) he does mention some details about their practices, which shows that they were probably the most proximate *saṃgha* of the three. Bronkhorst confirms that "Ājīvikism shared many features with Jainism [...] so many features that the early Buddhists often failed to distinguish them from each other" (2012: 825). From this we can easily understand why Devasena felt the need to 'other' these Ājīvikas. But, with a description of four verses, they are still less talked about than the Buddhists and were thus probably less proximate.

Now we come to the ascetic communities that were probably the most proximate to Devasena's Mūla Saṃgha: the Kāṣṭhas, Drāviḍas and Māthuras. In nowadays perspective these monastic units are all seen as part of the bigger Digambara Jain affiliation to which the Mūla Saṃgha also belongs. However, it might be so that in Devasena's time there was not such a notion of an overarching Digambara structure. Maybe we should consider Devasena's time as a context where several *saṃghas* lived next to each other, some being Jain and some being non-Jain. A context, where all *saṃghas* different from Devasena's were his others and there was no place for the idea of co-religionists (i.e. co-Digambaras). But indeed, from the *Darśanasāra* it does appear that the Kāṣṭha, Drāviḍa and Māthura Saṃgha share a big part of

⁵³ This is the interpretation that follows from Smith's theory on the proximate other. But, I should probably mention that it is also possible that other factors play a role in the reason that Devasena mentions these ascetic groups. Maybe Devasena mentions them as a 'dialogical other', that is to say only for the purpose of refuting the possibility of the position they proclaim, eventhough they might be remote.

their identity with the Mūla Saṃgha. Although Devasena makes it obvious that in his perspective, the Kāṣṭhas, Drāviḍas and Māthuras do not belong to the ‘Root Community’, this division might not be so evident for the units themselves. It is highly unlikely that they would see themselves as ‘unorthodox’, and consequently they probably saw their own community as following the line of the ‘Root Community’. Looking back at Smith’s definition, it indeed seems that the Kāṣṭha, Drāviḍa and Māthura Saṃghas are the most problematic Saṃghas from Devasena’s perspective. This is because in Smith’s opinion otherness is perceived as most problematic when the other is too-much-like-us or when it claims to be-us (2004: 245). And this is exactly what these ‘other’ Digambara communities do: they claim to be Mūla Saṃgha. That is the reason why Devasena gives a quite detailed explanation of their *ācāryas* and practices, which makes it possible for him to create the needed distance between their identity and his identity. Again I want to stress the fact that these details are not historical certainties, but essentially function as ways of ‘othering’. From the *Darśanasāra* itself it seems that the Kāṣṭha Saṃgha was for Devasena the strongest opponent. The text contains at least seven⁵⁴ verses on this *saṃgha* while most other *saṃghas* are discussed in five verses at most. Also by specifying their lineage as going back to the prominent *ācāryas* of the Mūla Saṃgha (Senagaṇa), the text shows how the Kāṣṭhas were recently very proximate and how they probably had a strong reflexive impact on the Mūla Saṃgha. I could furthermore speculate on how the *Darśanasāra* already foretells that except for the Mūla Saṃgha, the biggest Digambara community would be the Kāṣṭha Saṃgha, absorbing the Māthura Saṃgha in the fourteenth century and existing until the nineteenth century (De Clercq 2011: 67).⁵⁵ But of course, this is mere speculation.⁵⁶

It has now become evident that in defining others, there are always degrees of difference. One other is more different from the self than another. The other can be very remote, quite proximate, very proximate or extremely proximate and everything in between. And rather ironically it is exactly the least different other (i.e. the most proximate other) that needs to be more strongly differed from the self. So indeed the process of ‘othering’ depends on relative modes of relationship between self and other, and is foremost a process of interrelation. This

⁵⁴ If you count the verses about the predecessors of Kumārasena (the founder of the Kāṣṭha Saṃgha) as part of the section on the Kāṣṭhas, then you’ll get a total of ten verses.

⁵⁵ The Drāviḍa Saṃgha did not last such a long time (see 2.1 The Digambara Saṃghas).

⁵⁶ I did not include Yāpanīya Saṃgha in this section, because Devasena only wrote one verse on this community. They were thus worth being mentioned, but seem to be a rather remote (not absolutely remote) other. Because they became extinct by the fifteenth century (Jaini 1991: 42), it is not unlikely that in Devasena’s time they were already numerically remote from the Mūla Saṃgha.

process of differentiation does not only implement the discovery and reconstitution of the relations between the self and the other, it also effectuates the discovery and reconstitution or reaffirmation of the self's identity. As Smith says a 'theory of the other' depends on the capacity to see others as we see ourselves, because it "requires those complex political and linguistic projects necessary to enable us to think, to situate, and to speak of 'others' in relation to the way in which we think, situate, and speak about ourselves" (2004: 276). In consequence, examining the *Darśanasāra* through the process of 'othering' or the concept of the proximate other is more a methodology to explore how Devasena thought about and formed the identity of his own community, than it is a way to say something about the 'other' communities. How weird it might sound at first: 'othering' is an issue of own identity formation.

Conclusion

As this whole dissertation was centred around a text, namely the *Darśanasāra*, the goal of the dissertation was to answer some questions in function of that text. The questions were not all of the same category, some questions needed a different approach than others. From that fact there arose another question: what is the best approach or methodology towards this text? In trying to answer this I approached the text from three different perspectives. Firstly I tested whether a philosophical approach was suitable for the *Darśanasāra*. What philosophical issues can the *Darśanasāra* teach us or what philosophical facts does it refer to? The second approach was a positive historical one. I tried to find out what historical facts the *Darśanasāra* can reveal to us, especially in relation to the medieval Digambara traditions. Thirdly, I used a more theoretical approach towards the text in examining how the theory of ‘othering’ can be applied to the *Darśanasāra*. What could the methodology of the proximate other tell us about the text?

So in fact, what was guiding the structure of this dissertation, was the search for a suitable approach towards the *Darśanasāra*.

The same search was what brought Lucas den Boer to write his 2014 article about the ‘Methodological Challenges in the Study of Jain Doxographies’. Although in the first chapter of this dissertation I explained why, in my opinion, the *Darśanasāra* is not a doxography, I have also showed how some elements of doxographic literature can be found in Devasena’s text. And this is the case with den Boer’s article. The challenges that he reveals in his article, that is actually set around Guṇaratna’s refutation of the Cārvākas in his *Tarkarahasyadīpika*, are indeed relevant for my own search towards a suitable approach. According to his analysis, the Jain doxographies are often used by historians to “reconstruct the way in which philosophy developed over the centuries”. As the current understanding of the historical status of some Indian philosophical movements is rather sketchy, the doxographies seem to be reliable and thus attractive sources to fill these gaps (2014: 27). However, we have to keep in mind that “Jain authors had their own agendas and we cannot suppose that the description of other schools were only written to provide the reader with an accurate description of the philosophy of contemporaries” (den Boer 2014: 27). This point is especially relevant for the *Darśanasāra*, of which the goal is to show the horrible character of some *saṃghas*.

Further, den Boer discerns three approaches that are generally used in the study of Indian philosophy. In the first approach, the text is related to the material and social circumstances of

the time in which it was written. From that approach scholars try to reconstruct the historical state of affairs that surrounded the author of the text on the basis of references in the text itself. The second approach relates the text to prevalent ideas existing at that time. This approach is primarily focused on disentangling ideological relations between schools of thought. The third approach only looks at the textual level. Scholars try to analyse words or verses in a text and look at the text of significant predecessors or contemporaries to situate the text in a chronological sequence (den Boer 2014: 28).

None of the approaches could help den Boer with his question of how to explain the role of the Cārvākas in Guṇaratna's text. The problem for him was the lack of relevant source material, because the three methodologies depended on the possibility to analyse the text in the perspective of existing data. This meant that to use the first approach he needed more knowledge about the social situation in Guṇaratna's time, and for the second he had to have knowledge of the ideas the Cārvākas proclaimed (2014: 29). But this he had not. Therefore den Boer chose instead of focusing on historical aspects, as current studies of Indian philosophy mostly do, to make a philosophical clarification of the own content of the text. The methodology that he proposes is one that tries to "understand the conceptual position that is propounded by an author" and how he establishes his position (2014: 29).

The problems that den Boer faced in studying the *Tarkarahasyadīpika* are comparable with the problems I experienced mostly in the second chapter. In the first chapter, I was not really concerned with historical aspects, I just wanted to have a better understanding of the text and references in the text seen from what fits into a philosophical spectrum. Although in the first part of the first chapter some traces of the 'standard' approach ("to reconstruct the way in which philosophy developed over the centuries") can be acknowledged. In the second chapter, I used a combination of the first and second approach that den Boer describes. I tried to find historical facts about the *saṃghas* Devasena mentions and tried to see what the *Darśanasāra* can contribute to that picture. This approach did not produce many effective results. The historical facts I wanted to authenticate appeared to be very uncertain. The main reason for this is, just like for den Boer, the lack of relevant source material. For many *saṃghas*, as for example the Māthura Saṃgha, there is not enough material to check if the *Darśanasāra*'s rendering of their establishment is correct. Also, especially for the Digambara *saṃghas* there are no, or very little, other sources to gain information about the conduct and the beliefs of these *saṃghas*. And in no way can we trust what Devasena says about their beliefs, because he writes from the opponent's perspective. Therefore, I too found it necessary to search for a

different approach, that would prove to be effective in drawing true conclusions about the text, and, like den Boer proposes, would centre around the conceptual position of the author. This I found with the theory of ‘othering’. Devasena writes only about his others and this in a negative way; he is explicitly putting his others on a distance. But, the portrait he draws of his others cannot be seen as truthful. We have to assess his words in the light of the reciprocal relationship that exists between the self (Devasena) and the other (the mentioned *saṃghas*). Because when you talk about others, you will always do this in your own terms. This isn’t any different for Devasena: he describes the other *saṃghas* in his terms, what he ascribes to them is defined by what is important for himself. The beliefs and behavioural characteristics that Devasena calls refutable, show what aspects of his own identity (or the identity of his *saṃgha*) he finds important and wants to ascertain. For example, the fact that he refutes some *saṃghas* on the basis of wearing clothes, shows that it is important for him that monks of ‘the right path’ are naked.

In this theory of ‘othering’ there is an important role for the proximate other. Unlike the remote other the proximate other can be a threat for the self, because it can be too much like the self. The self doesn’t want to be identified with his proximate other and thus feels the need to differentiate himself from his other. The more proximate the other is, the stronger the need for differentiation from the self. In the *Darśanasāra* we can say that the Digambara *saṃghas* are more proximate than the non-Digambara *saṃghas* and that especially for the Kāṣṭha Saṃgha there is a strong need to differentiate it from the self.

This approach is in my opinion an approach from which one can display features of the *Darśanasāra* that are plainly relevant. From what Devasena writes it cannot be concluded that this *saṃgha* acts in this way or believes these things. For example, it is not because Devasena writes that the Buddhists ate fish, that they also actually did eat fish. The only facts that can be said about the text are Devasena’s representations, what he himself found wrong behaviour or beliefs.

In my opinion, any other perspective of analysis of the *Darśanasāra* failed to be productive. This affects most of the studies made on this text until now. For example, books like von Glasenapp’s *Jainism: An Indian Religion of Salvation* and Jain’s *Jaina Sects and Schools* draw conclusions from the *Darśanasāra* that cannot be drawn. They use the text as an objective historical account about some (Digambara) *saṃghas*. I want to argue for an approach to this text, and other texts that write about several *saṃghas*, that focuses on the position of the author. In my opinion, such texts can say more about the identity-formation of

the author (and his surrounding group) than about the identity of the groups that the author describes. I think that we need to step away from the overall historical approach to Jain Studies and rethink the ways in which we can use primary Jain sources.

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Appendix

This is the transcription of the Prakrit text of the *Darśanasāra* in the edition by Upadhye, with a Sanskrit *chāyā* based on Premi's *chāyā* but adjusted by myself in accordance with Upadhye's Prakrit text. I have included footnotes where Premi's Sanskrit rendering was adjusted. The Prakrit verses are given in bold, followed by their Sanskrit version.

paṇamiya vīrajiṇḍmaṃ suraseṇiṇamaṃsiyaṃ vimalaṇāṇaṃ |

vocchaṃ daṃsaṇasāraṃ jaha kaḥiyaṃ puṃvasūrīhiṃ ||1||

praṇāmya vīrajinendraṃ suraśreṇi-namaskṛtaṃ⁵⁷ vimala-jñānam |
vakṣye darśanasāraṃ yathā kathitaṃ pūrvasūribhiḥ || 1||

bharahe titthayarāṇaṃ paṇamiyadeviṇḍaṇāgagaruḍānām |

samaesu hoṃti keī micchattapavaṭṭagā jīvā ||2||

bharate tīrthakarāṇāṃ praṇamita-devendra⁵⁸-nāga-garuḍānām |
samayeṣu bhavanti kecit mithyātva-pravartakā jīvāḥ ||2||

usahajiṇaputtaputto micchattakalaṃkido mahāmoho |

savvesiṃ bhaṭṭāṇaṃ dhuri gaṇio puṃvasūrihiṃ ||3||

ṛṣabha-jina-putraputro mithyātva-kalaṅkito mahāmohaḥ |
sarveṣāṃ bhaṭṭānāṃ dhuri gaṇitaḥ pūrvasūribhiḥ ||3||

teṇa ya kayāṃ vicittaṃ daṃsaṇarūvaṃ sajuttisaṃkaliyaṃ |

tamhā iyarāṇaṃ puṇu sammatta-vaesu hāṇivayaṃ ||4||

tena ca kṛtaṃ vicitraṃ darśanarūpaṃ sayukti-saṃkalitaṃ |
tasmād-itarāṇāṃ puṇaḥ samyaktva-vacanesu hāni-padam⁵⁹ ||4||

eyaṃtaṃ saṃsaiyaṃ vivarīyaṃ viṇayajaṃ mahāmohaṃ |

aṇṇāṇaṃ micchattaṃ ṇiddiṭṭhaṃ puṃvasūrihiṃ ||5||

ekāntaṃ sāmśayikaṃ viparītaṃ vinaya-jaṃ mahāmohaṃ |
aṇṇāṇaṃ mithyātvaṃ nirdiṣṭaṃ pūrvasūribhiḥ ||5||

⁵⁷ Premi's original *chāyā* (1917) has 'surasena-namaskṛtaṃ' from the Prakrit 'suraseṇa-ṇamaṃsiyaṃ'.

⁵⁸ Premi (1917) writes 'devandra' instead of 'devendra'.

⁵⁹ Premi's *chāyā* (1917) has as second part of this verse 'tasmād-itarāṇāṃ puṇaḥ samaye tadd-hāni-vṛddhi-gataṃ' from the Prakrit 'tamhā iyarāṇaṃ puṇa samae taṃ hānibiḍḍhigayaṃ'.

uktaṃ ca

asīdi-sadaṃ kiriyāṇaṃ akiriyāṇaṃ havaṃti culasīdi |
satta-saṭṭhi aṇṇāṇā veṇaiyā hoṃti battisā || 6 ||⁶⁰

siripāsaṇāhatitthe saraūṭire palāsaṇayaratho |
pihiyāsavassa sīso mahāsudo buḍḍhakittimuṇī ||6||
śrī-pārśvanātha-tīrthe sarayū-tīre palāsa-nagara-sthaḥ |
pihitāsravasya śiṣyo mahāśruto buddhakīrti-muniḥ ||6||

tīmpūraṇāsaṇeṇa aṇṇiya-pāvajja jāo paribbhaṭṭo |
rattabaraṃ dharittā pavaṭṭiyaṃ teṇa eyaṃtaṃ ||7||
timi-pūrnāsaṇeṇa aṇṇita-pravajyātaḥ paribhraṣṭaḥ⁶¹ |
raktāmbaraṃ dhṛtvā pravartitaṃ tena ekāntaṃ ||7||

māmsassa ṇatthi jīvo jahā phale dahiyaduddhasakkarāe |
tamhā tāṃ vaṃchittā taṃ bhakkhaṃto ṇa pāviṭṭho ||8||
māmsasya⁶² nāsti jīvo yathā phale dadhi-dugdha-śakarrāyāṃ |
tasmāt-taṃ vāñchan taṃ bhakṣan na pāpiṣṭhaḥ ||8||

majjaṃ ṇa vajjaṇijjaṃ davadavvaṃ jahajalaṃ tahā edaṃ |
idi loe ghoṣittā pavaṭṭiyaṃ savvasāvajjaṃ ||8||
madyaṃ na varjanīyaṃ dravadravyaṃ yathā jalaṃ tathā etat |
iti loke ghoṣayitvā pravartitaṃ sarva-sāvadyaṃ ||9||

aṇṇo karedi kammaṃ aṇṇo taṃ bhumaṃjadīdi siddhaṃtaṃ |
parikappiūṇa ṇūṇaṃ vasikiccā ṇirayamuvavaṇṇo ||10||
anyaḥ karoti karma anyas-tad-bhunaḥkīrti siddhāntaṃ |
parikalpayitvā nūnaṃ vaśī-kṛtya narakam-upapannaḥ ||10||

⁶⁰ This verse doesn't have a *chāyā* because it occurred only in one of Upadhye's manuscripts, and not in Premi's edition.

⁶¹ For the first part of this verse Premi (1917) gives the Sanskrit 'tīmpūrnāsanaiḥ adhigatapravajyātaḥ paribhraṣṭaḥ' from the Prakrit 'tīmpūraṇāsaṇehiṃ ahigayapavajjāo paribbhaṭṭo'.

⁶² Premi (1917) writes 'māmsasya'.

**ekkasae chattīse vikkamarāyassa maraṇapattasa|
soraṭṭhe valahīe uppaṇṇo sevaḍo saṃgho ||11||**

ekaśate śaṭṭriṃśatsu⁶³ vikrama-rājasya maraṇaprāptasya |
saurāṣṭre vallabhyāṃ utpannaḥ sitapaṭaḥ saṃgaḥ ||11||

**siribhaddabāhugaṇiṇo sīso ṇāmeṇa saṃti āiriyo |
tassa ya sīso duṭṭho jīnacandaḍo maṃdacāritto**

śrībhadrabāhu-gaṇinaḥ śiṣyo nāmnā śānti ācāryaḥ |
tasya ca śiṣyo duṣṭo jīnacandro mandacāritraḥ ||12||

**teṇa kīyaṃ mayameyaṃ itthīnaṃ atthi tabbhava mokkho|
kevalaṇāṇiṇa puṇo aṇṇakkhāṇaṃ tahā roḍ||13||**

tena kīṭaṃ matam-etat strīṇāṃ asti tadbhave mokṣaḥ |
kevalajñānināṃ puṇaḥ annakkhāṇaṃ⁶⁴ tathā rogaḥ ||13||

aṃbarasahio vi jāi sījhaī vīrassa gabbhacārattaṃ|

para liṅge vi ya muttī phāsuyabhojjaṃ ca savvattha||14||

ambarasahitaḥ api yatīḥ sidhyati⁶⁵ vīrasya garbha-cāratvam |
paraliṅge ‘pi⁶⁶ ca muktiḥ prāśuka-bhojyaṃ ca sarvatra ||14||

aṇṇaṃ ca evamāi āgamaduṭṭhāi micchasatthāiṃ |

viraittā appāṇaṃ pariṭhaviyaṃ paḍhamae ṇarae ||15||

anyaṃ ca evamādiḥ āgamaduṣṭāni mithyā-śāstrāṇi |
viracya ātmānaṃ paristhāpitaṃ prathame narake ||15||

suvvayatitthe ujje khīrakadaṃbutti suddhasammatto|

sīso tassa ya duṭṭho putto vi ya pavvao vakko ||16||

suvrata-tīrthe ayodhyāyāṃ⁶⁷ kṣīrakadamba iti śuddhasammatto |
śiṣyaḥ tasya ca duṣṭaḥ putropi ca parvataḥ vaktraḥ ||16||

⁶³ Premi’s *chāyā* (1917) has ‘śaṭṭriṃśatsu varśasate’ from the Prakrit ‘chattīse varisasae’.

⁶⁴ Premi’s edition (1917) has ‘addakhāṇaṃ’ from the Prakrit ‘addakhāṇaṃ’.

⁶⁵ I corrected this form Premi’s rendering (1917) ‘sidhyati’.

⁶⁶ Premi’s *chāyā* (1917) has ‘paraliṅgepi’

⁶⁷ Premi (1917) gives here the word ‘upādhyāyah’ from the Prakrit ‘ujjho’.

vivarīyamayaṃ kiccā viṇāsiyaṃ savvasaṃjamaṃ loë |
tatto pattā savve sattamaṇarayaṃ mahāghoraṃ ||17||
viparītamataṃ kṛtvā vināśitaḥ sarva-saṃyamam⁶⁸ loke |
tataḥ prāptāḥ sarve saptama-narakaṃ mahāghoram ||17||

savvesu ya tittesu veṇaiyāṇaṃ samubbhavo atthi |
sajaḍā muṇḍiyasīsā sihiṇo ṇaggā ya keī ya ||18||
sarveṣu ca tīrtheṣu ca vainayikānāṃ samudbhavaḥ asti |
sa-jaṭā muṇḍita-śīrṣāḥ śikhino nagnāśca kiyantaśca ||18||

duṭṭhe guṇavaṃte vi ya samayā bhattīya savvadevāṇaṃ |
ṇamaṇaṃ daṇḍo vva jaṇe parikaliyaṃ tehi mūḍhehiṃ ||19||
duṣṭe guṇavati api ca samayā bhaktiśca sarvadevebhyaḥ |
nanaṃ daṇḍa iva jaṇe parikalitaṃ tair-mūḍhaiḥ ||19||

sirivīraṇāhatitthe bahussudo pāsasaṃghaṇisīso |
makkāḍapūraṇasāhu aṇṇāṇaṃ bhāsaē loe ||20||
śīrvīranātha-tīrthe bahuśrutaḥ pārśva-saṃgha-ḡaṇi-śiṣyaḥ |
maskari-pūraṇasādhuḥ⁶⁹ ajñānaṃ bhāṣate loke ||20||

aṇṇāṇādo mokkho ṇāṇaṃ ṇatthi tti muttajīvāṇaṃ |
puṇarāgamaṇaṃ bhamaṇaṃ bhavē bhavē ṇatthi jīvassa ||21||
ajñānato mokṣo jñānaṃ nāstīti mukta-jīvanām |
punar-āgamaṇaṃ bhramaṇaṃ bhavē bhavē nāsti jīvasya ||21||

ekko suddho buddho kattā savvassa jīvaloyassa |
suṇṇojjhāṇaṃ vaṇṇāvaraṇaṃ parisikkhiyaṃ teṇa ||22||
ekaḥ śuddho buddhaḥ karttā sarvasya jīvalokasya |
śūnyadhyānaṃ varṇāvaraṇaṃ pariśikṣitaṃ tena ||22||

⁶⁸ Premi (1917) has here ‘satyasamyamam’ from the Prakrit ‘saccasaṃjamaṃ’.

⁶⁹ Premi (1917) wrote ‘maskaripūranasādhuḥ’.

jiṇamaggabāhiraṃ jaṃ taccam saṃdarisiūṇo pāvamaṇo |

ṇiccaṇigoye patto satto majjesu vivihesu ||23||

jinamārga-bāhyaṃ yat tattvaṃ saṃdarśya pāpamanāḥ |

nityanigode prāptaḥ sakto madyeṣu vividheṣu ||23||

siripujjapādasīso dāviḍasaṃghassa kārago duṭṭho |

ṇāmeṇa vajjaṇaṃdī pāhuḍavedī mahāsatto ||24||

śrīpūjyapāda-śiṣyo drāviḍasaṃghasya kārako duṣṭaḥ |

nāmnā vajranandīḥ prābhṛtavedī mahāśāstraḥ⁷⁰ ||24||

appāsuyacaṇayāṇaṃ bhakkhaṇa-doso ṇa vajjio muṇiḥiṃ |

parirāiṃ vivariṃ viṣeṣiṃvaggaṇaṃ cojjaṃ ||25|| jummaṃ |

aprāśuka-caṇakāṇāṃ bhakṣaṇa-doṣo na varjitaḥ munīndraiḥ |

pariracitaṃ viparītaṃ viśeṣitaṃ vargaṇāṃ⁷¹ codyam ||25|| yugmam|

bīesu ṇatthi jīvo ubbhaṣaṇaṃ ṇatthi phāsugaṃ natthi |

sāvajjaṃ ṇa hu maṇṇāi ṇa gaṇāi gihakappiyaṃ aṭṭhaṃ ||26||

bījeṣu nāsti jīvaḥ udbhakṣaṇaṃ nāsti prāśukaṃ nāsti |

sāvadyaṃ na khalu manyate na gaṇati gṛhakaḥ pitam artham ||26||

kacchaṃ khetam vasahiṃ vāṇijjaṃ kāriūṇa jīvaṃto |

ṇhamto sīyalaṇīre pāvaṃ pauraṃ sa samajjedi ||27||

kacchaṃ kṣetraṃ vasatiṃ vāṇijyaṃ kārayitvā jīvan |

snātvā śītalāṇīre pāpaṃ pracuraṃ sa samācayati⁷² ||27||

paṃcasāe chattīse vikkamarāyassa maraṇapattassa |

dakkhīṇamahurājādo dāviḍasaṃgho mahāmoho ||28||

pañcaśate ṣaṭtrimśati⁷³ vikramarājasya maraṇa-prāptasya |

dakṣiṇa-mathurājātaḥ drāviḍasaṃgho mahāghoraḥ ||28||

kallāṇe varanayare duṇṇisae paṃca uttare jāde |

⁷⁰ Premi's *chāyā* (1917) has 'mahāsattvaḥ' from the Prakrit 'mahāsatto'.

⁷¹ I emended this word from Premi's rendering (1917) 'varggaṇaṃ'.

⁷² Premi (1917) writes the Sanskrit 'saṃcayati' from the Prakrit 'saṃjedi'.

⁷³ Premi's *chāyā* (1917) has 'ṣaḍvimśati' from the Prakrit 'chaṭhvīse'.

jāvaṇiyasaṃghabhāvo sirikalasādo hu sevaḍado ||29||

kalyāṇe varanagare dviśate⁷⁴ pañcottare jāte |

yāpaṇiyasaṃgha-bhāvaḥ śrīkalaśataḥ khalu sitapaṭataḥ ||29||

sirivīrasenaśiṣo jīnaseṇo sayalasaṭṭhaviṇṇāṇī |

siripaumaṇḍipacchā causaṃghasamuddharaṇdhīro ||30||

śrīvīrasena-śiṣyo jinasenaḥ sakala-śāstra-vijñānī |

śrīpadmanandi-paścāt catuḥsaṃgha-samuddharaṇa-dhīraḥ ||30||

tassa ya sīso guṇavaṃ guṇabhaddo divvaṇāṇaparipuṇṇo |

pakkhuvavāsaṭṭhamādi mahātavo bhāvaliṃgo ya ||31||

tasya ca śiṣyo guṇavān guṇabhadro divyajñāna-paripūrṇaḥ |

pakṣopavāsaḥ suṣṭhumatiḥ mahātapāḥ bhāvaliṅgaśca ||31||

teṇa puṇo vi ya miccuṃ ṇāūṇa muṇissa viṇayaseṇassa |

siddhaṃtaṃ ghoṣittā sayam gayam saggaloyassa ||32||

tena puṇaḥ api ca mṛtyuṃ jñātvā muneḥ viṇayasenasya |

siddhāntaṃ ghoṣayitvā svayaṃ gataḥ svargalokasya ||32||

āsī kumāraseṇo ṇaṃdiyade viṇayaseṇadikkhiyao |

saṇṇāsabhaṃjaṇeṇa ya aḡhiyapuṇadikkhao jādo||33||

āsītkumāraseno nanditaṭe viṇayaseṇadīkṣitaḥ |

saṃnyāsa-bhañjanena ca aḡhīta-punardīkṣo jātaḥ ||33||

parivajjiūṇa picchaṃ camaraṃ ghittūṇa mohakalideṇa |

ummaggaṃ saṃkaliyaṃ bāgaḍavisaesu savvesu ||34||

parivarjya picchaṃ camaraṃ ḡhītvā moha-kalitena |

unmārgaḥ saṃkalitaḥ bāgaḍa-viṣayeṣu sarveṣu ||34||

itthīṇaṃ puṇadikkhā khullayaloyassa vīracariyattaṃ |

kakkasakesaggaṇaṃ chaṭṭhaṃ ca guṇavvadaṃ nāma ||35||

⁷⁴ Premi's edition (1917) has 'saptaśate' from the Prakrit 'saṃttasae'. Actually Upadhye's rendering of the Prakrit 'duṇṇisae' is an emendation based on Premi's comments in his edition of the Darśanasāra. Premi comments that the dating 'sattasae' cannot be correct and therefore suggests to replace this word by 'duṇṇisae'. All manuscripts that Upadhye used for his edition use the word 'sattasae' or a variant of it (1933-34: 204).

strīnām punardīkṣā kṣullakalokasya vīracaryatvam |
karkaśa-keśa-grahaṇam ṣaṣṭham ca guṇavratam nāma ||35||

āyamasatthapurāṇam pāyacchitam ca aṇṇahā kiṃpi |
viraittā micchitam pavatṭiyam mūḍhaloesu ||36||
āgama-śāstra-purāṇam prāyaścittam ca anyathā kimapi |
viracya mithyātvam pravartitam mūḍha-lokeṣu ||36||

so samaṇasaṃghavajjho kumāraseṇo hu samayamicchato |
cattovasamo ruddo kaṭṭham saṃgham parūvedi ||37||
sa śramaṇasaṃgha-vadhyah kumārasenaḥ khalu samaya-mithyātvī |
tyaktopāśamo rudrah kāṣṭhasaṃgham prarūpayati ||37||

sattasae tevaṇṇe vikkamarāyassa maraṇapattassa |
ṇaṃdiyaḍe varagāme kaṭṭho saṃgho muṇeyavvo ||38||
saptaśate tripañcāśati vikramarājasya maraṇaprāptasya |
nanditaḥ varagrāme kāṣṭhasaṃgho jñātavyah ||38||

ṇaṃdiyaḍe varagāme kumāraseṇo ya satthaviṇṇāṇī |
kaṭṭho daṃsaṇabhaṭṭo jādo sallehaṇākāle ||39||
nanditaḥ varagrāme kumārasenaśca śāstravijñānī |
kāṣṭhaḥ darśanabhraṣṭo jātaḥ sallekhanākāle ||39||

tatto dusaetīde mahurāe māhurāṇa guruṇāho |
ṇāmeṇa rāmaseṇo ṇippicchaṃ vaṇṇiyaṃ teṇa ||40||
tato dviśate'tīte mathurāyām māthurāṇam gurunāthaḥ |
nāmnā rāmasenaḥ niṣpicchi varṇitam tena ||40||

sammattapayaḍimicchatam kahiyam jam jīṇimḍabimbesu |
appaparaṇiṭṭhiesu ya mamattabuddhīe parivasaṇam ||41||
samyaktva-prakṛti-mithyātvam kathitam yat jinendrabimbeṣu |
ātmapara-niṣṭhiteṣu ca mamatvabuddhyā parivasanam ||41||

eso mama hoī gurū avaro ṇatthi tti cittapariyaṇam |

sagagurukulāhimāṇo iyaresu vi bhaṅgakaṛaṇaṃ ca ||42||

eṣa mama bhavatu guruḥ aparō nāstīti cittaparicalanam |
svakagurukulābhīmāna itareṣu api bhaṅgakaṛaṇaṃ ca ||42||

jaī paumaṇaṃdiṇāho sīmaṇdharasāmidivvaṇāṇeṇa |

ṇa vibohaī to samaṇā kahaṃ sumaggaṃ payāṇaṃti ||43||

yadi padmanandināthaḥ sīmandharasvāmi-divyajñānena |
na vibodhati tarhi śramaṇā kathaṃ sumārgaṃ prajānanti ||43||

bhūyabalipupphayaṃtā dakkhiṇadese tathottare dhammaṃ |

jaṃ bhāsaṃti muṇiṃdā taṃ taccāṃ ṇivviyappaṇa ||44||

bhūtabali-puṣpadantau dakṣiṇadeśe tathottare dharmam |
yaṃ bhāṣete munīndrau tattattvaṃ nirvikalpena ||44||

dakkhiṇadese viṃjhe pukkhalaē vīracāṇdamuṇiṇāho |

aṭṭhārasaetīde bhillyasaṃghaṃ parūvedi ||45||

dakṣiṇadeśe vindhye puṣkare vīracandra-muninātha |
aṣṭadaśasate'tite bhillyakasaṃghaṃ prarūpayati ||45||

so ṇiyagacchaṃ kiccā paḍikamaṇaṃ taha ya bhiṇṇakiriyāo |

vaṇṇāyaraṇavivāī jīṇamaggaṃ suṭṭhu ṇihaṇedi ||46||

sa nijagacchaṃ kṛtvā pratikramaṇaṃ tathā ca bhinnakriyāyāḥ⁷⁵ |
vaṇṇācāraṇa-vivādī jīṇamārgaṃ suṣṭhu nihaniṣyati ||46||

tatto ṇa ko vi bhaṇiō guruṇaḥaraṇaṃgavehi micchatto |

paṇcamakālavasāṇe micchādaṃsaṇaviṇāsohi⁷⁶ ||47||

tato na ko'pi bhaṇito guru-gaṇadhara-puṅgavaīḥ mithyātvaḥ |
pañcamakālāvasāṇe⁷⁷ mithyādarśana⁷⁸ vināśo hi ||47||

⁷⁵ I interpreted the Prakrit word 'kiriyaō' as a singular ablative and therefore wrote 'kriyāyāḥ' where Premi's *chāyā* (1917) gives the word 'kriyāḥ'.

⁷⁶ This is an emendation by Upadhye himself based on three forms found in the manuscript: *micchāsīsaṇaviṇāse hi*, *micchādaṃsaṇaviṇāsehi* and *sicchamṭāṇa viṇāso hi*.

⁷⁷ I corrected Premi's rendering (1917) of 'pañcamakālavasāṇe' because of the sandhi between 'kāla' and 'avasāṇe'.

⁷⁸ Premi's *chāyā* (1917) has here instead 'śikṣakānām' from the Prakrit 'sicchamṭāṇaṃ'.

ekko vi ya mūlaguṇo vīraṃgayaṇāmao jāi hoī |
so appasudo vi paraṃ vīro vva jaṇaṃ paboheī ||48||
eka api ca mūlaguṇaḥ vīraṅgaja-nāmakāḥ yatiḥ bhaviṣyati |
sa alpaśruto'pi paraṃ vīra iva jaṇaṃ prabodhayiṣyati ||48||

puvvāyariyakayāiṃ gāhāiṃ samucciūṇa eyattha |
siridevasenaṇaṇiṇā dhārāe saṃvasaṃteṇa ||49||
pūrvācārya-kṛtā gāthāḥ samucciyatvā ekatra |
śrīdevasena-ṇaṇinā dhārāyāṃ saṃvasatā ||49||

raio daṃsaṇasāro hāro bhavvāṇa ṇavasae ṇaue |
siri pāsaṇāhagehe supavitte māhasuddhadasamīe ||50||
racito darśanasāro hāro bhavyānāṃ navaśate navate⁷⁹ |
śrīpārśvanātha-gehe supavitre⁸⁰ māghasuddha-daśamyāṃ ||50||

rūsau tūsau loō saccaṃ akkhaṃtayassa jīvassa |
kiṃ jūyabhae sādī vivajjiyavvā ṇariṃdeṇa ||51||
ruṣyatu tuṣyatu lokaḥ satyam-ākhyātakasya jīvasya⁸¹ |
kiṃ yūkābhayena śātī vivarjitavyā narendreṇa ||51||

⁷⁹ Premi's edition (1917) gives 'navake' from the Prakrit 'navae'.

⁸⁰ Premi's edition (1917) gives 'suvisuddhe' from the Prakrit 'suvisuddhe'.

⁸¹ Premi's *chāyā* (1917) gives 'sādhoḥ' from the Prakrit 'sāhussa'.

